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INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE, ENERGY DEPENDENCY, AND SECURITY 
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Many states lack domestic access to crucial energy supplies and must deal with the 
challenge of formulating an energy security policy that informs their relations with energy 
producing states. While secure and uninterrupted access to energy is crucial to state security 
and welfare, some states fail to implement energy security policies and remain dangerously 
dependent on a foreign supplier. In the post-Soviet region many states even actively resist 
attempts by the European Union and others to diversify their supplies. Why and under what 
conditions do states pursue energy security? Conversely, why do some highly dependent states fail to maximize 
their security vis-à-vis a dominant supplier?  
I argue that that to understand the complex nature of energy dependence and 
security it is necessary to look beyond energy markets to domestic political capture and 
institutional design. More specifically, I argue that initial reform choices guiding transition 
had long-lasting affects on the ability to make coherent policy choices. States that did not 
move away from Soviet era property rights empowered actors with an interest in maintaining 
the status quo of dependence. Others that instituted de facto democratic property rights to 
guide their energy transitions were able to block energy veto players and move towards a 
security maximizing diversification policy. I term this the Strong Players, Weak Rules 
Theory. Although the institutional legacies of the Soviet Union had long-lasting effects on all 
states in the region, I argued that all states were not doomed to path dependency. Change is 
possible in both directions: towards and away from the institutional reform that facilitates 
energy security. 
To illustrate this logic I first present an original dataset, which facilitates an 
innovative method of accurately measuring the complex nature of energy dependence in the 
region. To examine the conditions under which states choose various energy security 
policies, it is first necessary to understand the extent to which they are dependent on their 
primary supplier. I argue that current measures of energy dependence are inadequate, and 
miss out key political and country level variables including provisions in bi-lateral contracts 
overseeing the provision of natural gas supplies across borders and ownership structures of 
key downstream infrastructure. I first review the components of an original index of energy 
dependency and then present my findings both within case over time and comparatively 
across countries. 
In Chapter Four I present initial quantitative evidence of a correlation between weak 
property rights, corruption and energy dependence. Due the magnitude of data collection 
and methodological issues regarding measurement of institutional development, this chapter 
is just the first step towards showing a relationship between institutional development and 
energy outcomes. I first review measures of the dependent and independent variable and 
then present findings as well as areas for future research. 
In Chapters Five through Seven I evaluate three cases of energy dependence post-
1991: Ukraine, Lithuania and Hungary. Ukraine illustrates a classic case of Strong Players, 
Weak Rules. Lithuania shows how a state can break from path dependency to pursue energy 
security, and Hungary demonstrates how a state can regress from a policy of energy 
diversification to one of dependency. 
I find that institutional legacies of the Soviet period have long-lasting effects energy 
security even decades after independence. I further find that globalization has provided new 
avenues for corruption and reinforced Soviet patterns of elite resource distribution that can 
hamper a state’s ability to maximize its security. I conclude this study with broader 
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Chapter 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Our relations with Russia will now be poisoned by gas for a long time to come.” 
-President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko1 
 
 
After the disintegration of Russia’s Soviet empire, as former satellite states 
abandoned it for the West, the Russian bear was wounded, but he did not remain toothless. 
While the Soviet Union may have lost its grip over the political destiny of its former empire, 
Russia has maintained enormous power through another legacy: energy. By 2006, Russia’s 
state-owned energy conglomerate Gazprom was the largest energy company in the world, 
with reserves larger than those of BP, Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobile combined. 
Gazprom produced over one fifth of the world’s natural gas supplies, and owned the world’s 
largest pipeline network, including control over the extensive transit network that brought 
Europe’s energy supplies to market. Moreover, Gazprom supplied over one third of 
Europe’s energy overall, and up to 100 percent in many of its former satellite states. 
Although the Soviet Union itself disintegrated, its institutional legacies did not disappear, 
and continue to have a profound impact on contemporary security outcomes, as energy sits 
at the nexus of both economic development and security. 
States in Eastern Europe that once celebrated independence from the Soviets left 
themselves vulnerable to Russian interests through immense dependence on Russian 
commodities. While some states invested significant resources in exploring alternative 
supplies and other energy security measures, others subverted attempts at diversification in 
favor of dangerous dependence.  In 2012 The Polish Geological Institute published a study 																																																								
1 Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. “Belarus: Moscow and Minsk Back Down from Gas 
Crises as Temporary Supplies Resume,” RFERL Newsline, February 19, 2004.  
 2 	
estimating that between 346 and 768 billion cubic meters (bcm) of recoverable natural gas 
supplies lay under Polish soil.2 Poland, which had long been highly dependent on Gazprom 
for its energy supplies, celebrated the discovery of domestic resources as a foreign policy 
coup, with then prime minister Donald Tusk proclaiming, “After years of dependence on 
our large neighbor, today we can say that my generation will see the day when we will be 
independent in the area of gas and we will be setting the terms!”3 When it was time for gas 
contract renegotiations with Gazprom, Poland used its newfound leverage to file a claim 
against the company with the Stockholm Arbitration Court and secured a price cut of nearly 
20%, or about $1 billion a year.4 Concurrently, Poland began an aggressive campaign to 
reduce its dependence on Russia via other channels, investing in the construction of a 
liquefied natural gas terminal on the Baltic Sea, which would enable it to buy gas from other 
producers and increase infrastructure connections with neighboring Germany.  
Although Polish public opinion of shale gas was overwhelmingly positive,5 in June of 
2013 residents of the town of Zurawlow blocked access to the gas exploration site, claiming 
that US energy giant Chevron (which had received an exploration permit from the Polish 
government) was poisoning its water and ruining its farmland. The protest lasted 400 days 
and garnered international press coverage as “Occupy Chevron.” In the end, Poland was 
																																																								
2 Polish Geological Institute. “Assessment of Shale Gas and Shale Oil Resources of the 
Lower Paleozoic Baltic-Podlasie-Lublin Basin in Poland, First Report,” Warsaw, March 
2012. 
 
3 Donald Tusk, quoted in Nelson, Arthur. “Poland’s Shale Gas Revolution Evaporates in the 
Face of Environmental Protest,” The Guardian, January 12, 2015. 
 
4 Marson, James and Joe Parkinson. “In Reversal, Neighbors Squeeze Gazprom over Natural 
Gas Prices,” The Wall Street Journal, May 1, 2013. 
 
5 82% of Polish respondents were in favor of shale gas exploration. Marocci & Fedirko, 
2013. 
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forced to abandon its shale gas dreams and Chevron withdrew from the project. But in a 
twist that emphasizes the crucial geostrategic importance of resource dependence, several 
sources revealed that Occupy Chevron was not what it appeared. While the protest did 
eventually garner the support of the Green party and other environmental activists, initial 
protests were not spontaneous, but rather financed by Gazprom, which had clear interest in 
destroying Polish shale ambitions. In an interview in Warsaw on March 9, 2015, member of 
the Russian Duma Ilya Ponomarev claimed, 
Gazprom is financing environmentalists in the US and Europe. They are paying high 
profile people to say fracking is dangerous. Russia Today dedicates time to saying 
fracking is dangerous. Protests are financing through Gazprom—financed and 
affiliated—in Lithuania, Poland and Bulgaria.6  
 
But even after the collapse of a potential European shale gas revolution, Poland remained 
committed to pursuing a costly policy of diversification away from Russian commodities, 
investing in the so-called “Baltic Pipe” that would link Norway’s North Sea gas fields directly 




Photo: Adrian Stadniki, 2013. 																																																								
6 Author Interview with Ilya Ponomarev, Warsaw, March 9, 2015.  
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However not all energy dependent states are committed to decreasing dependence 
on a dominant supplier. Although the European Union’s (EU) poorest member state, 
Bulgaria, pays one of the highest prices for Russian gas supplies on which it is nearly 85% 
dependent, Bulgarian policymakers have neglected to pursue even the most basic energy 
security policies. At the same time as Bulgaria’s PM Boris Borisov imposed a moratorium on 
shale gas exploration, Bulgarian officials also dismissed plans to construct an underground 
gas storage facility that would have decreased the chances of supply disruption, and managed 
fluctuations in peak demand. The refusal to build the gas storage facility was especially 
puzzling considering the project had been heavily promoted by both Brussels and 
Washington, and that Sofia had been offered substantial European Union funds to subsidize 
construction. Despite visits to Sofia by then US Secretary of State John Kerry on January 15, 
2015 and former British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond on January 14, 2015 who urged 
the Bulgarians to move forward with the project, Borisov’s government scrapped the project 
with no explanation. 
Even more striking is the Ukrainian failure to reform its energy security policy, 
despite two major gas crises in 2006 and 2009 that left Europeans from Paris to Istanbul 
without heat for over 19 days in January, a crisis symptomatic of Ukraine’s dependence on 
Russian gas supplies and their highly contentious diplomatic relationship. Shockingly, in the 
wake of both crises, Ukraine actually increased its dependence on Russian gas through a 
serious of unfavorable gas contracts that would eventually land former PM Yulia 
Tymoshenko in prison on charges of treason. 
Many states lack domestic access to crucial energy supplies and must deal with the 
challenge of formulating an energy security policy that informs their relations with energy 
 5 	
producing states. While secure and uninterrupted access to energy is crucial to state security 
and welfare, some states fail to formulate and implement energy security policies altogether. 
Instances of neighboring states with similar levels of dependence who have wildly different 
energy policies abound. For example, Lithuania, a state that was previously 100% dependent 
on Russia for its natural gas supplies, has in recent years made great strides towards 
decreasing energy dependence on its dominant supplier, Russia. In contrast, Latvia has 
increased its already significant dependence on Russian gas and even rejected Lithuanian 
efforts to pursue a regional Baltic gas ring.  
In sum, Poland remains committed to diversifying away from Russian supplies and 
Bulgaria actively resists efforts to increase its energy security. Neighboring Latvia and 
Lithuania have also taken divergent energy policy paths despite identical situations of high 
dependency on Russia. Why and under what conditions do states pursue energy security? Conversely, why 
do some highly dependent states fail to maximize their security vis-à-vis a dominant supplier? These are the 
questions my research seeks to explain.  
Energy Security and National Security 
 
Understanding the dynamics of energy security has crucial implications for the fields 
of international relations and comparative politics, as well as policymaking. Even though  
most developed and developing countries rely heavily on petroleum products to fuel their 
economies, 73% of the world’s total oil reserves are held by just seven countries: Venezuela, 
Saudi Arabia, Canada, Iran, Iraq, Russia and Kuwait. 7 Perhaps even more crucially, over 
58% of the world’s total natural gas reserves are held by just four countries: Iran, Russia, 
																																																								
7 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2016.  
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Qatar and Turkmenistan.8 Until the US shale gas revolution, many of the world’s largest 
economies did not have substantial recoverable domestic resources, and yet have continued 
to pursue a hydrocarbon based development strategy. Although natural gas reserves are 
highly concentrated in the hands of a few suppliers, it is also the world’s fastest growing fuel, 
and will remain “the dominant form of energy over the period to 2035, meeting 60% of the 
projected increase in demand and accounting for almost 80% of the world’s total energy 
supplies by 2035.”9 This imbalance between producers and consumers has critical real world 
consequences: in 1973 the United States assumed that its energy supply was secure, but 
following US support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War, the incentives of the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries changed dramatically, resulting in a 
severe oil crisis that caused economic crisis and influenced the coming decades of American 
foreign policy.  
The US reaction to the oil crisis -- putting the pursuit of secure access to 
hydrocarbons at the forefront of its foreign policy agenda -- is in line with the understanding 
of most international relations scholarship on energy security. Because natural resources are 
crucial for powering both an economy and armed forces, energy dependence has long been 
considered a major security problem, with most theorists advocating a policy of 
diversification. After deciding to make the switch from Welsh coal to oil supplies from 
Persia on the eve of World War I, Winston Churchill famously declared, “Safety and security 
in oil, lie in variety and variety alone.” In his seminal work on power and international trade, 
Albert O. Hirschman observes that commerce can become an alternative to war by 
																																																								
8 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016, p. 20. 
 
9 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016, p. 2. 
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providing a method of coercion outside of the realm of armed conflict.10 This tenet is 
exacerbated by the fact that the trade of natural resources, which are essential to state 
survival and security, can be highly politicized. The logical assumption is that states reliant 
on energy imports will seek to reduce dependence on any one upstream provider so that 
they may avoid being “held hostage”. Hirschman argues that countries menaced by a 
possible interruption of trade have the alternative of diverting its trade to a third country. 
Therefore, states wishing to conserve their influence derived through foreign trade should 
take precautions against this. Downstream states should seek to diversify their supply of 
energy across a broad spectrum of suppliers, thereby reducing the level of dependence, and 
possible vulnerability to coercion, on any one upstream state. Conversely, upstream states 
should attempt to maintain dependence by driving others out of the market, offering 
incentives or institutionalizing trade to reduce flexibility. 
The importance of reducing dependency on a foreign partner is echoed in a plethora 
of international relations literature (Krasner, 1999; Kirschner, 1999; Yergin, 2006). 
Economics literature points out however that states may face a tradeoff between price and 
dependence, and thus can help us understand the conundrum facing energy dependent states 
but does little to help distinguish the conditions under which states choose to pursue 
diversification (Williamson, 1971; 1985). Other recent political economy literature seeks to 
explain persistent dependency by arguing that corporate interests subsume the larger 
concerns of the state (Abdelal, 2013; 2015; Stulberg, 2015). Existing accounts in political 
science and economic literature fail to address why only some states pursue energy security 
because they do not account for the complex relationship between natural gas trade, foreign 																																																								
10 Hirschman, Albert O. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1945. 
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policy and the simple matter of transit of a tangible good. Most notably, the theories that 
account for any variation are economic in nature and disregard the role that political factors 
play in the distribution of resources. In contrast, popular theories predict uniform behavior 
for producers and consumers. Why have some relationships been characterized by 
competitive resource nationalism, but others as examples of strengthening interdependence 
and regional cooperation?  
Interestingly, Hirschman notes that any switching of trade would be rendered 
impossible by a monopoly of trade imposed by one nation upon another, such as in a 
colonial system. In many ways, the fixed nature of point-to-point infrastructure that 
historically dominated the gas market mimics a colonial system because it made seeking out 
alternative trading partners difficult. Long-term bi-lateral contacts between producers and 
consumers included stipulations such as “take-or-pay” clauses that imposed strict fines on 
the consumer states if they did not consume contractually obligated volumes. Furthermore, 
these contracts often contained “destination clauses” which stipulated that consumer states 
could not re-sell or distribute gas purchased to others.  
Diversification 
 
But despite the institutional strategies and barriers to potential energy security, many 
states face more fundamental challenges such as geography and technology. Because natural 
gas is both highly flammable and pressurized, it is difficult to handle and transport, thus 
requiring fixed infrastructure, long-term investment and point-to-point delivery.  Many states 
can only receive gas through expensive pipelines that take the gas from the point of 
extraction in the upstream state to a hub within their borders. There are several unique 
characteristics of pipeline and transit economics that result in of structural challenges. The 
nature of pipelines is such that they are subject to economies of scale, long-life cycles, large 
 9 	
up front investment, natural monopolies and tyrannies of distance. 11  Generally, the 
construction and management of a natural gas pipeline involves multiple stakeholders, who 
are generally left to their own devices to solve conflicts of interests. Further, the contracts 
that stipulate property rights and distribute profits among stakeholders and suppliers fall 
under different national legal jurisdictions, making it difficult to adjudicate settlements. The 
risks of pipelines for both upstream, transit and downstream states are compounded by the 
fact that the owners of pipelines are not always the owner of the commodity or even the 
largest investor. Because the cost of operation is much cheaper than the cost of 
construction, there are incentives for delivery to continue even if the initial return on 
investment is not recouped. For landlocked states that do not have access to ports and 
therefore alternative LNG supplies, this means that energy dependent states often have to 
rely on just one supplier. 
However, diversification of energy does not only concern diversification of supply. 
States with limited access to alternative suppliers can increase their energy security by 
increasing storage capacity for reserves, investing in domestic transportation infrastructure, 
increasing energy efficiency, and by lobbying for and investing in “reverse flow” technology. 
Recent legislation by the EU mandated that pipeline operators install switchback 
mechanisms so that Western EU countries could provide Eastern countries with natural gas 
from their own reserves in case of emergency. Following the Ukraine crisis in 2014, 
Ukraine’s capacity to import natural gas from its Western European neighbors increased to 
40mcm and has been receiving (Russian) natural gas from Slovakia and Hungary.12 Finally, 
																																																								
11 Stulberg, Adam. “Eurasia’s Pipeline Tangle:  Practical Lessons from Cross-Border Pipeline 
Operations,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 3, 2011. 
 
12 “Reverse Flows Shore Up Ukrainian Gas Supplies,” The American Interest, January 25, 2015. 
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states can increase their energy security by reducing the proportion of natural gas usage in 
their energy mix, through an increase in renewables, nuclear or fuel solids (coal, biomass).  
 
 
Potential Methods of Diversification: 
1. Increased mix of energy producers 
2. Increased underground storage capacity 
3. Increased LNG infrastructure 
4. Increased proportion of domestic fuels (coal, renewables, nuclear) in national 
fuel mix 
5. Investment in transit infrastructure and reverse flow capacity 
6. Increased energy efficiency 
 
Nevertheless, despite the variety of means through which states can increase their energy 





Not only is unraveling the puzzle of international energy relations and domestic level 
energy policy formulation crucial to increasing our theoretical understanding of state 
behavior, but it also has important policy implications. Since the political crisis in Ukraine 
over economic alignments, strategic consequences, and security concerns led to the ouster of 
pro-Russia president Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, the question of whether 
European countries would have access to secure energy supplies has once again been at the 
forefront of the agenda for policymakers and the popular media alike. Although an 11th hour 
detail brokered by the EU between Russia and Ukraine guaranteed an uninterrupted flow of 
 11 	
natural gas to Europe through Ukrainian pipelines before the start of the winter season13, 
deliberations have been fraught with animosity, mistrust and pessimism about the future of 
European security and East-West relations.  
Understanding the conditions under which states pursue diversification or 
dependence also has significant implications for US and European foreign policy in Eastern 
Europe. As the European Union continues to invest significant resources towards 
diversification programs in its new member states, a more nuanced exploration of the 
efficacy of these programs is crucial. One critical finding of this project is that under certain 
circumstances EU aid may disrupt the cross-national investment networks that support 
Russian foreign policy goals in the near abroad. With tensions at their highest levels since the 
Cold War, the intersection between foreign and energy policy has become more important 
than ever and demonstrates the ways in which the interface between economics and national 




I argue that to better understand under what conditions states choose diversification 
and under what conditions states choose dependence, it is necessary to look beyond energy 
markets to domestic political capture and institutional design. In this project, I argue that 
property rights institutions and newly empowered strong actors contributed to a powerful 
institutional lock-in that has restricted the choices available to states in regards to energy 
policy. Looking at the period of 1989-1991 is crucial for understanding contemporary 
outcomes of European energy security. In many cases, the initial reform choices set states 																																																								
13 Rapoza, Kenneth. “Gazprom Gets Paid, but Russian Gas Bill Still Due in Ukraine,” Forbes, 
November 4, 2014. 
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onto a path that determined their ability to make coherent policy choices decades later. 
However, despite the wide variation in the types of political actors in place at time of 
transition, all transitioning states had to design new de jure property rights to guide the 
process of economic transformation. States that instituted exclusive property rights which 
limited access to capital and productive fixed assets empowered strong actors who gained 
exclusive access to capital and assets, including those formerly owned by the state such as 
the energy sector. The large majority of these states have dependence policies today. Ukraine 
is one of the most notable cases of states instituting exclusive property rights, which created 
a group of actors with veto power over energy policy but little interest in the energy security 
of the state. In contrast, when states put in place de facto democratic property rights, which 
set out clear and enforced rules to guide the process of transition, strong actors were unable 
to become energy veto players. Most of these states today have policies of energy 
diversification. But contemporary outcomes are also shaped by the new globalized economy 
under which old institutional arrangements thrive. Throughout this dissertation I discuss the 
new tools of financial globalization including shell corporations, tax havens and complex 
sequence acquisitions that facilitate corruption and weaken the ability of the state to control 
policymaking. I argue that financial globalization interacts with property rights regimes to 
facilitate new avenues of kleptocracy. In particular, the replacement of petty bureaucratic 
corruption with crony capitalism abets Russian foreign policy aims in the region and 
hampers governance. Further, I argue that to fully understand the mechanisms by which 
energy decisions are made it is crucial to pay close attention to the role that private citizens 
and organizations play in international affairs. 
 I demonstrate empirically that weak political institutions lead to a relative weakening 
of power in the international sphere and corruption. This dissertation goes beyond existing 
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literature on corruption to examine the ways in which stagnant reforms and failed 
governance influence insecurity, but crucially this is not a story about democracy vs. 
authoritarianism. Many states with relatively robust democratic institutions can remain stuck 
on a path of energy dependence. As explained in the following chapter, the energy sector is 
particularly vulnerable to corruption and thus can be highly resistant to change even in the 
most radical reformers. I argue instead that it is the crucial intersection of de facto property 
rights, structure of the ownership of the market and the extent to which rule of law actually 
has control over these structures that is indicative of outcomes. 
The implications of the effect of property rights on the physical security of the state 
are underdeveloped in current literature. Because energy sits at the juncture of economic 
development and security, a lack of institutional oversight into who controls policy over and 
access to resources can leave states vulnerable to coercion. This weakness can explain why 
states do not pursue rational security maximizing behavior even when they are insecure. This 
dissertation will explore in depth the conditions under which states elect to maximize their 




 For the purposes of this study, I restrict my examination to Eurasia,14 which relies on 
Russia as its dominant supplier. There are several reasons why this region makes a good case 
through which to examine variation in energy security outcomes. The Eurasian gas trade is 
the largest by volume in the world, and relies largely on Russia for its entire supply (over 																																																								
14 I use the term “Eurasia” to refer to Europe, Turkey and the Caucasus. Central Asia is 
excluded from the study because they do not purchase gas directly from Russia, instead 
relying on complicated barter arrangements and gas swaps. All countries in the region to 
which Gazprom sells gas directly are included in this study, but Gazprom’s Asian partners 
are excluded. 
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30% of European gas is supplied directly by Gazprom). Further, the historical development 
of Eurasian the gas trade left many states in the position of being both highly reliant on 
hydrocarbons for their economies, and yet lacking domestic resources with which to fuel 
them. Because the gas trade was developed during the Soviet era, the period of transition 
between 1989-1991 provides me with a methodological starting point from which to 
examine divergence in energy policies after independence. As will be elaborated further in a 
later section, the nature of Soviet central planning and infrastructure development left many 
post-Communist states, and even some Western European states, without crucial linkages to 
each other, or to potential alternative suppliers. As a result, many newly independent states 
were faced with the task of completely reorganizing their energy sectors and developing an 
energy security strategy for the first time. The critical juncture of transition therefore allows 
me to compare the success, failure or even lack of energy security over time. 
 As Russia reasserts itself on the world stage beyond its former sphere of influence, 
understanding the mechanisms by which she exacts foreign policy concessions is crucial. 
Beyond any methodological justification, examining the legacies of Russia’s Soviet empire 
and its outcomes on contemporary security is an important venture in its own right. 
Additionally, explaining the puzzling sub-rational behavior of energy dependent states with 
theories of international relations and comparative politics is crucial because this is one of 
the major questions in both political economy and security studies.  
 I restrict my project to the examination of Gazprom’s consumers in Eurasia, which 
range from states that are 100% dependent on Russia for its natural gas supplies, to those 




Figure 1-0-1: Universe of Cases: Gazprom's Eurasian Clients 






















Table 1-1: European Dependence on Natural Gas 
Share of Natural 
Gas in Total 
Primary Energy 
Supply (2012)   
Dependence on 
Russian Natural Gas 
2012 (Calculated by 
share of imports from 
Russia in total supply)   
Belarus 58% Estonia 100% 
Netherlands 42% Finland 100% 
Italy 39% Latvia 100% 
Ukraine 37% Lithuania 100% 
Slovakia 26% Moldova 100% 
Slovenia 36% Serbia 100% 
Hungary 36% Belarus 99% 
UK 35% Czech Republic 97% 
Romania 31% Slovakia 97% 
Croatia 30% Bulgaria 85% 
Ireland 30% Ukraine 62% 
Latvia 29% Austria 61% 
Slovakia 26% Greece 60% 
Luxembourg 26% Poland 53% 
Belgium 25% Slovenia 45% 
Spain 23% Hungary 34% 
Austria 23% Germany  31% 
Germany 22% Italy 25% 
Denmark 20% Luxembourg  24% 
Portugal 18% Romania 18% 
Norway 17% France 16% 
Czech Republic 16% Croatia 12% 
France 15% Netherlands  3% 
Greece 15% Belgium 0% 
Poland 14% Denmark 0% 
Bulgaria 14% Ireland 0% 
Switzerland  12% Norway 0% 
Estonia 10% Portugal 0% 
Finland 9% Spain 0% 
Sweden  2% Sweden 0% 
    Switzerland 0% 
 
  UK 0% 
Source: International Energy Agency 2013a. 
 
 Despite the fact that in this project I focus on Eurasia and the particular legacy of 
post-Communist energy and institutions, the theories generated here also apply to other 
 17 	
regions, as well as other quasi-regionally traded commodities. In the concluding chapter of 
this dissertation I apply my theory to the case of natural gas dependency in Israel, and 
explore the generalizability of my findings to the case of water in Central Asia. I find that de 
facto property rights and subsequent corruption around the commodities sectors has 
contributed to sub-optimal security outcomes by empowering actors whose interests are in 
enriching themselves rather than in the wellbeing of the state. 
 This project contrasts the experiences of the development of energy security policy 
in other regions, highlighting the historical development of the European gas trade, legacies 
of Soviet economic planning and their enduring influence on contemporary outcomes. 
Beyond the obvious policy implications for Eurasian states, the evidence generated in this 
dissertation has relevance to US foreign policy in the European community and the former 




The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. In the following section I 
review the historical legacy of the Soviet-European gas trade to provide background on the 
starting point of the cases and to provide context on the sorts of institutional arrangements 
that governed the distribution of resources for nearly 40 years prior to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. In Chapter Two I present my Strong Players, Weak Rules Theory, positing 
that a lack of energy security can be explained by the failure to substantially reform de facto 
property rights governing the distribution of energy resources. Where Soviet era property 
rights were not disrupted post-transition, strong actors with an interest in profiting off the 
state blocked reform. This chapter discusses how the theory relates to existing literature and 
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derives testable hypotheses from my theory and the alternative explanations. Finally, this 
chapter outlines the methodology and case selection strategy used in this dissertation. 
Chapter Three presents the contents of my original dataset, gathered through 
eighteen months of fieldwork in the region, which facilitates an innovative method of 
accurately measuring the complex nature of energy dependence in the region. To examine 
the conditions under which states choose various energy security policies, it is first necessary 
to understand the extent to which they are dependent on their primary supplier. I argue that 
current measures of energy dependence are inadequate, and miss out key political and 
country level variables including provisions in bi-lateral contracts overseeing the provision of 
natural gas supplies across borders and ownership structures of key downstream 
infrastructure. In this chapter, I present a new index of energy dependence, using data 
gathered from over 300 elite interviews. I first review the components of the index and then 
present my findings both within case over time and comparatively across countries. 
In Chapter Four I provide a first step towards generalizability, testing the validity of 
my hypotheses using quantitative analysis. These findings provide empirical support for the 
theory and also provide evidence that the findings of this project are generalizable. I measure 
institutionalization of property rights at time of transition and then at critical junctures using 
existing measures of property rights (amount of money in the banking sector, investor 
protection indexes) and corruption. Using my original dataset, I demonstrate empirically 
through a structural equation model that states with de facto Soviet era property rights 
regimes are more energy dependent than those with better quality property rights 
institutions. This chapter represents a first step towards a full-scale quantitative analysis that 
in the next stage of the project. 
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In Chapter Five I evaluate the mechanisms of my theory through the case of energy 
in post-Soviet Ukraine. I show that Ukraine did not substantially restructure its property 
rights regime during transition and that privatization empowered energy veto players with an 
interest in maintaining ties with their main supplier (Moscow). Without a strong institutional 
frame to guide the privatization process, corrupt practices grew around a number of 
industries, but particularly the energy sector. Soviet era corruption not only continued, it 
proliferated under the new market conditions. I review Ukraine’s changing energy security 
over time and find that as my theory predicts, Ukraine has been unable to pursue a policy of 
diversification due to a continued nomenklatura property rights regime that mismanaged 
privatization and empowered energy veto players with deep connections to Moscow. 
Further, I find that despite dramatically changing international conditions and incentives, 
Ukraine’s failure to substantially improve its energy security is due to domestic level variables 
rather than the traditional explanation of an aggressive producer. 
In Chapter Six I examine post-Soviet Lithuania as an outlying case. My theory 
predicts that states that failed to radically restructure their property rights regimes during 
transition are unlikely to pursue a policy of diversification because patterns of Soviet era 
energy efficiencies are reproduced through existing institutions. Lithuania however was able 
to break from path dependence due to a number of factors, including a volatile political 
system, an overarching European Union level energy policy that coincided with Lithuanian 
political actors’ aims, significant material resources, and environmental concerns of EU 
citizens. The Lithuanian case demonstrates that even in the most aggressive post-Soviet 
reformers, an unofficial nomenklatura property rights regime remains a huge impediment 
towards pursuing the most basic state security policies. 
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Chapter Seven examines the case of Hungary, which is a crucial case because it 
allows me to see if this case truly deviates from my theory and to explore an additional 
possible causal mechanism. Hungary should be a disconfirming case because it has the 
anticipated outcome but lacks the independent variables and long-term initial conditions of 
my theory. Hungary actually turns out to be an excellent case because it demonstrates how 
post-independence economic and political policies can affect energy security even in the 
absence of a strong Soviet legacy. Further, given my two-tiered theory of immediate 
explanatory variables paired with longer term facilitating conditions it is possible to explain 
outcomes in Hungary through a deep examination of post-1991 domestic and international 
developments that allowed political opportunists to portray diversification as a cosmopolitan 
agenda seeking to undermine Hungarian sovereignty. Within the context of the global rise in 
populism, the Hungarian case provides interesting theoretical and policy implications on the 
effect of populism on energy policy, particularly diversification and green measures that are 
associated with a liberal cosmopolitan agenda.  
 Chapter Eight concludes the dissertation by summarizing the findings of my 
dissertation and outlining implications for both further research and policy. In addition, I 
also present a summary of the case of natural gas in Israel to show the applicability of my 
theory beyond the European context. Finally, I discuss the applicability of my theory to 
other commodities including water. 
 
 The Legacy of the Soviet Energy Trade 
 
 In many ways, patterns of energy trade and policy in the European sphere have their 
origins in the way interests survived or reorganized following the collapse of the previous 
system: The Soviet Union and a divided Europe. Prior to the 1970s, and despite having 
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some of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world, the Soviet Union was a net importer of 
hydrocarbons. Guided by what the fear of a potential energy shortage, Brezhnev launched a 
campaign to increase domestic production of natural gas by 50 percent over five years. The 
goal of the five-year plan was for natural gas to replace oil as the chief source of hard-
currency income through the 1980s and was achieved by a massive 45 billion-ruble 
investment into new gas fields in Siberia.15 The program did lead to significant increases in 
production, but more importantly helped establish the energy sector as the Soviet Union’s 
greatest link to the West. The huge growth in energy exports fostered the establishment of a 
number of important pipelines running from Soviet Russia to Europe that are still in use 
today, including the “Brotherhood” pipeline (1967) transecting Ukraine and Slovakia 
through to the Czech Republic, Germany, France, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Italy and 
Balkans.  
 Almost immediately following the decision to establish gas linkages with the West, 
European states viewed the Soviet gas opportunity not as a cooperative endeavor, but as a 
competitive one. As early as 1964, the Soviets identified both Italy and Austria as promising 
consumers: both were already large scale users of natural gas and were expected to face a gas 
deficit as early as 1970.16 By virtue of its size, Italy was regarded as the most important 
potential market, and Italy was anxious to take the lead on any project over Austria, and thus 
the Soviets and Italian state gas monopoly ENI began collaboration on the potential “Trans-
European Pipeline” in 1964. However, upon hearing the news that the Italians might take 
the lead role in securing Soviet gas supplies, the Austrians, desperate for access to gas 																																																								
15 Gustafson, Thane. “The Soviet Gas Campaign: Politics and Policy in Soviet Decision 
making,” Project AIR FORCE Report, RAND, June 1983. 
 
16 Hogselius, Per. Red Gas: Russia and the Origins of European Energy Dependence. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan 2013. Pp. 38. 
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supplies, hatched a plan to take advantage of NATO’s embargo on pipe exports to the 
Soviet Union. Having already profited from the embargo by forming alliances with troubled 
German firms, the Austrians envisioned a plan by which they would supply German pipes to 
the Soviets for the Italian pipeline and encourage Moscow to include Austria in its new 
export scheme.  
 Austria received more good news when word spread that both Hungary and 
Yugoslavia (partners on the Trans-European Pipeline) were reluctant to contribute financing. 
Hungary had just begun domestic exploration for natural gas, and Yugoslav President Josep 
Tito was more interested in pursuing access to Algerian supplies rather than Soviet ones.17 
Austrian state owned company the Austrian Mineral Oil Administration (OMV) at once put 
forward the idea of a Czechoslovakian-Austrian transit route as a cheaper and more reliable 
alterative. The Soviets were interested, especially since there was the possibility that the 
Austrian pipes might be paid for through in kind gas exports to Austria rather than scarce 
hard currency. As expected, ENI was less than thrilled about this new option, especially as it 
had envisioned itself the hub for Soviet gas in Western Europe. In October 1966, large 
delegations from ENI and OMV visited Moscow independently and the outcome of this 
meeting was made clear through an official visit to Austria by Soviet head of state Nikolai 
Podgorny, formally confirming that Austria would participate in the Soviet-Italian pipeline 
and that Austria, in return, would receive Soviet natural gas.18 In this manner, Austria 
became the first capitalist country to import Soviet gas and by 1971 was nearly 50 percent 
dependent on them for gas supplies. In the ensuing years Italy, France even the FDR 
																																																								
17 Ibid. pp. 52 
 
18 Ibid. pp. 53 
 23 	
became consumers of Soviet gas and for the next 23 years received supplies without much 
derivation from contractual obligations. 
 Along with the spectacular growth of energy trade with Europe as a whole, the 
increase in gas production also led to a systemic pattern of gas dependence for the Eastern 
bloc countries, the legacies of which are still in place today.  Interestingly, although the 
Soviet goal was to encourage multilateral energy cooperation with the Eastern bloc states, 
this was difficult because member states could not agree on how to collaborate. Instead, 
energy relations remained bilateral relationships in which European states were provided 
with subsidized energy in return for better relations with Moscow.19 One of the first bilateral 
agreements for Soviet gas was with Czechoslovakia, which already had existing pipeline 
infrastructure, and through which the Austrian pipeline extension would be built. Due to a 
the rapidly growing popularity of gas as a fuel, the Czechs were excited to take advantage of 
the Austrian opportunity and signed a contract with the Soviets in December 1964. 
Although the Czechs had originally hoped to balance the Soviet gas with Algerian supplies, 
negotiations with Sonartech (the Algerian state energy company) collapsed and thus the 
Czechs set out to negotiate for additional Soviet supplies, leaving them highly dependent on 
Russian gas bound through the Austrian corridor.20 
 Overall, Moscow’s energy relations with Warsaw Pact states was characterized by 
flexible pricing so that the Soviets could discriminate bilaterally with individual states.21 This 
meant that Moscow could use its flexible pricing policy as a tool of foreign policy, punishing 																																																								
19 Balmaceda, Margarita. The Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania between 
Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013 p. 44. 
 
20 Hogselius, Red Gas, Pp. 90. 
 
21 Marrese, Michael. “CMEA: Effective by Cumbersome Political Economy,” International 
Organization 40, 1986. 
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and rewarding its allies accordingly. In addition to flexible pricing, Moscow also used a 
number of other strategies such as the barter of energy supplies for transit services, pipeline 
construction and even for trade of consumer goods not available in the USSR. As a result, 
the energy trade was extremely opaque and tied up with numerous other aspects of the 
economic and political system. Further, the nature of this relationship left a legacy of 
mistrust and distorted prices, with both sides claiming they were being exploited.22  
 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, patterns of the energy trade went 
through a period of upheaval. Several countries involved in the gas trade and transit of gas 
now ceased to exist. For example, Germany had imported Soviet gas in cooperation with the 
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, but now found that the pipeline through which it received 
its gas passed through five new states: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic. Perhaps one of the largest implications of the collapse on the gas trade and 
ensuing state energy policies was the breakup of the Soviet gas giant Mingazprom, which was 
divided up into national entities post 1990. While the Russian portion of Mingazprom was 
transformed into RAO Gazprom, dividing up the Soviet gas grid was a large process with 
large implications and residual effects. “Our gas distribution system is shaped in a way that 
makes it simply impossible to divide it according to the borders of CIS member nations,” 
officials noted. “If we tried to carve up the system, even Russia with its enormous gas 
reserves, would simply not be able to meet its own gas needs.”23 One example of this was 
the fact that parts of Southern Russia were supplied by gas pipelines that ran through eastern 
																																																								
22 Balmaceda, The Politics of Energy Dependency, p. 44. 
 
23  Oil & Gas Journal. “Gazprom Moving Towards New Era in Russian Natural Gas 
Industry,” September 7, 1992. 
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Ukraine. Further, Mingazprom had set up extensive gas storage facilities in Ukraine that 
were used for transmission and supply to former Warsaw Pact satellite states.  
 Finally, the collapse of the economic system in the CIS and Eastern European states 
meant that there was a lack of capital for the necessary maintenance and investment in both 
the physical infrastructure and for their domestic gas supplies. This was a problem for not 
only the cash strapped states themselves, but for Russia, who was concerned that transit 
states would not be able to pay for their supplies, and for Western European consumers, 
who were worried about the security of their supply. The way that Eastern European and 
post-Soviet states dealt with the reestablishment of energy access in the early days of the 
1990s has in part led to the energy security policy outcomes we see today. Although the 
specific causes of initial conditions in individual states will be discussed in greater depth in in 
the following chapters, the institutional legacies of the Soviet-European gas trade have long 
shadows, and continue to have persistent effects on contemporary outcomes. 
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As the previous chapter demonstrates, following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the reorganization of the European energy trade in 1991, European states have pursued 
a variety of energy security strategies. While it is logical to assume that heavily dependent 
states would pursue a strategy of diversification, this has not been the case in contemporary 
Europe. Current theories can only provide partial answers, or account for the behavior of 
certain types of states partially because these types of questions have received relatively little 
systematic attention. There is a plethora of well-researched literature on why and how 
resource rich states choose to develop their energy sectors (Jones Luong 2010, Jones Luong 
& Weinthal, 2001, 2006a) and the domestic energy reform of producer states (Jones Luong 
& Wienthal 2006b), but less attention has been paid to the determinants of energy security in 
energy dependent states. Margarita Balmaceda has written excellent work on the energy 
policies of transit states, but there is a lack of literature that tackles an in depth analysis of 
the drivers of both producer and consumer states.  Most notably, when scholars and popular 
literature tends to look at energy markets, they often neglect to look at the political capture 
going on below the surface that drives the markets themselves. What then, explains why and 
under what conditions states will choose from a variety of energy security strategies? 
It is my contention that in addition to the traditional approach to energy security that 
dictates diversification as the policy most likely to ensure access to a stable supply of energy, 
there is also another path to energy security that flies in the face of traditional wisdom. In 
practice, an alternative to the costly policy of diversification is simply maintaining a close 
relationship with a producer state. In contrast to the diversification policy, I term this 
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alternative policy “active dependence”. Under active dependence, states that are reliant on a 
single supplier of energy either do not attempt to pursue diversification policies or make 
feeble attempts, but rather focus on increasing ties with their main supplier state across a 
host of issues. This active dependence often manifests through a number of cooperative 
initiatives with their supplier state and favorable energy contract renegotiations. 24  For 
example, Hungary, which is largely reliant on Gazprom for its natural gas supplies has in 
recent years fostered a close relationship with Moscow on a host of issues, including a 
contract to build a nuclear power facility and on tackling the “reverse flow” initiative put 
forth by the EU energy commission in exchange for increased gas supplies and more 
favorable contract stipulations. Moving beyond the traditional approach allows a more 
nuanced understanding of the choices that states face when formulating their energy security 
policies.  
To better understand under what conditions states choose diversification and under 
what conditions states choose active dependence, it is necessary to look beyond energy 
markets to the political capture going on domestically. Looking at the period of 1989-1991 is 
crucial for understanding contemporary outcomes of European energy security. In many 
cases, the initial reform choices set states onto a path that determined their ability to make 
coherent policy choices decades later. The political actors guiding the transition process 
varied greatly from case to case: Hungary had a liberal coalition, while Ukraine’s first 
																																																								
24 For example, the gas contract renegotiation between Gazprom and Hungary on February 
17, 2015, which replaced the current agreement signed in 1996, cancelled the “take-or-pay”  
provision, which had previously required Hungary to pay for specific volumes of gas despite 
the actual usage. Hungarian PM Viktor Orban announced, “Today we have agreed, taking 
into account our good relations and on the basis of mutual agreement of both sides, that gas 
which goes unused by Hungary can be used in the following years, and that we will pay for 
gas when we get it. For us it’s a great relief.” Oil and Gas Eurasia, “Russia and Hungary Agree 
on New Gas Contract,” February 18, 2015. 
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president was the Ukrainian Socialist Republic’s head of state.25  However, despite the wide 
variation in the types of political actors in place at time of transition, all transitioning states 
had to design new de jure property rights to guide the process of economic transformation. I 
argue that property rights institutions and newly empowered strong actors contributed to a 
powerful institutional lock-in that has restricted the choices available to states in regards to 
energy policy. States that instituted property rights which erected barriers to access to capital 
and productive fixed assets also empowered strong actors who had access under the new 
property rights regimes to former states assets (e.g. energy). The large majority of these states 
have active dependence policies today. In contrast, when states put in place largely 
democratic property rights, strong actors were unable to become energy veto players. Most 
of these states today have policies of diversification. The period of 1989-1991 is a critical 
juncture in which former CIS and East/Central European states were completely 
reorganizing both politically and economically, the choices available to leaders at the time 
were highly restricted by structural and Soviet legacies. But another crucial piece of the 
puzzle lies in the interaction of these institutional legacies with a new economic environment 
of financial globalization. New ownership structures and financial arrangements such as 
offshore intermediaries, corporate service providers, and shell companies combine with 
nomenklatura dealings to engender crony capitalism.  
In this chapter, I propose a theory that explains energy security outcomes as a 
product of institutional choice and the ability of newly empowered actors to become energy 
veto players.  Although most states made institutional choices at the time of transition, other 
																																																								
25 Leonid Kravchuk joined the Communist Party of Ukraine in 1958 and became Chairman 
of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR in 1990. Wolczuk, Kataryna. “The Politics of 
Constitution Making in Ukraine,” Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation, ed. Taras Kuzio, 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998. 
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states made radical changes to their property rights regimes in later years. But I review below 
the existing literature for potential explanations for why energy security policy may vary 
amongst similarly placed consumer states, before presenting a theoretical model that 
accounts for regional variation in consumer vulnerability and choice of energy security 
policy. I then outline my hypotheses about the energy security policy preferences of 
European states, and the methods used in the following chapters to test this theory before 
presenting my case selection strategy. 
 
 Rational Choice Theories of Energy Policy 
 
Conventional wisdom on the drivers of the energy trade puts forth that states should 
pursue a policy of survival. Both economic development and military effectiveness, which 
are essential to the core goal of state survival, require secure and constant access to energy, 
particularly hydrocarbons. Hirschman suggests that politics of foreign trade is the use of 
“trade as a means of political pressure and leverage” and thus “a country trying to make the 
most out of its strategic position with respect to its own trade will try precisely to create 
conditions which make the interruption of trade of much greater concern to its trading 
partner than to itself” (1945 p.7). Furthermore, traditional approaches assert that states 
choose their trade policies on the basis of the strategic opportunities that are open to them 
and should seek energy independence when possible to increase power and security 
(Krasner, 1999; Kirschner, 1999; Yergin, 2006). Sabonis-Chafee uses this approach in her 
analysis of Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Armenian energy policies in the initial post-Soviet 
period, arguing that systemic variables including regional climate and energy vulnerability 
provide the best explanation for why and when states pursue diversification policies 
(Sabonis-Chafee, 1999). Because she uses a realist paradigm to explain policy shifts however, 
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she both overestimates state capacity and a unified policy making attitudes. Further, using 
systemic variables such as regional climate do not account for within-region variation in 
policies (for example, variation in energy security strategies between Hungary and Poland). 
Others argue that rather than looking at the energy trade from a purely security 
oriented standpoint, one should look to price theory. In this model, states face a trade-off 
between price and dependence. As rational actors, they recognize their dependence and 
understand that they will have to pay for that dependence either in terms of high prices, or in 
policy concessions (Williamson 1971; 1985). This theory puts forth that a state must make a 
choice between paying a high price for independence now or delaying until a later period. 
This is a useful concept for understanding the dilemma that energy dependent states face, 
but it does little to help us distinguish under what conditions states choose diversification or 
active dependence because it ignores domestic level variables. 
Other scholars do take into account the role of sub-national and non-state actors. 
Rawi Abdelal has written at length about the natural gas trade in Europe, arguing that the 
study of direct relationships between multinational firms deserves greater attention (Abdelal 
2013, 2015). Abdelal’s point that multinational firms are central actors in the outcome of 
energy security is important: he claims that corporate interests often subsume the larger 
concerns of policy makers and the state in general. Stulberg shares this view, arguing that the 
close relationships between multinational firms contributed to restraint on the part of both 
Russia and Ukraine in the wake of the Maidan Revolution (Stulberg, 2015). In the Baltic 
states, Grigas acknowledges the complex impact of business interests on energy relations 
with Moscow but also points to historical tensions and Soviet occupation has having long 
lasting effects on energy outcomes (Grigas, 2013). While insights into the nature of historical 
tensions and occupation are certainly another point to consider, these arguments are difficult 
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to apply beyond the Baltic region. Observations on the role of the firm are crucial, but this 
project aims to go beyond the study of the firm as an actor to understand the complex 
relationship between the state and the firm. It is true that the relationships between 
multinational firms have a large effect on energy security outcomes, but what explains the 
origins of this power and where does the state fit in? 
These policy prescriptions, largely based on theories of survival and efficiency, ignore 
crucial domestic characteristics of downstream states. While traditional explanations can 
provide useful models that illustrate the problems and choices that states face when they are 
energy dependent, they are unable to give us direct insight into what causes some states to 
pursue some policies while neighboring states pursue others. First, they do not account for 
the starting conditions of states, which have a critical affect on policy making through the 
design of institutions. Domestic competition for political and economic goods among 
societal groups and governmental actors is the basis for understanding policy choices 
(Klapp, 1987; Frieden, 1994), even those constrained by international factors such as the 
energy trade. The pluralist view of political processes sees groups of people as potential 
interests groups that can mobilize and influence policy-making (Dahl, 1961). In terms of 
energy policy, the liberal perspective expects that competition between organized interest 
groups and their interaction with policy-makers influences policy (Cheon & Urpelainen, 
2013). 
 
Institutional Explanations  
 
A large set of literature addresses how states differ in economic success because of 
the different institutions (North 1981, AJR 2001, 2009; Ferraro 2008). Property rights 
institutions are most intimately linked to the distribution of power in society because they 
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regulate the power relations between citizens and political elites. Poorly designed property 
rights institutions can increase the risk of clientilism by creating a non-level playing field in 
favor of groups or firms with close relationships to those in power (Acemoglu and Johnson 
2005, 956). Where there are “extractive” institutions, we observe a pattern of corruption and 
low public goods provision. This literature identifies that colonial institutions are sticky and 
hard to change, even in the face of significant economic and political transformation. 
Property rights institutions in the Soviet period were largely extractive: aimed at maximizing 
the rent to the rulers and ruling stratum. Soviet era property rights facilitated rent seeking 
behavior by party apparatchiks and bureaucrats through a nomenklatura procedure that 
distributed to a favored few the best paid managerial jobs as well as access to scarce goods 
and services (Winiecki, 1991 p. 5).  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, former Soviet bloc states had to completely 
reorganize the political system and economy. The first crucial task was instituting a system of 
comprehensive rule of law under which secure property and contractual rights could extend 
to all citizens equally. I define rule of law as well-defined and enforced property rights, broad 
access to those rights, and uniformly enforced regular rules to resolve property disputes. 
Absence of rule of law is a regime that does not protect investors’ returns from state 
expropriation and that does not enforce contracting rights (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2004). Where 
independent judiciaries were set up swiftly, property rights institutions were able to guide the 
privatization process and mitigate corruption. A secondary but also crucial institutional task 
was improving bureaucratic quality to manage the provision of public services and goods. 
However, the choices available to leaders were highly constrained by legacies of the 
Soviet Union. First, the types of leaders making decisions at time of transition varied greatly 
from case to case. In some states, new leaders were actually old Communist apparatchiks 
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while in other states decision-making was a process of coalition between previously excluded 
actors and the old regime.  A vast literature discusses how interactions between the 
opposition and the ruling elite led to different political arrangements post-transition (Stark & 
Bruszt, 1990; Przeworski, 1992; Linz & Stepan, 1996). However, in addition to constraint on 
the initial political conditions, there were also structural restrictions guiding the choices 
available to leaders, including the nature of economic development under Soviet rule.  
In some (particularly Central European states), there was diversification of the 
economy beyond heavy industry (Winikecki, 1991). However, in others, particularly former 
Soviet states such as Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, development was almost entirely based 
on heavy industry supported by cross subsidization from Moscow. In these states, there was 
very little diversification of the economy with the result that Soviet red directors with ties to 
Moscow had a great deal of power. Further, a large sector of the national labor force was 
low-skilled labor in inefficient heavy industry. This posed two major problems for the 
development of property rights institutions. First, when the political and economic system 
collapsed, it was difficult for leaders to close inefficient factories without putting a large 
segment of the labor force out of work. This meant that in practice, party apparatchiks and 
former red directors with incentives to keep elements of the Soviet era property rights 
institutions were left in their former privileged positions even under the new regime. Second, 
because these apparatchiks had profited from Soviet era transfers of material goods across 
borders, they were now looking to replace their lost Soviet profits with national level gains. 
In general, states whose Soviet era development strategies were more unevenly 
distributed to heavy industry centered economies were less able to manage a transition to 
inclusive property rights. Those whose economies were more diversified were less 
constrained in their abilities to make radical changes to the property rights system. However, 
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a second set of constraints based around the nascent political system after transition also 
affected the outcome of property rights.  Keefer (2004) argues that in young democracies 
lacking competitive parties, politicians can only make credible promises to those with whom 
they already have a reputation. In this view, young democracies therefore encourage the 
formation of patronage networks and property rights become an instrument of 
redistribution within these networks. While this does not explain why some states were able 
to put in place a strong rule of law based system while others were not, I argue that this 
exacerbated the consequences of uneven development under the Soviet period and led to a 
situation in many states where property rights institutions were designed to perpetuate the 
nomenklatura system.  
The political system after and during transition also had a large effect on the choice 
of property rights institutions in post-Communist states. Fish (1997) argues that the winners 
of the first elections held post-transition had long-lasting effects on political and economic 
development in former Eastern bloc countries. Where Communists were defeated decisively 
in the first multiparty elections, the Communist party reformed and adapted. Where they 
were victorious, they remained “wedded to tradition”. Although Fish seeks to explain the 
extent of economic reform undertaken at the end of 1995, his insights into first and second 
order effects of the first elections are important. Generally, the states that had Communists 
parties that failed to make major reforms were also subject to the same Soviet era structural 
restraints that made instituting good property rights difficult. 
Literature on privatization claims that early winners of the process attempt to stall 
the economy in a partial reform equilibrium that generates concentrated rents (Hellman 
1998, 2004). Given that in some cases we would expect better energy policy where long-term 
path dependent factors such as level of Soviet control were low, variation in how states 
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privatized can explain outcomes. Where states had independent energy policy institutions 
and infrastructure during the Soviet period, we expect better outcomes post-independence. 
But where winners of early market reform distortion are able to slow or stop reform in 
partial reform equilibrium, this can mimic the effect of long-term Soviet control factors, 
leading to an active dependence energy security policy.  
Dynamics of privatization may also explain why states burdened with a legacy of 
heavy Soviet control have been able to overcome these impediments and choose a costly 
strategy of diversification. Where alternative incentives are strong enough to prevent either 
early winner or losers from disrupting the pace of reform, states may be able to overcome 
path dependent legacies by creating strong formal institutions to oversee the policy making 
process and the energy sector. Literature on democratization argues that diffusion can 
greatly affect the propensity of a state to democratize if its neighbors are doing so (Brinks 
and Coppedge, 2006). States that were offered strong alternative incentives in the form of 
EU money for infrastructure and development were sometimes able to avoid the pitfalls of 
privatization because early winners in the process were able to envision a future in which 
they were able to extract rents from an alternative source with better prospects.  
 
Strong Players, Weak Rules 
 
The choice and timing of property rights at the time of transition had crucial and 
long lasting effects on the nature of energy policy in post-Communist states particularly 
because the choice of property rights institutions directly affected the process of 
privatization of national industries including energy. Outcomes are path dependent because 
even actors who are seeking change find their choices constrained by existing institutions. I 
argue that this lock-in effect of initial institutional choices had a two main consequences 
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relating to energy policy. First, states that failed to radically break away from Soviet era 
property rights were unable to manage privatization in a way that would enable policy 
freedom in later years. Specifically, in states where mass privatization was initiated before 
institutions to support rule of law and governance were put in place, the energy sector is 
more likely to be vulnerable to corruption. Second, this mismanagement of privatization of 
national industries empowered strong actors with formal and informal veto power that 
greatly reduced policy choices. While the presence of strong actors is unavoidable, it is the 
choice of property rights at time of privatization that affected the ability of strong actors to 
become energy veto players with the potential to influence policy.  
The global context under which transition and privatization was managed was one of 
an explosion of new tools of financial globalization. Thus while weak institutional reform 
allowed a continuation of Soviet-style resource allocation, globalization empowered veto 
player even further by providing them with new ownership arrangements and by increasing 
the ability of private individuals and firms to play key roles in governance (Findley, Nielson 
& Sharman 2014). Because of the ease with which it is now possible to set up new 
transnational ownership arrangements quasi-legally, weak institutional environments 
facilitate spectacular corruption with the ability to directly affect state interests. In the post-
Communist world, the transition away from state socialism but not necessarily away from 
the institutions that supported it provided an opportunity for new forms of corruption, 
especially related to privatization (Sharman 2017). Energy security outcomes are thus not 
only a story about domestic politics, but also the ways in which domestic interests interact 
with transnational ones.   
I argue that states that were unable for various reasons to set up “good” property 
rights institutions during transition are highly unlikely to pursue energy policies of 
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diversification today. Instead, these states remain locked into an active dependence strategy 
of energy security because of badly managed privatization and strong actors with ties to the 
Soviet system of dependence on Russian commodities. In this chapter, I define privatization 
as the process of transferring ownership rights of productive assets held by the state (Stark & 
Bruszt 85). Although almost all of the 30 states emerging out of the Soviet bloc chose to 
write new constitutions at the time of transition, the constitutional arrangements regarding 
property rights vary greatly from case to case. For example, Estonia and Ukraine put in place 
extremely strong constitutional provisions for property rights, but also included clauses that 
prescribed limits to private property (Field and Voigt 2003). I therefore propose the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: States with a nomenklatura property rights regime are more likely to pursue an active dependence energy 
security policy. 
 
H2: States with a rule of law property rights regime are more likely to pursue a diversification energy security 
policy. 
 
Table 2-1: Post-Communist Property Rights Regimes 
Post-Communist Property Rights Regimes 
Nomenklatura System Rule of Law System 
Lack of security against uncompensated loss of 
property to state agencies or private individuals 
Security against uncompensated loss of 
property to state agencies or private individuals 
Lack of independent Judiciary Independent Judiciary 
Lack of defined and enforced rules to solve 
property disputes 
Defined and Enforced rules to solve property 
disputes 
Low Bureaucratic Quality High Bureaucratic Quality 
 
Low public goods provision High public goods provision 
 
  
Of course, it is impossible to discuss property rights regimes without distinguishing between 
de jure and de facto property rights. This study will systematically examine not only the legal 
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rights governing privatization but also the relationship of those rights to both economic 
activity and policy-making. Here I move beyond the idea of mixed “fuzzy” property rights as 
is presented in literature on privatization in post-communist states26 and focus more on 
where we see a systematic disjuncture between the laws governing rights and how those 
rights are used in practice. 
Below I present a model of energy security policy that explains persistent path 
dependent outcomes of active dependence policies resulting from institutional choice at 
transition as well as states that have either escaped path dependent outcomes or regressed 
back. In the empirical chapters that follow, I analyze the processes of path dependency and 
elucidate how initial strategic choices shape further policy choices decades later. I then 
elaborate below on the consequences of institutional path dependence: failure of 




26  Verdery, “Fuzzy Property: Rights, Power and Identity in Transylvania’s 
Decollectivization,” in Burawoy and Verdery, eds. Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change 




Figure 2-1: Strong Players, Weak Rules Theory 
 
The Making of Energy Veto-Players 
 
The initial choice of property rights institutions affected the nature of privatization, 
which is a powerful indicator of contemporary energy security policies in Europe. At the 
time of transformation, states grappled with four main dimensions of the privatization 
debate: foreign vs. domestic ownership; spontaneous privatization vs. privatization that was 
directed/controlled by state agencies; institutional vs. natural ownership; concentrated vs. 
dispersed ownership (Stark & Bruszt 1998). The initial choice and timing of property rights 
system restricted the choices available to states on all of these dimensions, and in some 
cases, empowered strong actors as veto players. Most important, states that were unable to 
put in place a rule of law system were highly unlikely to choose managed privatization 
because there was a lack of critical legal vehicles to guide the process. As a result, these states 
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often chose spontaneous privatization processes whereby powerful pre-transition actors 
were able to convert political capital into economic capital by naming themselves as new 
owners. In other words, where privatization was not brought under public control, strong 
actors seized the process for private gain rather than public good.  
These actors, who can range from corporate actors to warlords, are all potential veto 
players, whose agreement is necessary to change policies from the status quo (Tsebelis, 
2002). Energy policy formulation is a complex process that involves a number of actors. In 
most countries, there is a dedicated Ministry of Energy, with a number of appointed 
ministers and deputy ministers whose job it is to liaise with both domestic and international 
leaders, as well as corporate actors. While traditionally veto players are constitutionally 
defined, in many of the European cases, veto players are created by informal, path 
dependent processes resulting from both Soviet legacies and post-Soviet institutional 
processes such as privatization as elucidated above. Where there are powerful actors with 
interests in the energy sector, states must have strong formal property rights institutions to 
prevent them from becoming energy veto players. If privatization and institutional reform 
are incomplete or distorted, these actors are likely become veto players that prevent the 
government from policies that would inhibit their access to rents or profits (Shliefer 1997; 
Frye and Schliefer 1997). 
Strong actors can become veto players by privatization not only through the process 
of spontaneous privatization but also through the choice of institutional vs. natural 
ownership and concentrated vs. dispersed ownership. In states that were unable to 
substantially change the property rights system, strong actors with connection to the former 
Soviet era energy system had the decks stacked in their favor in terms of access to prized 
state assets. Privatization generally yields to two types of domestic ownership: institutional 
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(endowments and inter-corporate holdings) and natural. The problem with institutional 
ownership is that it mimics the problems of the pre-transition system: the organization 
structure of industrial concentration gives large firms monopoly positions. Further, 
corporations such as banks that both issue credit and own shares are therefore more likely to 
lobby for political concessions such as subsidies, import licenses and lenient regulations 
(Stark & Bruszt 1998, p. 64-69). In contrast, natural ownership puts risk into the hands of 
genuine entrepreneurs who risk losing personal property if a venture fails. I argue that where 
a rule of law system was not instituted before the privatization of state energy assets, we are 
more likely to see institutional ownership and therefore strong monopolistic firms that act as 
energy veto players. These firms are further empowered by financial globalization, which 
empowers actors with tools to shield themselves from risk, hide assets and remain 
anonymous in transactions that may attract unwanted attention.  
 Another critical dimension of the privatization process that had a long-term impact 
on the empowerment of strong actors with the potential to act as veto players was the choice 
between concentrated vs. dispersed ownership. In general, states that opted for fast 
privatization tend to have concentrated ownership because the private capital of the general 
population was insufficient to purchase any significant stake in large state enterprises such as 
the energy sector. As elucidated above, this was largely a consequence of a lack of real 
transformation of the Soviet era property rights regime in favor of a strong rule of law 
regime. Naturally, concentrated ownership in the hands of inter-corporate holdings is 
problematic for a number of reasons but primarily because it increases the likelihood of rent 
seeking behavior.  
But the nature of dual transition meant that in many cases actors with personal 
connections and informal power were also able to formally institutionalize power because of 
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a failure of institutions to prevent against rent seeking behavior among the politically 
connected. Not only do the early winners precipitate large-scale redistribution of resources 
that leaves the country worse off, but it also has the micro-level consequence of further 
undermining the institutional framework of governance (Ganev, 2013, 118). As Ganev 
points out in his study of Bulgarian transition, an important characteristic of these early 
winners is that they tend to act as “state breakers, not state makers.”  
Clearly, strong actors with interests in the energy industry exist everywhere, but the 
extent to which they are able to become veto players is conditional on the nature of property 
rights instituted at time of transition. For example, the role of the major energy companies 
of European states varies greatly to the extent that they are allowed to dictate state policy. 
Germany’s gas giant E.ON, while powerful within its sector, does not have direct influence 
on the overall energy security policy of the German state, and follows state directives in 
terms of exploring new green technologies and projects. A prominent example of this is the 
recent decision in December 2014 to spin off its fossil fuel and nuclear generation business 
to focus on renewables. The chief executive of EON, Johannes Teyssen, argued that the 
traditional business model for utilities was “broken apart” after the transition to renewables, 
known as Energiewende, was launched by the German government in 2000.27  
Conversely, the role of the major Italian energy companies (ENI and ENEL) in 
formulating Italian energy policy is significant. Some observers argue that this is not a major 
deviation from the previous energy regime, except that prior to privatization the two 
companies missions included the protection of energy security. At the time of privatization 
in 1995, ENI supplied more than 50 percent of Italy’s energy needs, a bigger share of the 
																																																								
27 Vasagar, Jeevan. “EON Split Driven By Technology,” Financial Times, December 2, 2014. 
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economy than any company in Europe except Spain.28 ENI took a gradual approach to 
privatization, placing a total of 63% of ENI’s share capital for purchase over a period of six 
years.29 However, because of the gradual approach, ENI retained a significant influence in 
the formulation of Italian energy policy. Following privatization, the company’s focus was 
on maximizing shareholder value and was no longer expected to be responsible for ensuring 
Italian energy security. However, because privatization was incomplete, both ENI and 
ENEL retain substantial influence over the direction of Italian policy. 
 Energy veto players can have a wide range of interests. Hirschman argues that in 
some cases, if the weight of a stoppage of trade would fall disproportionately upon certain 
groups, these groups might make up a “commercial fifth column” (Hirschman, 1945). In his 
insightful analysis, Hirschman goes further and asserts that these groups may exert a 
powerful influence in favor of a ‘friendly’ attitude toward the state that provides them with 
the means to extract rents. Corporate veto players prefer whatever policies are the most 
conducive to a good return on investment and reject those that would restrict their ability to 
make money. The interests of gas middlemen or local oligarchs are more nebulous, but in 
principle are similar to those of the corporate players: they dislike potential policies that 
could disrupt their profit stream and reduce their local influence. Similarly, depending on a 
number of factors that will be elaborated below, large stakeholders might have a vested 
interest in pursuing a state policy of diversification. If a veto player stands to gain more from 
increased contact with multiple suppliers or through participation in the construction of 
																																																								
28 Tagliabue, John. “Company News: Privatization is Crucial for Italy’s ENI,” The New York 
Times, January 17, 1995. 
 
29  ENI. “Privatization,” Shareholder Information, Investor Relations, ENI. 
<http://www.eni.com/en_IT/investor-relation/eni-stock-
markets/privatization/privatization.shtml> Accessed June 15, 2015. 
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storage projects, they will be more likely to support traditional energy security policies. I 
therefore propose a conditional hypothesis. 
H3: Conditional on the nature of incentives at the time, states with energy veto players are more likely to 
pursue policies of active dependence. 
  
The Uniqueness of the Energy Sector 
 
The processes of institutional design and privatization had broad long-lasting affects 
on transitioning states. However, the energy sector is particularly vulnerable to these 
processes and exacerbates the influence of the two main variables elucidated above: choice 
of property rights institutions and strong actors. The nature of economic development in the 
USSR encouraged energy poor states to adopt heavy industry centered (and thus energy 
intensive) development strategies, which were supported by Soviet cross subsidization 
despite the fact that it was highly inefficient. This explains why some states continued to 
develop according to a model based on cheap and available energy even after they no longer 
had ready access to the materials following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additionally, in 
states where the model of development path dependency was entrenched, there were large 
societal implications in terms of employment in the industrial sector. Extensive literature on 
the resource curse discusses how states that are over reliant on commodities have a large 
sector of low-skilled labor that inhibits diversification of the labor market (Humphreys, 
Sachs, Stiglitz 2007; Ross 1999). When a large sector of the labor force is employed in heavy 
energy intensive industrial sectors, it is nearly impossible to close inefficient factories and 
move to a less energy intensive development model without severe societal consequences.  
Therefore governments had to weigh the costs of potential upheaval against those of 
switching development strategies. Across the cases in which this development strategy was 
already locked in, changing the property rights system was difficult and thus privatization 
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was more likely to formally empower strong actors with an entrenched interest in 
maintaining the status quo.  
Energy veto players were empowered by privatization processes but because of the 
unbalanced nature of the labor force, they are also more likely to engender popular support. 
In extreme cases like Ukraine, energy middlemen and other local oligarchs who support an 
active dependence policy also act as advocates for local workers whose livelihood depends 
on the continued operation of energy intensive industries, especially in economically 
depressed areas. Any policies perceived as anti-industry or that would threaten the closure of 
large scale industrial employers are discouraged by these veto players. In many states, the 
chaos surrounding political reform post 1991 enabled the energy veto players not only to 
profit off of the state, but also to grab hold of governance itself and perpetuate a cycle in 
which they could continue to profit from the old Soviet system.  This is particularly salient in 
cases where the energy sector was highly decentralized prior to the breakup of the Soviet 
Union (Ukraine, Bulgaria) because it allowed regional players greater power and 
independence. Since energy veto players manipulate Soviet era inefficiencies, they often 
profit at the expense of state budgets and thus undermine the cohesion and implementation 
of national energy security strategy. 
The ways in which gas and oil transmission infrastructure was built during the Soviet 
period can also give us insights into why some states were more or less likely to radically 
restructure the property rights system. A rich literature discusses the impact of colonial 
infrastructure on post-colonial political development. Herbst argues that European colonists 
set up capital cities in Africa that moved power towards the oceans and away from interior 
centers of power (Herbst 2000). Where infrastructure was oriented outwards towards the 
colonizer and away from the national center of power, states were less cohesive and lacked 
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linkages from capitals to surrounding territories. The nature of energy infrastructure 
constructed under the Soviet system can act in a similar manner. Where energy infrastructure 
is built towards the center of the colony (Moscow) rather than built with the purpose of 
connecting the national capital with surrounding areas, there is a lack of cohesion between 
the energy industry and energy policy-making capability. In these states, actors were 
conditioned to see their profit stream as coming from Moscow, rather than the republic. 
Further, at the time of independence, these states had to scramble to construct entirely new 
institutions to manage energy security as well new infrastructure to connect their grids. 
Because ensuring that energy was available to all geographic areas of the new state was a 
pressing priority, decisions about construction were often made before necessary institutional 
development around property rights.  
 These patterns of Soviet control over Eastern European and CIS states led to the 
emergence of new players with the ability to prevent reforms upon independence. Energy 
veto players were more likely to emerge in states that did not have full policy making 
apparatuses following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many of these states lacked complete 
ministries with the sole task of energy management and instead had Soviet era industrial 
linkages that were stronger than any governmental bodies at the time.30 Because of the 
nature of the Soviet economic system, this meant that many industrial and enterprise actors 
who depended directly on Moscow had little or no contact with the government of the state 
they worked in. In some cases, this direct link between Moscow and industry was much 
stronger than any government body. In the early chaotic days following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, many of these actors were able to consolidate their interests to act as a 																																																								
30 Sabonis-Chafee, Theresa. “Power Politics: National Energy Policies and the Nuclear Newly 
Independent States of Armenia, Lithuania and Ukraine,” PhD Dissertation, Political Science, 
Emory University, 1999. 
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powerful industrial lobby that had a huge role in the early policy making process. In the case 
of several post-Soviet states this lobby was able to bloc institutional and economic reforms 
in order to continue access to state subsidies, including energy subsidies.31 
 
Escaping Institutional Lock-In 
 
 I argue the initial choices of institutions at the time of transition have a long-lasting 
effect on energy security policy. In many cases, this institutional lock-in persists from the 
Soviet era: once states were on a path in which they relegated their decision-making 
capability to Moscow, they often remained locked in even after the supposed reorganization 
of institutions and strategies following independence. However, it is misleading to argue that 
all states burdened with structural conditions of path dependency are doomed forever. 
Change is possible and can be explained in divergent cases. Lithuania is a case where 
institutional lock-in in the energy sector was broken, with radical consequences. While this 
will be explained in more detail in the case study, the explanation for the shift in institutions 
and resultant policy is largely a case of radically changing incentives. In the Lithuanian case, 
although property rights, particularly in the energy sector, were weak and retained many 
Soviet era features, strong actors were able to replace revenue streams with new 
opportunities from the EU that came from Lithuania positioning itself as a leader of Baltic 
energy security. As a result, Lithuania embarked on a large project to radically restructure the 
property rights system in favor of Western style reforms. In contrast, Hungary is a crucial 
disconfirming case because it did embark on a rule of law path but does not have the 
expected outcome of diversification. In the Hungarian case, as will be elaborated in a later 
chapter, a decline in democratic institutions resulting from a deep political crisis and 																																																								
31 Balmaceda, The Politics of Energy Dependency, 57. 
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landslide victory led to a radical transformation in incentive structure surrounding the energy 
industry. The Hungary case is also an important indicator of the powerful nature of 
transnational corruption and the financial instruments that facilitate it. Globalization 
combined with forces that move against rule of law principles can facilitate a rapid regression 
of institutional development and democratic indicators. 
 
Research Design 	
I argue that this puzzle is best investigated with a mixed-methods approach, where I 
examine the energy security outcomes of downstream states both comparatively and within 
case across time. The unit of analysis is a dyadic relationship between the downstream states 
and her producer, and the universe of cases are all European consumers of natural gas from 
Russia from 1991-present. I have compiled an original dataset that includes energy trade 
statistics, bi-lateral contract information between Russia and her European trade partners 
from 1991-present and energy security policies and legislation during the same period. 
Because it is often difficult to find major indicators of change within the scope of long-term 
natural gas contracts (which can range from 5-30 years), I offer a novel way of evaluating 
change in energy security policy across time. In chapter Three, I argue that most indexes of 
energy security miss out on crucial variables: ownership structures in downstream states as 
well as information garnered from the bi-lateral contracts that govern the international sale 
and transport of natural gas. I then offer an original index of energy security using this data, 
much of which is publicized here for the first time.  
In Chapter Four, I measure institutionalization of property rights at time of 
transition and then at critical junctures using existing measures of property rights (amount of 
money in the banking sector) and corruption. Using my original dataset, I demonstrate 
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empirically through a structural equation model that states with Soviet era property rights 
regimes are more likely to pursue polices of active dependence and have lower quality energy 
security outcomes. The results are largely consistent with my energy veto players argument, 
which emphasizes state society relations of energy elites.  
Due to limitations of statistical inference due to endogeneity and measurement error, 
I then use descriptive statistics to identify countries with which I examine the mechanisms of 
my model through qualitative case studies. These cases are developed through fieldwork in 
all three countries as well as in Russia. In all cases I use observation, participant observation 
and semi-structured interviews with experts, policy makers, energy industry actors, 
journalists and government officials. I have conducted elite interviews so that I can interact 
with first hand participants of the processes I am investigating and to move beyond written 
accounts that may only represent the official version of events rather than the underlying 
context (Mahoney 2012, Mosley 2013).  
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Figure 2-0-2: Case Study Selection 
Table 2-2: Case Study Selection 





Nomenklatura System (1) Lithuania Ukraine 
 
 I select Ukraine as a case study because it has been the site of a substantial portion of 
energy security policy discussion since the fall of the Soviet Union and it contains both my 
independent and dependent variables. Further, the Ukraine is an excellent case through 
which to demonstrate the mechanisms of my theory because it is the classic case through 
which historical legacy and the processes of post-communist privatization interact to 
produce the ideal initial conditions for the development of my independent variables: weak 
institutions allowing powerful actors to emerge as energy veto players. Further, because it 
has been the site of several serious international disputes over energy, Ukraine is a good case 
to examine state response or lack of response to crises. The periods after a crisis are a strong 
test of my theory because they increase the demands for energy security both domestically 
and regionally. Ukraine is also a good comparative case study to pair with Lithuania because 
it has similar historic and geographic relationship to their main supplier, yet differs in the 
outcome of the DV. 
 Lithuania provides a case study where the outcome on the dependent variable 
switched mid-case (around 2009) from a confirming case, to one in which the outcome is 
absent. Following a number of years in which it was unable to reduce dependence on 
Russian energy supplies, Lithuania dramatically shifted course and became a regional leader 
in the push for diversification and Baltic energy security. Exploring how and why this shift 
was able to occur gives important insights into how other highly dependent states might 
 51 	
manage their energy security strategies in the future. Although the independent variables 
were very similar to those present in the Ukraine case, Lithuania was able to change from the 
predicted outcome of active dependence to a diversification policy. This can help explore the 
causal mechanism of interest because I can examine the conditions under which the case 
deviates from expected outcome and why.  It is also an excellent test for my mechanism 
because it enables me to elucidate the interaction between path dependent factors as well as 
newly emerging incentives for energy veto players that contributed to a rare success story.  
Hungary is a crucial case because it allows me to examine further to see if this case 
truly deviates from my theory and to explore an additional possible causal mechanism. 
Hungary should be a disconfirming case because it has the anticipated outcome but lacks the 
independent variables and long-term initial conditions of my theory. Hungary, although only 
34% reliant on natural gas for its fuel mix, is highly dependent on Russian gas and has failed 
to implement a diversification strategy despite repeatedly announcing the desire to do so. In 
fact, Hungary has actually increased its commitment to an active dependence policy in recent 
years despite having fairly strong formal institutions and a history of independent institutions 
during the Soviet period. However, Hungary actually turns out to be an excellent case 
because it demonstrates how post-independence economic and political policies can affect 
energy security in the absence of a strong Soviet legacy. Further, given my two-tiered theory 
of immediate explanatory variables paired with longer term facilitating conditions it is 
actually possible to explain outcomes in Hungary through a deep examination of post-1991 
domestic and international developments that facilitated the late development of a class of 





 Energy security policy and its ties with the international energy trade are an 
increasingly crucial aspect of the global landscape. Elucidating the origins of state policy that 
governs the international commodity trade has important implications for international 
political economy, alliance politics and regional security. Explaining how and why states 
make energy security policy choices that affect international relationships will be an 
important contribution to the fields of international and comparative politics. Because I 
offer an account of the domestic factors that contribute to a state’s ability to make energy 
security policy as well as its vulnerability as consumer, my theory significantly improves on 
the existing literature. 
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Chapter 3 - WHAT IS ENERGY DEPENDENCE? A NEW INDEX 
 
“There is a well-known fairy-tale about an old woman who asked a golden fish to turn her 
into a Sea Empress but in the end she found herself back with her broken washtub in front 
of her.” 
-Deputy Chairman of Gazprom Management Committee, Alexander Medvedev 
 
Introduction 	
 Traditional studies of energy security have used a variety of measures to evaluate a 
country’s relative security vis-à-vis their main supplier. These indices rely largely on measures 
such as relative dependence across sectors, availability of alternative supplies, domestic 
production and storage as a percentage of annual consumption, price,  and energy intensity.32 
Many studies present only a simple figure indicating the ratio of supplies from one or many 
importers to the total annual consumption. However, when evaluating the relative energy 
security of states that rely in large part on natural gas supplies from a regional monopolist, 
these measures miss out on key factors. First, they ignore political and country level variables 
such as regime type, corruption and property rights regimes and also neglect the provisions 
in bi-lateral contracts overseeing the provision of natural gas supplies across borders. 
Because these contracts are opaque agreements governing the transmission of commodities 
across borders, understanding the political context under which they were signed is crucial. 
Second, traditional measures also miss out on key processes such as the involvement of the 
producer state in downstream activities. One example of this is the purchase by Gazprom in 
2006 and 2011 of 50% stakes in the sole Belarusian natural gas infrastructure and 
																																																								
32 IEA. “The IEA Model of Short-term Energy Security,” IEA, 2011d. Egging, Ruud. 
Franziska Holz and Steven A Gabriel. “The World Gas Model: A Multi-Period Mixed 
Complementary Model for the Global Natural Gas Market,” DIW Discussion Paper 959, 
(2009). Chyong, Chi Kong and Benjamin F. Hobbs. “Strategic Eurasian Natural Gas Market 
Model of Energy Security and Policy Analysis: Formulation and Application to South 
Stream,” Energy Economics 44, (July 2014): 198-211. 
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transmission company Beltransgaz.33 This brought the entire Belarusian transmission system 
under 100% control of Belarus’ only supplier of natural gas. These purchases and 
investments can have a major influence on a country’s ability to control their own energy 
security futures. As a result, we need more nuanced and comprehensive measures of energy 
security to understand both the causes and the implications of energy dependence.  
 One way of capturing the nuances of the relationship between consumers and 
producers overtime is through a systematic examination of the contracts that govern the 
relationship. I argue that bi-lateral contracts facilitating the natural gas trade between 
upstream and downstream states are a good tool through which to compare and evaluate de-
facto energy security outcomes.  Along with other measures that will be described below, 
contracts are useful because they provide a tool with which to compare stated energy 
security policies with actual outcomes as well as cover the gaps in existing measures. This 
chapter presents a detailed analysis of the energy security outcomes in Gazprom’s 
downstream partners from 1990-2015.34 This examination of the dependent variable is 
critical, as in the next chapter I will show empirically a correlation between the energy 
security of consumer states and the property rights regime.  
																																																								
33 Gazprom Press Release. “Russia and Belarus Define New Terms and Conditions for Gas 
Supply and Transmission. Gazprom Takes Full Ownership of Beltransgaz.” November 25, 
2011.  
 
34 Gazprom has 22 foreign partners, to which it sells natural gas. The majority of these states 
are in Europe. However, Gazprom also sells to Armenia, Georgia and Turkey relying on 
mostly the same infrastructure that links Russia with its European consumers. I do not 
include in this study other Eurasian states including Azerbaijan and Central Asia because 
they do not import Russian gas under contract with Gazprom. Gazprom signed a deal with 
Azerbaijan in 2015 facilitating the possibility of small amounts of LNG gas, but so far this 
has not materialized. Central Asian states do not import Russian gas, in fact, in some cases 
Gazprom imports Central Asian gas and re-markets it for European consumers.  
 55 	
The main hurdle in this endeavor is the fact that most natural gas contracts include 
strict non-disclosure agreements that outline penalties for divulging details of the 
agreements. However, during 18 months of fieldwork in the region I was able to gather 
contractual data on all of Gazprom’s Eurasian partners through interviews, archival research 
and news media reports. In the section below I provide a justification for using contracts as 
a measure of the dependent variable and present an original dataset of descriptive statistics 
on contractual data in Eurasia. Second, I provide an original measure of energy dependence 
through a number of significant indicators. In this chapter, I describe and justify the data 
points, and then present comparative tables of energy dependence. Finally, I present an 
original index of the relative energy security of Eurasian states overtime that combines 
contractual data along with other measures of diversification. In the proceeding chapter I 
outline an empirical strategy and present preliminary findings of quantitative analysis using 
my original dataset. 
 
Why Natural Gas Contracts? 
 
One way of evaluating energy dependence is to look at bi-lateral energy contracts, 
which are made directly between upstream and downstream states at the highest level 
(usually directly between heads of state or ministers of energy). Bi-lateral contracts are an 
excellent way of evaluating energy security policy outcomes across cases because we can 
compare the contracts on a number of provisions, which makes it easier to evaluate which 
states get better deals than others. I argue that comparing contractual provisions across cases 
is an underutilized and important tool for evaluating energy security both across time and 
cases. 
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Unlike oil, which is sold on a market, natural gas has regionally disparate benchmark 
prices, and the method by which gas is priced varies regionally. However, the dominant 
mechanism for the international gas trade in Europe remains oil indexation, in which the 
price of gas is based on price competition with alternative fuels “at burner tip” (the final 
point at which gas is used for consumption residential industrial or commercial consumers). 
While the oil indexation pricing mechanism originated in Europe in the 1960s and spread to 
Asia, a contrasting method based on hub pricing and traded markets developed in the 
United States and has spread to parts of continental Europe via the UK.35 
However, several changes in the gas market have begun shifting patterns of price 
mechanisms. While the most immediate change might be in Europe, the implications of this 
potential pricing transformation have broader consequences, because once-isolated regional 
gas markets are now becoming interconnected through the rising trade of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG). For example, if spot market pricing becomes the norm in Europe, Asia will be 
the last remaining strong hold of oil-indexed pricing. In contrast, if oil-indexation remains 
the model in Europe, it is possible that North American spot-pricing may be affected. While 
spot markets for natural gas have increased significantly over the past five years in Europe, 
the cheapest and therefore most common method of gas transportation remains through 
pipeline gas, and therefore long-term natural gas contracts remain common. Although the 
European Union is currently attempting to require states to submit their energy contracts 
with foreign partners to a central commission in the interest of transparency and Union level 
																																																								
35 Melling, Anthony. Natural Gas Pricing and Its Future: Europe as the Battleground. Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace: 2010. 
 
 57 	
energy security,36 several states argue that this would decrease their bargaining leverage with 
foreign partners, and would therefore lead to national energy insecurity vis-à-vis their 
upstream partner.37 
Traditionally, natural gas exporters sought long-term (20-30 year) contracts that tied 
the price of gas to the price of oil and included requirement clauses, price indexation, 
liquidation damages, arbitration and other provisions. Purchasers were required to pay for a 
pre-specified minimum quantity of natural gas regardless of whether that quantity was 
consumed (so-called “Take-or-Pay” provisions). This capital was then used to cover the 
financing and exploration of natural gas fields, which was previously limited to small number 
of regions worldwide: primarily Russia and the Middle East. Further, the transport of natural 
gas from producing regions to consumer usually requires an extensive and elaborate 
transportation system involving pipelines that use pressure from compressors to move gas. 
The cost of these expensive infrastructure projects is financed by the money guaranteed by 
take-or-pay provisions. The Take-or-Pay clause is considered to be both an incentive 
mechanism to seek compliance in the execution of the contract as well as a means to spread 
risk. The clause must provide an incentive to the buyer to take all the gas that it can absorb, 
while at the same time curtailing the risk to the producer of making this gas available 
upstream. 
The pricing, duration, requirement, enforcement and other provisions are then 
specified in wholesale long-term Gas Sale & Purchase Agreements (GSAs) that vary greatly 
according to the market in which the gas is sold. Producer states feel that it is in their interest 																																																								
36 Kanter, James. “Europe Seeks Alternatives to Russian Gas Imports,” The New York Times, 
February 16, 2016. 
 
37 Lewis, Barbara. “Debate on Gas Contract Secrecy Overshadows EU Quest for Energy 
Union,” Reuters, March 18, 2015. 
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to defend the status quo of monopolies, demarcation agreements, oil-indexed contracts and 
vertically integrated control of the infrastructure. Sergey Komlev, Head of Contract 
Structuring and Price Formulation at Gazprom, has argued extensively for the continued 
practice of long-term GSAs, claiming that they treat both buyer and sellers fairly. He has also 
said that Brussels’ desire to abolish bi-lateral GSAs is a geopolitically motivated move against 
Russia.38 In some respects he is right: in a traditional long-term contract, risk is distributed 
between the producer and consumer: while the upstream producer has more information on 
production costs and the opportunity cost of production, the downstream producer has 
more information on potential demand.  
Historically, producers preferred this method of contracting because when spot 
prices were higher than the oil-index prices, producers could usually sell additional gas onto 
the market without upsetting their core wholesale customers (downstream consumer states). 
This meant that they could not only sell more gas, but could generally achieve higher prices 
in subsequent negotiations. However, when spot prices are lower than oil-indexed prices, 
producer states often enter into renegotiations with consumers who want to lower prices. 
Recently however, long-term contracts have begun to be modified by so-called “gas swing 
contracts” between exporting states and consumers on the delivery of variable daily 
quantities of gas, between a specified minimum and maximum daily limit. The main 
components of swing contracts include: start and end date of delivery, annual contractual 
quantity (ACQ), yearly take or pay (Yearly ToP), daily take or pay (Daily ToP), daily 
minimum quantity (DCQ), daily maximum quantity (MOP) and contract price formula.39 
																																																								
38 Interview with Sergey Komlev, February 5, 2015. 
 
39 Hegde, Kjersti & Eirik Fjeldstad. “The future of European Long-Term Natural Gas 
Contracts,” ESCP Europe, September 1, 2010. 
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While the vast majority of Gazprom’s contracts with downstream partners are 
though long-term GSAs, the other prominent method of gas contracting is through short-
term contracts linked to hub pricing. In markets where available gas is not blocked by long-
term contracts (the UK, the Netherlands and North America) short-term contracting 
between producers and consumers emerges where spot markets have emerged as gas hubs. 
Spot market trading, provides consumers with the benefit of the price advantage through 
short-delivery purchases and sales. 
Despite the fact that short-term contracting and hub pricing is becoming increasingly 
prominent in the European market, the majority of Gazprom’s sales with its European, 
Central Asian, Caucasian and Asian partners are still conducted through long-term GSAs 
with specific provisions detailing the specifications of renegotiation. Due to significant 
market restructuring in Europe over the past decade there has been a push by European 
partners to increase the portion of gas available on the market to be traded through short-
term contracts. However, Russia as the dominant exporter has a strategy to avoid this: when 
spot prices are lower than oil-index prices there is pressure to enter into renegotiations for 
lower prices but major gas producers such as Russia have the ability, through production 
constraints, to make some of the spot gas volume diminish from the market if it becomes 
oversupplied. Because of the price renegotiation clauses in long-term GSAs, major sellers 
would be extremely unwise to dump volumes of un-contracted gas into oversupplied 
markets. 
To best understand the determinants of energy security we must first evaluate energy 
dependence. For that purpose several salient elements of variation on gas contracts that will 
be examined and compared both across cases and within cases over time: duration, price 
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determination, volumes, renegotiation, enforceability, monitoring and terms (including ACQ, 
Yearly and Daily ToP, DcQ & MOP).   
Along with several other elements that will be described below, when viewed as a 
holisitic document, contracts are an excellent way of evaluating energy security. When states 
choose active dependence, this will often be reflected in their gas contract. For example, in 
the Ukrainian-Russian contract of 2009, there were several provisions that indicated 
Ukraine’s inability to implement long-term energy security improvements. Not only did 
Ukraine’s base price for gas increase to $450/tcm (one of the highest prices in Europe), but 
transit rates remained fixed and the contract also included strict take-or-pay clauses. Most 
notably, there exists a provision in the contract that allows Gazprom through a subsidiary to 
market 25% of imported gas directly to industrial users on the Ukrainian market.40  This 
provision adds a significant dimension to the 2009 Ukraine Russia natural gas negotiations 
and demonstrates the poor quality of Ukraine’s energy security beyond a higher price or 
strict payment terms. Therefore, while it is important to evaluate and compare individual 
provisions such as price and volume, it is also crucial to evaluate (as much as possible) entire 
documents for unusually significant provisions. Given the sensitive nature of the contracts 
and the fact that penalties against disclosure are often written into the agreements, it is 
impossible to get the full set of contracts for all European countries in the post-Soviet 
period. However, through extensive fieldwork in the region, as well as interviews with the 
Gazprom Head of Contract Structuring and Pricing Directorate, Sergey Komlev and other 
																																																								
40 Ukraine-Russia Gas Supply Contract 19 January 2009. g. mezhdu Otkrytym Aktsionernym 
Obshchestvom “Gazprom”, Moskva, Rossiiskaia Federatsiia, i Natsional’noi Aktsionernoi 
Kompaniei “Naftogaz Ukrainy”, Kiev, Ukraina, o kupli-prodazhi prirodnogo gaza v 2009-
2019 godakh. Published at www2.pravda.com.ua/ru/news/2009/1/22/87168.htm 
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heads of national gas companies including the CEO of Litgas Dominykas Tuckus, I have 
compiled a dataset of current contracts on a number of significant provisions.  
 
Gazprom’s Contracts in Eurasia 
 
Gazprom currently has a total of 22 foreign partners in Eurasia.41 However, due to 
the fact that the company sometimes has multiple contracts with various corporations within 
a given country, there are 34 current contracts that govern the sale and transmission of 
Russian gas into Europe and beyond. The majority of these contracts were first initiated with 
state-owned enterprises in the 1990s. However, due to the liberalization of gas markets in 
most European states, many of Gazprom’s contracts are now made directly with either 
partially state owned or entirely private gas companies. In most Western European countries 
where gas markets are fully liberalized, Gazprom has several contracts with private 
corporations, whose relationship with the energy security policy-making apparatus varies 
greatly. In some cases, Gazprom’s foreign partners answer only to shareholders, while in 
others corporations often work in tandem with their governments to implement national 
policies. In East and Central Europe, liberalization of the gas markets has lagged, giving 
Gazprom the opportunity to invest and in some cases (Armenia, Belarus) entirely acquire the 
national gas infrastructure corporations in their downstream partners. As will be 
demonstrated later, the ownership structures of foreign partner companies are of crucial 
importance to understanding energy security. Table 4 shows the current terms of Gazprom’s 
contracts in Eurasia. 																																																								
41 Gazprom Export. “Foreign Partners,” <http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/> 
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Source: Gazprom Export, Gazprom Databook 2010, Eurostat, news media 
 
As previously mentioned, despite the transformation of the natural gas market in the 
past ten years that has made long-term contracts (LTCs) less attractive to consumer states, 
Gazprom has continued to push for LTCs with its partners. With a few notable exceptions, 
it has been relatively successful in signing new LTCs over the past few years with the result 
that a large portion of Gazprom’s contracts are valid well into the late 2020s and early 2030s. 
As shown above however, there are a few notable cases where states have chosen not to 
renew LTCs with Gazprom upon the expiration of their gas contracts. As will be discussed 
in greater detail in a subsequent chapter, Lithuania neglected to renew its LTC with 
Gazprom when it expired in 2015 and instead prefers buying volumes via short duration 
contracts.42 This was a significant moment for Lithuania’s energy security, as it allowed 
Lithuania the opportunity to seek new potential producer states after previously being 100% 
dependent on Russian gas supplies. Similarly (but under very different circumstances), gas 
supplies to Ukraine are now governed via short-term contracts that had been worked out in 
trilateral Russia-Ukraine-EU talks in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. While LTCs remain 																																																								
42 “Gazprom Temporarily Offers More Expensive Gas Pricing for Lithuania,” The Baltic 
Course, January 15, 2016. 
 64 	
Gazprom’s preferred method of doing business in Europe, there are a few notable cases in 
which Gazprom has made the decision to pursue short-term contracts with its downstream 
partners. Gazprom currently provides gas to Bosnia and Herzegovina through contracts with 
a 6-month duration because of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s previous inability to pay its gas 
debts. Gazprom now requires Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet its obligations in the first 
half of the year in order to keep receiving gas supplies in the second half.43 Similarly, 
Gazprom currently requires Moldova to make an annual extension of its contract that 
expired in 2012 due to a dispute over the gas debts of Moldova’s separatist region 
Trasnistria.44 Both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova are extremely small markets for 
Gazprom. 
 The most obvious point of comparison in gas contracts is the variation in prices paid 
by the consumer state. Price can be indicative of energy security for obvious reasons: 
because natural gas is transported through fixed infrastructure and is not easily substitutable 
higher prices mean that supply is less secure. Because in most Eastern European consumer 
states gas is used not only for industrial purposees but also for consumer heating supply, 
paying high prices for gas can mean having to divert money from other areas of the budget 
or even risking going into debt arrears with the main supplier. As mentioned above, unlike 
oil, gas prices determined privately between the consumer and the producer state and are not 
governed by market prices. As a result the prices paid by consumer states can vary widely 
both across time and cases. Many states pay high prices for natural gas because the rents 
generated off the resale and distribution of this gas are a key source of income for energy 																																																								
43 Walters, Greg. “Gazprom Presses Bosnia over Debt,” The Wall Street Journal, August 24, 
2006. 
 
44 “Dividing Up Moldovagaz and Moldova’s Gas Debts,” Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich, March 
30, 2011.  
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veto players. In other cases Russia sells gas cheaply to consumers where it owns distribution 
networks and can make profits re-selling the gas to industrial consumers on the downstream 
market. These numbers mean little however, unless we compare them with both the total 
dependence on Russian gas and with the annual contracted volumes of gas, which can both 
vary greatly.  
 


















Armenia  100% 1.96 110   165 
Austria 61% 7    397   
Belarus 99% 20.3 128 166 139 
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As presented above, prices paid per mcm of natural gas can vary significantly 
between consumers in a given year. In 2008 prices ranged from a low of $110/mcm in 
Armenia to $500/mcm in Italy. In 2013 prices ranged from $110 in Armenia to $546 in 
Macedonia, with six states paying over $500/mcm. The traditional explanation for this 
variation contends that this is a result of varying levels of dependence. When dependence is 
high, Gazprom can charge higher prices without fear of losing market share. Where 
dependence is low, Gazprom must keep its prices more competitive. In many cases, this 
explanation appears correct. In 2012, Hungary, which is 34% dependent on Russian gas, 
paid an average of $391/mcm. In contrast, Bulgaria, which is 85% dependent, paid $501 per 
mcm. However, the market power explanations fail to account for wide variations in price 
within the same state overtime. Why for example, does Bulgaria pay nearly $100 less per 
mcm in 2015 than in 2013? During this period Bulgaria’s relative dependence on Russian 
supplies remains flat. Similarly, why does Hungary’s price drop nearly $130/mcm during this 
same interval despite a stagnant relative dependence?  
The tradeoff between price and dependence explanation also neglects significant 
market factors including volume. For example, Poland, which is 57% dependent on Russian 
gas, pays $197 more per mcm than does Germany, which is only 31% dependent on Russian 
gas. However, when we compare the volumes we can see that Germany, Russia’s largest 
consumer, imports a minimum volume of 43.5bcm/year vs. Poland’s minimum 9.1 
bcm/year. Therefore the price difference could also be explained through high volume 
discounts. However, even taking into account volumes, market explanations do not account 
for wide variation in prices between states that are similarly dependent and that have similar 
factor endowments. The main determinant of price variation is instead political factors. In 
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the next chapter I will demonstrate empirically the correlation between choice and timing of 
property rights regime, privatization, corruption and energy security outcomes such as price. 
 













Price 2013  
Average 
Price 2015 
Bulgaria 85% 3 bcm 257 501 400 
Czech 
Republic 
(RWE) 97% 9 bcm   503   
Slovakia 
(SPPa.s.) 97% 6.5bcm   429   
Belarus 99% 20.3 128 166 139 
Armenia 100% 1.96bcm 110   165 
Estonia 
(Eesti 
Gas) 100% .7bcm   442 287.3 
Finland 100% 
appox. 
3.10 bcm   385   
Latvia 100% .0015 bcm   416   
Lithuania 100% .0027 bcm 520-540 500 370 
 
 
As Table 6 demonstrates, Bulgaria, which is 85% dependent pays over $300/mcm more than 
Belarus and over $100 more than Finland. More puzzling is the price disparity between 
Lithuania and Estonia and Latvia. All three countries were 100% dependent on Russian 
supplies in 2013 and are similarly placed geographically. Why then, does Lithuania pay 
$75/mcm more than its neighbor Latvia? As I will demonstrate below and in a proceeding 
chapter, examining energy security requires a comprehensive understanding of a number of 
factors that go beyond price, dependence and annual volumes. To truly understand energy 
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dependence it is necessary to examine specific contractual provisions as well as ownership 
structures of natural gas companies, infrastructure and transit systems. All of this ultimately 
depends on politics, reform and corruption, which is why it is necessary to use innovative 
measures of the dependent variable to reflect the entire range of variation. 
 Most of the contracts between Gazprom and its downstream partners include a 
number of significant provisions that add complexity to the traditional understanding of 
international commodity trade. In the section below, I will provide a summary description of 
several examples of Gazprom’s contacts that include important provisions, which provide a 
more nuanced view of the contractual outcome, and therefore energy dependence in the 
downstream state. A full summary of all 34 current contracts is available upon request. In the 
proceeding chapter I introduce a dataset based upon these observations that assigns dollar 
values to all contract provisions as a way of gaining analytical traction. 
 
Armenia 
 Gazprom’s first formal contract with Armenia was signed in 1997, when Armenia 
agreed to deny Iran a potential deal to transit gas to Georgia and Ukraine as well as to reduce 
the diameter of a new domestic pipeline that was essential to the gas trade with Iran. In 
exchange, Gazprom agreed to provide Armenia with heavily subsidized gas. Part of the 
reason that Armenia pays the lowest prices in Eurasia for its natural gas supplies despite 
importing a relatively meager volume of approximately 2bcm/year is the fact that Gazprom 
has engaged in a strategy of buying downstream infrastructure in Armenia over time. 
Gazprom first acquired a 45% stake in the Armenia gas network, Armrosgazprom as 
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payment against gas debt arrears in 1997.45 During the period of 2006-2013 Gazprom 
acquired the remainder of shares in exchange for temporary price freezes and delayed 
implementation of Gazprom’s general price hikes in its contract renegotiations.46 The 2006 
contract set the price of gas at $110/mcm until January 1, 2009. As a result, Gazprom now 
controls 100% of Armenia’s gas infrastructure and transit system. Thus, despite the fact that 
Armenia pays the lowest prices in Eurasia for its gas, it is a mistake to evaluate energy 
security quality on the basis of price alone. Not only is it 100% dependent on Russian 
supplies, but Russia’s Gazprom controls the entire supply chain in Armenia from the time it 
enters the country’s borders to the final point of delivery to consumers.  
 
Belarus 
 Gazprom has had a contentious relationship with Belarus for some years. Although 
Belarus pays extremely low prices for its natural gas supplies, it has had several contractual 
disputes over the years. Gazprom continued to provide gas supplies to Belarus following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union at heavily subsidized prices. Throughout the years, a pattern 
emerged in which Belarus amassed debt arrears in the hundreds of millions of dollars, 
Gazprom threatened to reduce supplies and finally a fragile contractual compromise would 
emerge. However, a major contract dispute arose ahead of the 2006 contract negotiations 
when Gazprom sought a price increase that would bring Belarus up to market levels as well 
as a full payment of Belarus’ debts. Just hours before a threatened cut off of supplies a five-
year new contract was signed on January 1, 2007. Under this contract Belarus agreed to pay 
																																																								
45  Gazprom Subsidiary List. “Gazprom Armenia.” < 
http://www.gazprom.com/about/subsidiaries/list-items/669172/> Accessed May 12, 2016. 
46 Gazprom Press Release. “Gazprom Increasing Its Stake in ArmRosgazprom to 100 
percent.” January 14, 2014. 
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$100/mcm (down from Gazprom’s demand for $105/mcm) in exchange for selling 50% of 
the shares of Beltranzgaz, Belarus’ gas transmission and infrastructure company.47 In 2011, a 
further contract renewal agreement outlined pricing and gas transmission tariffs and included 
a purchase and sale agreement for the remaining 50% stake in Beltransgaz, which made 
Gazprom the total owner.48 In return Belarus had some of its debt forgiven and secured a 
Russian loan for a new nuclear power station.49 Thus although Gazprom failed in its quest to 
commercialize its relationship with Belarus, it did manage to gain complete control of 
Belarus’ gas transmission network, including the strategically important Northern Lights 
pipeline which transmits Russian gas through Belarus to Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Austria 
and beyond. Belarus is a good example of a case where examining the fuller picture of energy 
dependence including contract is very important to our understanding of its energy security. 
If one only examined the price and volume of the natural gas deal, one would come away 
thinking that Belarus had a very good deal indeed. However, if one examines contracts that 
ended the disputes between Russia and Belarus it is clear that Gazprom has made significant 





47 Yafimava, Katja and Jonathan Stern. “The 2007 Russia-Belarus Gas Agreement,” Oxford 




48 Gazprom Media. “Beltransgaz Returns to Gazprom Family,” April 4, 2012. 
 
49 Interview with Gazprom employee January 2015.  
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 Gazprom currently has two separate contracts to provide Bulgaria with natural gas. 
The first contract, originally signed with Bulgargaz, the Bulgarian state owned gas-company, 
was concluded in 1998 and renegotiated in December of 2006. This contract set minimum 
volumes for imports as well as transit. In 2012 however, the gas contract was renegotiated 
and signed directly between Gazprom and the government of Bulgaria (rather than through 
Bulgargaz).50 There are several aspects of the contract that are favorable to Bulgaria. First, 
the take or pay provision was lowered to 80% of booked volumes down from the previous 
90%. Second, the agreement provides for increasing gas transit volumes through Bulgaria. 
However, the contract also stipulates that further contract extensions are contingent on the 
replacement of barter settlements for gas transit with cash payments, something which 
Gazprom had been looking to achieve for many years. The 2012 negotiation made further 
transit volumes contingent on Bulgaria’s support for Gazprom’s South Stream pipeline 
project, which was later cancelled in 2014. Sergey Komlev, Head of Contract Structuring and 
Price Formation Directorate, later accused Bulgaria of breaking this agreement and failing to 
support Gazprom’s bid to build a pipeline through Southern Europe.51 Finally and most 
interesting, during the 2012 contract negotiations Gazprom signed a secondary contract with 
Overgas Incorporated, a joint stock company owned 50% by Gazprom and 50% by 
Bulgarian businessman Sasho Donchev. Donchev, a graduate of Moscow’s Oil and Gas 
Institute, was named director of the company in 2008, through a series of opaque holding 
companies with links to a man who was later arrested on charges of being a Russian Foreign 
																																																								
50 Brunwasser, Matthew. “Bulgaria Rejects Gazprom’s New Offer,” The New York Times, 
January 15, 2006.  
 
51 Interview, Sergey Komlev. 
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Intelligence Services agent. 52  Overgas, the largest private energy company in Bulgaria, 
controls approximately 10-12% of the Bulgarian gas market, and has over 55,000 household 
clients and 3,000 industrial clients.53 The contract between Gazprom Export and Overgas 
Inc. provided for the sale of 109mcm of gas in 2013, which was later extended to 400 
mcm/year for the period of 2013-2017. Overgas provided its industrial clients with prices 7-
8% lower than Bulgargaz, which had previously enjoyed a monopoly in the industrial 
sector.54 By signing a second contract with Overgas, which was effectively controlled by 
Gazprom itself55, Gazprom got access to the end user market at preferred rates, which 
allowed it to undercut Bulgargaz in its own market. Thus while Bulgaria negotiated a 20% 
price decrease in the contract from January 1, 2013, Gazprom gained further control of the 
Bulgarian gas market, decreasing Bulgaria’s energy security overall. In April 2016, Gazprom 
said it would sell off its shares in Overgas so as not run afoul of EU antitrust legislation in 




52 Kupchinkshy, Roman. “Bulgaria’s Overgas, A Russian Spy in Canada and Gazprom,” 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, Issue 30, February 13, 2009.  
 
53 Gotev. Georgi. “Bulgarian Gas Wars Uncover Hidden Gazprom Strategies,” EurActiv.com; 




55 In 2007 the chairman of the board of Overgas was Alexander Medvedev, the head of 
Gazprom Export, the company that sells the gas to Overgas. This was technically not a 
conflict of interest under Bulgarian law.  
 
56 Tsolova, Tsvetelia. “Bulgaria’s Overgas takes Gazprom to Court of Gas Supply Halt,” 
Reuters, April 7, 2016.  
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 Gazprom has three current contracts with Italy’s ENI, including a new strategic 
partnership and extension of currently binding contract. Prior to 2003, Gazprom had 
routinely included so-called “destination clauses” which established territorial restrictions on 
the destination of Gazprom gas. However, in 2003, following an investigation by the EU 
Commission, a deal was brokered that abolished all territorial restrictions in all Gazprom 
contracts with ENI. The amended contract then provided for two delivery points for 
Russian gas as opposed to one, and ENI was free to take gas to any destination after 
delivery. While this was seen as a victory for downstream states, the amended contract also 
deleted a provision that obliged Gazprom to obtain permission from ENI to sell gas to 
other customers in Italy. Following the abolishment of this restriction, in 2007 Gazprom 
gained access to the Italian market through two subsidiaries, ZMB Italia (100% owned 
Gazprom subsidiary) and Centrex (owned 66.67% by ZMB and 33.33% by Centrex Europe 
Energy and Gas, which is a Vienna based company of Centrex Holding Ltd, a Cyprus-
registered structure of Gazprombank)57, with sales up to 3bcm/ year permitted. During this 
contract renegotiation, ENI was promised the rights to buy assets in Russia. It was later 
revealed through a parliamentary investigation that Bruno Mentasi-Granelli, a prominent 
Italian businessman and close friend of Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi, owned 33% of Centrex 
Europe through several subsidiaries which were all registered at the same address in Milan.58 
Another major change to LTCs in Europe was also instigated in the Italian contract. In the 
2013 renegotiations, ENI won a 7% reduction in price. In 2014, Gazprom and ENI signed a 
contract addendum that reduced supply prices further and changed the price indexation. 																																																								
57 ICIS. “Gazprom Strengthens Presence in Italian Downstream Market,” 29 September 
2008. 
 
58 Kupchinsky, Roman. “Berlusconi, Centex, Hexagon 1 and 2 and Gazprom,” Eurasian Daily 
Monitor, Vol. 5 Issue 228, December 1, 2008. 
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This was the first major LTC that did away with oil indexation price calculations. Gazprom 
also cut ENIs take or pay volumes to 16bcm from its usual 19bcm/year. In return, ENI 
promised to make up the volumes by taking more gas in the period of 2015-2017. 
 
Latvia 
 Gazprom delivers gas to Latvia under a contract concluded between Gazprom 
Export and the Latvian state-owned natural gas company Latvijas Gaze, which is 34% 
owned by Gazprom itself.59 Latvijas Gaze is currently the country’s sole natural gas provider, 
transmission company, and storage provider. In addition, Latvijas Gaze is 25% owned by 
Itera Latvia, a subsidiary of the notorious Russian gas trading company “Itera”, which has 
played a large part in the Ukrainian gas trade. Although Latvia maintains a large underground 
storage unit at Incukalns, access to this facility is limited as it 50% owned by Gazprom. 
During the 2014 contract renegotiations, Gazprom reduced Latvijas Gaze’s take-or-pay 
provision to 80% in return for the Latvian government’s decision to postpone EU mandated 
ownership unbundling under the Third Energy Packages until 2017.60 Citing a commitment 
to a 1996 agreement that guaranteed exclusivity to Gazprom, the Latvian government has 





59 Natural Gas Europe. “Latvia Opts for Cheaper Gazprom Gas, Hinders Lithuanian LNG 
delivery,” May 21, 2015.  
 
60 Natural Gas Europe, “Who will buy Gazprom’s Stake in Latvijas Gaze?” March 24, 2016. 
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 Gazprom’s contract with Moldova shows a similar strategy to that employed in 
Latvia. Although Gazprom has refused to sign an LTC with Moldova, instead preferring to 
pursue an annual renegotiation, Gazprom currently owns a 50% stake in the Moldovan state 
gas company Moldovagaz, and manages a 13.44% stake for the separatist authorities in 
Transnistria.61 In the 2012 gas contract renegotiations, Gazprom offered Moldova a price 
discount in return for postponing the implementation of the TEP that would require 
Gazprom to sell their stake in Moldovagaz. During this negotiation, Gazprom also 
demanded that the Moldovan government assume Transnistria’s gas debts ($5.2b in 2015). 
Transnistria then obtained a four-year delay in TEP implementation (until 2020) in exchange 
for a one-year price discount.62 Notably, Transnistria consumes over two thirds of the gas 
supplied annually by Gazprom to Moldova and pays nothing for it. TiraspolTransGaz-
Pridnestrovye (the Transnistrian gas authority) sells gas on the domestic market at subsidized 
prices (between approximately $75-90 per mcm) and keeps the profits. Moldovagaz, which 
then assumes Transnistria’s debt tolerates this because Gazprom holds a controlling stake in 
the company. Because Moscow has not official recognized Transnistria, it can officially 
assign Moldova with its debts. 
 
Poland 
 Poland has long been one of the vocal opponents of European dependency on 
Russian gas supplies. As one of Gazprom’s largest customers in Europe, importing 																																																								
61  Interview Moldovan official; Casinge, Ecaterina. “Gazprom Monopoly Broken in 
Moldova,” EurActiv.com August 28, 2014; “Companies with Gazprom’s participation and 
other affiliated entities,” Gazprom <http://www.gazprom.com/about/subsidiaries/list-
items/> accessed June 13, 2016. 
 
62 Interview Moldovan official; OSW, “An Aided Economy: The Characteristics of the 
Transnistrian Economic Model,” May 16, 2013.  
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approximately 9bcm of gas annually, Polish officials were outraged when it was revealed in 
2012 that they were paying one of the highest prices in Europe. Following the discovery of 
huge shale gas deposits, Poland negotiated a 15% price cut in 2012 and changed the pricing 
formula of the 2010 contract by linking the price of gas to market prices rather than the 
traditional oil-indexation.63 All other provisions, including take-or-pay, remained the same. 
This resolution allowed Poland to drop an arbitration case it had brought to Stockholm’s 
arbitration court, although it filed another case in an attempt to further reduce prices in 
2014.64  However, despite initial excitement about the possibility of over 300 years of energy 
independence following the discovery of 5.3 trillion cubic meters of shale gas reserves, 
Poland was forced to abandon plans to extract large amounts of shale gas due to unfavorable 
geography65 and environmental concerns.66  Gazprom’s contract with the state-controlled gas 
company Polskie Gornictwo Naftowe I Gazownictwo SA (PGNiG) is due to expire in 2022, 
and Piotr Naimski, deputy minister in charge of energy security has publically stated that 
PGNiG is seeking to end the contract after this point. The Polish Energy Ministry issued a 
statement claiming, “The strategic goal of PGNiG, in line with the politics of Poland’s 																																																								
63 Interview Polish official February 2015. Buckley, Neil, Jan Cienski and Joshua Chaffin. 
“Gazprom Reduces Price of Gas to Poland,” The Financial Times, November 6, 2012.  
 
64 Gazprom. “Gazprom and PGNiG Reach Agreement on Gas Price,” November 6, 2012, 
<http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2012/november/article147730/>.  
 
65 Staehr, Fabian. “Natural Gas Supply Diversification in Eastern Europe and Long-Term 
Opportunities from Domestic Shale Gas Resources: A Modelling Approach Using the 
Global Gas Model,” Masters Thesis: Faculty of Georesources and Materials Engineering, 
Aachen University, May 2015.  
 
66  Interestingly, accusations have been leveled that Gazprom was directly financing 
environmentalists and environmental protests against the dangers of fracking. Ilya 
Ponomarev, an opposition member of the Russian Duma said in an interview that 
“Gazprom is financing environmentalists in the US and Europe. It’s paying for high profile 
people to say fracking is dangerous. Russia Today dedicates time to saying fracking is 
dangerous.” Interview Ilya Ponomarev, March 9, 2015. 
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government is the true diversification of gas sources and routes. In the near future, PGNiG 
plans to base its import portfolio on LNG deliveries as well as supplies from western and 
northern Europe.”67  This statement comes on the heels of another arbitration case between 
Gazprom and PGNiG, who is seeking a further reduction in prices. While papers for the 
deal were prepared in 2015, they were not verified because of elections in Poland and 
changes in PGNiG’s leadership. Gazprom Deputy Chief Executive Officer Alexander 
Medvedev did not seem overly concerned by Poland’s adversarial position, stating, “Of 
course, everybody is free to choose how to purchase his gas and to ensure the 
competitiveness of his economy. There is a well-known fairy-tale about an old woman who 
asked a golden fish to turn her into a Sea Empress but in the end she found herself back 
with her broken washtub in front of her.”68 However, unlike other cases mentioned above, 
Poland has built its first LNG terminal and has plans to build a pipeline in to the North Sea 
to directly transport Norwegian gas to Polish territory.69 
 
Rating Contractual Outcomes 
 
 As demonstrated above, natural gas contracts contain a wealth of information on 
energy security that has not yet been systematically analyzed. While price, volumes, duration 
and transit fees are crucial to understanding relative energy security, it is clear that they do 
not paint the full picture of energy policy outcomes. In many cases, Gazprom makes price or 																																																								
67 Mazneva, Elena and Maciej Martewicz. “Gazprom says U.S. LNG is no Panacea as Poland 
Shuns Russian Gas,” Bloomberg, May 31, 2016.  
 
68 Mazneva, Elena and Maciej Martewicz. “Gazprom says U.S. LNG is no Panacea, 2016. 
 
69 Interview Polish official February 2015. Shemetov, Maxim. “Poland Aims to End Long-
Term Gas Supplies from Russia after 2022,” Reuters, May 31, 2016.  
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take-or-pay concessions in return for the acquisition of downstream assets, or even for the 
delayed implementation of the EU TEP.  On initial examination, this may seem like a 
positive outcome for the downstream state. However, as seen above in the cases of Armenia, 
Belarus, Latvia and Moldova, Gazprom’s control over the national transmission and 
distribution networks can lead to severe energy insecurity. In the case of Armenia, 
Gazprom’s control over Armrosgazprom meant that to secure a new gas contract, Armenia 
was forced to deny a potential deal to increase its gas trade with another supplier, Iran. 
Further, an examination of the contracts can also yield important insights into the 
mechanisms that support my theory. In the case of Bulgaria, Gazprom’s contract with 
Overgas Inc. highlights the importance of Soviet-era networks and corruption that dominate 
the Bulgarian energy sector and prevent much needed structural reform. Similarly, even in 
countries that were not former Soviet bloc states like Italy, a lack of property rights and 
reform in the energy sector can lead to corrupt practices that retard the development of a 
cohesive energy security strategy. However, as the Polish case indicates above, some states 
have been successful at securing price reductions and other contractual outcomes to support 
their larger energy security policy goals. Although the Polish dream of gas independence 
following the discovery of shale gas deposits has now faded due to a variety of 
environmental and geological concerns, Poland has continued to seek diversification options 
through the construction of LNG terminals and partnerships with other producers.  In the 
next section I introduce the other half of the dependent variable: total state diversification 
policy. Following the presentation of this dataset I will present an original index of energy 
security quality that includes both contract data and diversification data. In the next chapter, 
I introduce a quantitative method of explaining the determinants of contractual outcomes by 
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assigning monetary value to each provision and using this data, along with the index 
introduced below, to evaluate my theory through multivariate regression. 
 
Nuances of Energy Security 
 
Most studies that seek to assess energy security focus solely on the degree of import 
dependence and the diversity of those supplies. These studies often fail to evaluate a large 
number of factors that contribute to energy security in order to achieve methodological 
precision in quantitative studies. For example, in a recent study by the European 
Commission, the authors state that they left out of analysis some potentially important 
indicators of energy security because they are “difficult to quantify.”70  None of these studies 
look at information garnered from natural gas contracts with suppliers beyond estimations of 
price or volume. Even studies that seek to go beyond a mere evaluation of import 
dependence to include measures such as LNG capacity, total fuel mix consumption and 
storage capacity neglect several important elements of energy security including the 
ownership structure of natural gas distributors, transport infrastructure and storage.71 In this 
section, I will introduce a number of measures not generally accounted for in traditional 
studies of cross-national energy security: fuel mix, energy intensity, ownership of 
downstream infrastructure and companies and directed flow capacities. In the following 
section I combine this data with information garnered from the natural gas contracts into a 
new comprehensive index of energy security outcomes in Eurasia from 1990-2015. 
																																																								
70  European Commission, “Member States Energy Dependence: An Indicator Based 
Assessment,” European Economic Occasional Papers, 145, April 2013.  
 
71 Shaffer, Brenda. “Europe’s Natural Gas Security of Supply: Policy Tools for Single 
Supplied States,” Energy Law Journal 36 no. 179 (2015).  
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Rather than examining energy security as a simple function of supply diversity, it is 
more helpful to look at a combination of the fuel mix in the Total Primary Energy Supply 
(TPES) and energy intensity (measure of energy use in relation to population and economic 
output, lower use of energy by industry to produce goods and services means higher energy 
security) paired with the availability and number of other producers. These measures are 
important for a number of reasons. First, these measures give us a good idea about how 
dependent electricity generation is on natural gas in a given state. Because natural gas is not 
easily substitutable for transportation oil, the amount of natural gas in the TPES is a good 
estimate of how reliant a state is on natural gas for electricity generation for residential and 
industrial customers, district heating and residential heating. Second, the transaction costs of 
fuel switching are high. Infrastructure for electricity generation is customized for fuel type, 
so switching to coal, nuclear, renewables or natural gas requires extensive modifications. 
Therefore different types of fuels are not easily substitutable and require not only a 
significant material investment but also long lead times. This has large implications for 
energy security: if a state uses a significant amount of natural gas in its TPES and is 
dependent on another state to provide this, it is difficult to switch to alternate sources of 
energy if their supply is threatened. Table 4 below shows the total share of natural gas in the 
TPES for each Gazprom partner and the percentage of natural gas purchased from 
producers beyond Russia.  
 
Table 3-4: Share of Natural Gas in TPES; Supply Diversity; Energy Intensity 
Country 
Total Share of 
Natural Gas in 




Armenia 59% Iran: 30% 191 
Austria 24% Norway 15% 139 
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Belarus 61% None 458 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 6% None 189 
Bulgaria 13% None 354 
Czech Republic 16% Norway: Statoil 254 
Denmark 22%   133 
Estonia 1% None 295 
Finland 11% None 269 
France 16%   170 
Georgia 42% Azerbaijan: 90% 244 
Germany 22% 
Norway: Statoil 25%; 
Netherlands 26% 163 
Great Britain 34% 
Norway 54%; Qatar 26%; 
Netherlands 15%; Belgium 
5% 141 
Greece 14% 
Algeria: Sonartrac 16%, 
Turkey: Botas 15%, Qatar 
4%; Nigeria 2% 137 
Hungary 40% 
Spot Markets from Western 
Europe; Domestic 
Production 20% 178 
Italy 39% 
Algeria: 32%; Libya 9%; 
Qatar 9%; Netherlands 7% 122 
Latvia 27% None 189 
Lithuania 37% Norway: Statoil 233 
Macedonia 1% None 222 
Moldova 68% 
Kazakhstan 24%, Romania 
8.5%,  528 
Netherlands 36%   172 
Poland 14% 
Germany (intra EU trade 
originating in Russia): 15%; 
Domestic 27% 212 
Romania 29% Domestic Production: 78% 248 
Serbia 12% None 653 
Slovakia 27% 
Germany: E.ON; France: 
GDF Suez 273 
Slovenia 10% None 190 
Turkey 32% 
Iran 18%; Algeria 9%; 
Azerbaijan 7%; Nigeria 3% 167 
Ukraine 40% 
Pre 2012 none; post 2012 
Russia: 92%, Germany, 565 
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Hungary, Austria, Poland 
 
Source:  Own compilation based on Holz, Shaffer, IEA Statistics 2012, European 
Commission Country Reports, Eurostat “Gross Inland Energy Consumption and Energy 
Intensity of the Economy 2003-2013.” 
 
Some states have TPES that are not well distributed. Many former Soviet states for example, 
have fuel mixes that are extremely carbon intensive and heavily reliant on natural gas. In 
states like Ukraine (who prior to 2014 had no alternative suppliers), Belarus, or Moldova this 
can be indicative of energy insecurity. Energy intensity is an important indicator of energy 
security: states with more energy intensive economies burn more fuel to generate the same 
amount of GDP. For example, most Western European states have energy intensity scores 
in the mid to low 100s. But Belarus, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine have extremely high 
energy intensity scores. Ukraine has the highest energy intensity score of any major 
industrialized state. However, even in states with relatively high shares of natural gas in their 
TPES, a well-diversified mix of suppliers can alleviate some of this insecurity. But while 
taking TPES and supply diversity into account is important, these measures alone do not 
give a full picture of energy security. Poland, for example, uses natural gas for only 14% of 
its TPES. However, because of its extremely carbon intensive economy, Poland imports 
large volumes of natural gas to fulfill its energy needs. In 2012, its natural gas consumption 
stood at 16.2bcm per year, of which 4.4 bcm was produced domestically.72 Poland also 
imports (Russian) natural gas from Germany, therefore reducing its natural gas supply 
dependency on Russia to approximately 55%. However, due to a number of other factors 
that will be discussed below, Poland actually enjoys a good degree of energy security. 																																																								
72 BP. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013, June 2013.  
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Poland’s energy security strategy was tested and ultimately shown to be successful during the 
2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis which resulted in significant gas shortages at the border but 
which did not have a severe impact on industrial production or home heating due to the fact 
that Poland is virtually self sufficient in the generation of electricity thanks to its coal 
reserves and production amongst other factors.73 
 A second and often ignored factor of energy security is the extent to which Gazprom 
plays a role in the downstream infrastructure and transmission systems. For example, 
Gazprom owns in entirety the Belarusian natural gas infrastructure and transit company, 
formerly Belarusian state-owned Beltransgaz (now Gazprom Transgaz Belarus). Gazprom 
also fully controls the transit pipeline system of the Yamal Pipeline via Gazprom Transgaz 
Belarus. This is a subsidiary in the same manner as the domestic Russian “Gazprom 
Transgaz” subsidiaries in Russian provinces (example: “Gazprom Transgaz Moscow”).74 
Further, Gazprom has full control over the operation of three underground storage facilities 
in Belarus and 233 distribution stations to local Belarusian consumers. Obviously, gas 
infrastructure is not easily substitutable: transport, transmission and energy generation 
infrastructure is expensive and takes years to build. If a state does not have full or even 
partial control over these facilities, it can be difficult or even impossible to replace them. 
Therefore it is crucial to understand the ownership structure of downstream assets including 
natural gas companies and transit and storage infrastructure. Table 8 shows direct shares of 
Gazprom in Eurasian Countries by the nature of the infrastructure. 
Table 3-5: Direct and Indirect Shares of OAO Gazprom in Eurasia 																																																								
73  Sharples, Jack. “Russo-Polish Energy Security Relations: A Case of Threatening 
Dependency, Supply Guarantee or Regional Energy Security Dynamics?” Political Perspectives, 
6 no. 1 (2012).  
 
74 Holz et al. 2014. 
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Country 
Ownership of Gas 






Gazprom Armenia: 100% 
Gazprom, operates gas 
supply for domestic market 
and power generation     
Austria   





Gazprom Tranzgaz Belarus 
(100% Gazprom):  sole 
natural gas infrastructure 








Naftna Industrija Srbije 
(Serbian Subsidiary of 
Gazprom Neft): opened 
over 250 petrol stations 
throughout Bosnia   
 
Bulgaria 
Bulgargaz (State Owned): 
delivers 90% of local gas; 
Overgas Inv. 50.5% 
Gazprom: 10% direct sales 
to consumers 
Overgas Inc. 50.5%; 
Bulgaria AD 50% WIEE 100% 
















Eesti Gaas: 37% Gazprom, 
9.7 Itera Latvija (Gazprom 
subsidiary): 2015 sold 37% 
stake now 100% state 
owned to comply with EU 
unbundling   
 
Finland 
Gasum: 25% sold to 
Finland January 2016 for 
$272m     
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Germany   
Yamal Europe: 
+50% Gazprom 






Great Britain   
 Interconnector UK 
Limited: 10% 
Gazprom   
Greece 
 South Stream Greece SA 
50%; Prometheus Gas SA 
50%     
Hungary   
South Stream 
Hungary Ltd. 50% Panrusgas 50% 
Italy   JSC Promgaz, 50% 
 
Latvia 
Latvijas Gaz: 34%, 25% 
Itera Latvija Latvijas Gaz: 34% 
Latvijas Gaz: 
34% 





subsidiary     
Moldova Moldovagaz: 50% Gazprom 
Moldovagaz: 50% 
Gazprom   
Netherlands       
Poland   
EuRoPol Gaz: 48% 
Gazprom 
 Romania       
Serbia 
NIS (largest energy 





Gazprom NIS: 56% 
Slovakia 
SPP: 51% state owned, 29% 
E.ON& GDF Suez     
Slovenia       
Turkey       








Source: own compilation from Gazprom and Subsidiary websites 
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As shown above, Gazprom’s activities in its downstream partners can range from complete 
control and ownership of all natural gas infrastructure, transport and delivery points 
(Armenia, Belarus) to no participation in downstream assets at all (The Netherlands, 
Slovenia). However, in almost all downstream states, Gazprom maintains some level of 
direct investment and ownership in the value chain (production, distribution, transportation 
and storage).  In the Baltics and Finland, which are largely dependent on Russian natural gas 
supplies, Russia holds shares of varying amounts in the national distribution companies as 
well as the pipeline operator in Lithuania. Gazprom is also active in trading and distribution 
in other Eastern and Central European countries. Even in states that have refused to sell off 
portions of their national gas companies, Gazprom has unique influence as an exporter due 
to its investment strategy. Unlike Belarus, Ukraine’s pipeline system is state owned (via state 
gas company Naftogaz Ukrainy). However, despite the fact that Ukraine has remained 
steadfast in its resistance to selling off shares Naftogaz Ukrainy to reduce gas debt, Gazprom 
is still engaged in the downstream sector in Ukraine as both a supplier and distributor of gas 
via its wholly owned subsidiary Gazprom Sbyt Ukraine, which serves mainly industrial 
consumers.75 Further reducing energy security is presence of Gazprom in the Ukrainian gas 
supplier UkrGazEnergo, which is owned by RusUkrEnergo a joint venture between 
Gazprom and Ukrainian gas middleman Dmitry Firtash, who has links to the Russian energy 
sector.  
Ownership of energy assets in a downstream state by their main supplier can 
negatively affect energy security in a number of ways. First, it decreases leverage in contract 
negotiations. When Gazprom owns transmission networks in the downstream states it can 
restrict access to volumes that may be available by alternate suppliers (see Armenia above). 																																																								
75 Holz et al., 2014. 
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This has a spiral effect on energy security: not only does it make a downstream state more 
dependent on their upstream supplier, but it also decreases the likelihood of access to other 
producers. Because constructing new natural gas infrastructure is costly, it can be very 
difficult to make the time and monetary investments necessary to build new infrastructure 
that is not controlled by the producing state.  
This investment strategy, which complements its traditional long-term contract sales, 
means that the producer can also control storage capacity and the domestic natural gas trade. 
Some states are considered more energy secure because they have the capacity to store 
natural gas for use in the winter months or for emergencies. However, in several states, these 
underground storage units are in large part owned and operated by Gazprom itself. While 
the gas remains physically on the territory of the downstream state, it is often not the 
property of the state itself, but of Gazprom. See Table 9 for Natural Gas Storage Capacity 
and Gazprom Participation in Storage. 
 





% of natural 
gas 
consumption) Gazprom Participation in Storage 
Armenia .006%  
Abovyanskaya UGS station (100% 
Gazprom 100%) 
Austria 82% Haidach (Gazprom 66.7%) 




Herzegovina 0%   
Bulgaria 17% None 
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Czech Republic 30% Damborice (Gazprom 50%) 
Denmark     
Estonia 0%   
Finland 0%   
France 29% None 
Georgia 0% None 
Germany 25% 
Katharina (50% Gazprom); Rehden 
(100% Gazprom); Etzel (Gazprom 
33.3%); Jemgum (100% Gazprom) 
Great Britain 0.06%   
Greece 1.86%   
Hungary 58%   
Italy 22% None 
Latvia 220%  Partial Ownership of Inculkans 
Lithuania   None 
Macedonia     
Moldova 0%   
Netherlands  .325%    
Poland 10% None 
Romania 23%  
 Signed with Gazprom for additional 
5bcm storage capacity 
Serbia 30% Banatski Dvor (100% Gazprom) 
Slovakia  44%    
Slovenia 0%   
Turkey 6%    
Ukraine 75%  None 
Source: Own compilation and calculation based on IEA Country Reports, European 
Commission, Holz, news articles 
 
The availability of natural gas storage facilities contributes to increased levels of energy 
security, improved balances in the natural gas system and more efficient servicing of peak 
gas demand.  Not only does increased storage capacity make the gas network more efficient, 
but it is also seen as a way of enhancing supply security against potential disruptions, as well 
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as a way of taking advantage of price fluctuations and seasonal demand. However, building 
UGS facilities iscostly and tends to be more expensive than storage solutions for other 
commodities such as oil.76 Further, states are highly constrained in their ability to develop 
UGS due to geological limitations: most notably a lack of underground storage caverns that 
could be easily converted to storage sights.  Slovenia, which currently has no underground 
gas storage facility, has unfavorable geology that permits storage only in aquifers, which due 
to faults, were found to be unreliable.77 
 Even in states that do have the geological potential to build UGS sites, the costs can 
be prohibitive. For example in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the project is estimated at around 
€50m excluding the cost of building pipeline infrastructure that would be needed to connect 
the site to the natural gas grid. 78 While there are a number of constraints on the ability to 
construct storage facilities, some states have made seemingly puzzling decisions not to invest 
in potential UGS facilities. Bulgaria’s lack of investment in this area highlights the 
mechanisms of the Strong Players, Weak Rules theory and the domestic political factors that 
will be explored in depth in the following chapters. Bulgaria has both a need for, and the 
geological potential to dramatically increase its gas storage capacity. Considering the fact that 
Bulgaria has faced a serious supply emergency once in 2009, it is puzzling that Sofia 
neglected for many years to make serious improvements to the capacity of its current UGS 
facility at Chiren or to invest in new facilities at the depleted offshore Galata gas field. 
Despite the fact that Sofia secured a €200m EU funded loan to increase the capacity of 																																																								
76 IEA. IEA Looks Into Gas Security, March 11, 2010. 
 
77 Gosar, Andrej. “Seismic Reflection Investigations for Gas storage in Aquifers (Mura 
Depression, NE Slovenia),” Geologica Carpathia 56 no. 3 (June 2005).  
 
78 Giamouridis, Anastasios and Spiros Paleoyannis. “Security of Gas Supply in South Eastern 
Europe: Potential Contribution of Planned Pipelines, LNG and Storage,” OIES, July 2011. 
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Chiren in 2005, the project has languished.79 Additionally, in Poland and Romania there is 
unused potential for more storage, but these states have exhibited a preference for relying on 
storage services provided by Gazprom. 
 Despite the fact that UGS facilities are complex entities, they do represent a good 
partial measure of overall energy security when paired with the ownership structure of those 
facilities. Thus while Serbia’s Banatski Dvor facility holds over 30% of Serbia’s annual 
consumption of natural gas, it is important to note that that facility is owned and operated 
100% by Gazprom. This can limit Serbia’s ability to use the gas: Gazprom could potentially 
decline to refill the facility in case of a dispute, and could also prevent Serbia from shipping 
gas in that facility to another state in an emergency. 
 Since the Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of 2009, the European Union has focused on 
increasing pipeline connections between member states (EU regulation 994/2010).80 Created 
with the aim of increasing the energy security, the regulation stipulates that as of December 
2013 all cross-border pipeline connections must accommodate reverse flows as well as 
traditional flow direction. This means that in case of an emergency, pipelines must be able to 
technically accommodate the flow of gas from West to East, instead of the traditional East 
to West flows. In practice, the regulation meant that Russian gas that had flowed westwards 
could potentially be sent back East to vulnerable states. For the most part, this regulation has 
been implemented, increasing the energy security of several member states. However, there 
remains a lack of pipeline capacity to reverse flow to the most vulnerable countries in 																																																								
79 Sofia News Agency. “Bulgaria’s Chiren Gas Storage has Enough Gas for 3 Months,” 
February 25, 2015.   
 
80 Regulation 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 




Eastern Europe, particularly Bulgaria. Table 10 shows the directed flow capacities between 
EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe. 




Austria Slovenia Yes 
Austria Slovakia Yes 
Poland Germany Yes 
Czech 
Republic  Germany Yes 
 Latvia Estonia Yes 
Latvia Lithuania Yes 
Austria Hungary Yes 
Bulgaria Greece No 
Romania Bulgaria No 
Hungary Romania Yes 
Hungary Croatia Yes 
Slovenia Croatia No 
Czech 
Republic Poland No 
Poland  Slovakia No pipeline 
Lithuania Poland No Pipeline 
Ukraine Slovakia Yes 
Ukraine Hungary Yes 
Ukraine Poland Yes 
Source: ENTSO-G (2013), Holz and own updates 
 
The importance of reverse flow capacity became evident in the wake of the Ukraine crisis in 
2014. In April 2014, Ukraine signed an agreement with Slovakia that would enable EU states 
to deliver natural gas supplies through Slovakia to Ukraine, thus decreasing Ukraine’s 
dependence on Russian deliveries.81 During the following year, as Russia and Ukraine were 
unable to agree on quarterly gas prices during negotiations, Ukraine was able to receive 
																																																								
81 Harrison, Colin and Zuzana Princova. “A Quiet Gas Revolution in Central and Eastern 
Europe,” Energy Post, October 29, 2015. 
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shipments of gas from Hungary and Slovakia to make up for a lack of Russian supplies 
during the six month period in which Russia stopped gas flows due to non-payment of gas 
debts. However, while reverse flow has provided Ukraine with increased flexibility and 
options in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, many do not regard reverse flow as the panacea to 
Eastern Europe’s energy dependency. In mid 2015 Kiev appealed to the European Union to 
intercede in an agreement between Gazprom and Slovak pipeline operator Eustream that it 
says violated EU law by allowing Gazprom to prevent reverse flows back to Ukraine in one 
key pipeline.82 Ukraine had repeatedly asked Slovakia to allow reverse flows through one of 
four main pipelines at the Uzhgorod-Velke Kapusany gas transit point on the Ukraine-
Slovak border, but Eustream declined, citing an agreement with Gazprom that prevented 
this. Similarly, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán stopped reverse flow deliveries to 
Ukraine in 2014, announcing “Hungary cannot get into a situation in which, due to the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict, it cannot access its required supply of energy.”83 Nevertheless, 
the reverse flow capacity has fundamentally changed the nature of energy security for certain 
states, including Ukraine, but remains lacking in other energy insecure states such as Bulgaria 
and the Baltics. 
 The final measures of diversification that will be used to evaluate energy security are 
more traditional measures of diversification: potential LNG terminals and import capacity 
and alternative fuel sources (nuclear, renewables). Table 11 shows LNG Terminals (with 
capacity) and percentage of power generation by nuclear and renewables. 
																																																								
82 Lewis, Barbara. “Ukraine Appeals to EU over ‘Illegal’ Gazprom Pipeline Contract,” 
Reuters, June 23, 2015.  
 
83 Agence-France Presse. “Hungary suspends Gas Supplies to Ukraine Under Pressure from 
Moscow,” The Guardian, September 26, 2014. Hungary also received a €10b loan from 





Table 3-8: Alternative Fuel Sources by Country (2013) 
Country LNG Terminals 
Nuclear (percentage 
of power generation) Renewables 
Armenia N/A 42.90% 
Investment in Wind 
Farms 










Herzegovina N/A 0% 
Very Low: mainly 
feed-in tariffs in 
power generation 
Bulgaria None 33% 
16% renewables: 
wind, solar (2013): 
but Feb 2016 
government 
abolished preferential 
prices for renewable 
energy installations 
Czech Republic N/A 33% (6 generators) 
5%, 13% EU Target 
2020 
Denmark Hirtshals (500cm) 
0% Production (small 
import from Sweden, 
Norway and Germany) 
2050 Goal of 100% 
renewable 
Estonia None 0% 16% 
Finland 
Povoo (opened 2010): 
very small production 
capacity (27mcm) used for 
peak-shaving, fuel of 
cruise ships. Not 
equipped to send to gas 





Cavaou, Fos-sur-mer 42% 8% 
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Georgia None 0% 
19% mainly hydryo 
minimal geothermal, 
solar 
Germany Planned: Wilhemshaven 0% 30% 
Great Britain 
South Hook, Dragon, 
Grain, Canvey, Teesside 18% 14.90% 
Greece 
Revithoussa (.5-
.68bcm/year) 0% 8% 




Porto Levante, Offshore 
LNG Toscana 0% 17.10% 
Latvia None   35.80% 
Lithuania Klaipeda (4bcm/year) 0% 22% 
Macedonia N/A 0% 
11% (biomass, 
geothermal) 
Moldova N/A 0% 1% 
Netherlands 
Gate, Rotterdam: one of 
the largest in the world, 
but only operating 10% 
capacity   14% 
Poland 
 Swinoujscie (capacity 
5bcm/year) 0% 9% 
Romania 
Planned terminal on Black 
Sea 8.50% 3% 
Serbia N/A 0% Goal of 27% by 2020 
Slovakia N/A 25% by 2020 11% by 2020 
Slovenia None 20% 25% by 2020 
Turkey 
2 LNG ternimals: annual 
capacity 14bcm; new 
terminal under review 
with cacpcity of 18 
mcm/d. 0% but planned 2020 Goal of 30% by 2023 
Ukraine* Planned: Odessa 27.10% negligible 
Source: Own compilation, news sources, IEA, EC 
 
While LNG has been imported to Western Europe for decades, it is a completely 
new source of gas supplies for Eastern European countries. Constructing access to LNG 
terminals (where available) opens up possibilities for new suppliers that were previously not 
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available due. Although the construction of LNG terminals has become a main priority for 
several energy dependent European states, LNG gas is obviously not an option for 
landlocked states. However, for those whom it is an option, increasing LNG capacity has 
dramatically changed the energy security outlook and in some cases has become the 
cornerstone of energy security policy. Poland has constructed a terminal on Baltic Coast 
(Swinoujscie) and Lithuania completed a floating LNG terminal at Klaipeda that has allowed 
Lithuania to break its 100% dependency on Russian gas with Norwegian imports. Gazprom 
does not participate in any existing LNG imports in Europe, although it has plans through 
one of its subsidiaries to develop a terminal in Finland. 
Other states have opted to increase their energy security by investing in alternative 
sources of energy including nuclear and renewables. As demonstrated above, there is a large 
variation in the extent to which states have been able to invest in alternative sources of 
energy. Belarus for example, has no nuclear power generation capabilities and has so far 
made no significant investment into renewable energy sources. Germany, which enforced a 
moratorium on nuclear energy following the Fukushima disaster, generates approximately 
30% of its energy needs through renewable sources. Finland generates close to 50% of its 
energy needs through nuclear and renewable sources. However, in the Baltic States, the 
statistics on renewable energy are somewhat misleading as they include biomass (wood) as a 
renewable source of energy.84 
 
Understanding Energy Security: A New Index of Energy Dependence 
 
																																																								
84 Interview Dominykas Tuckas, CEO Litgas, July 29, 2015 
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Energy security is a complex and nuanced issue that cannot be understood by 
assessing simple metrics such as price or simple dependence levels. During the Russia-
Ukraine crises, the media has illustrated energy insecurity by showing the relative portion of 
Russian gas supplied to European states, assuming that those with high numbers are the 
most vulnerable to Moscow. Even policymakers have neglected to look at a full picture of 
variables when trying to assess relative energy security. In its 2013 report on European 
energy security, the European Commission wrote: 
 
While we have tried to cover the most important elements of energy supply, some 
important issues remain outside the scope of (the report) as they are too difficult to 
quantify…they include, for instance, the level of integration of a given country within 
the EU gas and electricity markets, the adequacy of connections and entry points for oil, 
gas and electricity, and the level of storage capacity for oil and gas.85 
 
Economists have built modeling tools to simulate future patterns of natural gas production, 
consumption and trade and to simulate potential disruptions of supply capacity.86 While 
useful for understanding potential disruption scenarios, these models do not include the data 
gathered from gas contracts, political constraints, or factors outside of the natural gas market 
(other sources of energy, strategic goals etc…) Other political science studies on energy 
security that have attempted to include a wider variety of variables are largely qualitative 
studies based on a small number of cases.87 None of these studies has included a systematic 
examination of natural gas contracts as a way to supplement our understanding of energy 
security. In the section below I rate the total energy security of Eurasian states vis a vis 
																																																								
85 European Commission Member States Energy Dependence, 2013. 
 
86 Holz et al., 2013; Egging, 2013. 
 
87 Shaffer, 2015; Balmaceda, 2013. 
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Russia at various time intervals based on the diversification data presented above.88 This 
index is a quantitative assessment of the relative dependence of the downstream state on 
Russia as a natural gas supplier based on 10 variables: Total share of natural gas in TPES, 
Energy Intensity of GDP, Dependence on Russian Gas Imports (calculated by share of 
Russian gas imports in natural gas portion of TPES), Ownership of downstream 
infrastructure, reverse flow capacity, natural gas storage, LNG capacity, share of nuclear 
power in TPES, share of renewable energy in TPES and Contract Score. I present time 
series data because it enables us to see change over time and to evaluate institutional change 
as an independent variable over time. Additionally, I transform the qualitative data on 
contracts into quantitative data by assigning positive and negative dollar values to individual 
events. I then score each event on the benefit to the producer and consumer states, coding 
each contract event as a dichotomous variable that is multiplied by the value of the contract. 
This contract data is then assigned a weighted value into the index of energy dependence in 
Eurasia for a cohesive rating of Eurasian energy security by state.89 The Index is presented 
on a scale of 0-1000, with 0 indicating no dependence on Russian gas supplies and 1000 
indicating complete dependence on Russian gas for all energy needs. In the following 
chapter I will use multivariate regression to evaluate the theory based on this data. 
 










Armenia 1996 673 
 
Latvia 1991 499 
Armenia 2015 654.8 
 
Latvia 2015 590.6 																																																								
88 Please see Appendix A for Methodology Used to Develop Energy Dependence Index 
 
89 Please see Appendix A for Coding Protocol  
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Austria 1991 345.45 
 
Lithuania 1991 540.5 
Austria 2015 318 
 
Lithuania 2015 453.6 
Belarus 1991 591.5 
 
Macedonia 1991 274.8 
Belarus 2015 747.1 
 
Macedonia 2012 364.9 
Bulgaria 1991 509.5 
 
Moldova 1991 669.2 
Bulgaria 2014 488.3 
 
Moldova 2015 635.8 
Czech Republic 1991 518 
 
Netherlands 2000 284.25 
Czech Republic 2012 473.5 
 
Netherlands 2015 263.8 
Denmark 2011 237.7 
 
Poland 1991 529.5 
Estonia 1991 528 
 
Poland 2014 406 
Estonia 2016 578 
 
Romania 1991 386.45 
Finland 1991 500.5 
 
Romania 2015 297.5 
Finland 2015 493 
 
Serbia 1996 596.6 
France 1991 390.8 
 
Serbia 2013 607.15 
France 2015 384.3 
 
Slovakia 1991 520.75 
Georgia 1992 560 
 
Slovakia 2014 500 
Georgia 2016 294.65 
 
Slovenia 1992 531.75 
Germany 1991 275.5 
 
Slovenia 2013 356.2 
Germany 2015 342.2 
 
Turkey 1987 454.45 
Greece 1998 452.8 
 
Turkey 2015 355.5 
Greece 2014 346.9 
 
Ukraine 1991 570.25 
Hungary 1991 492 
 
Ukraine 2015 337 
Hungary 2015 432.65 
 
UK 1999 253.4 
Italy 1991 326.1 
 
UK 2015 236.35 
Italy 2016 287.7 











Table 3-10: Average Index Score by Country 1991-2015 
 
 
The data presented in the index is interesting for a number of reasons. First it allows 
me to examine relative dependence on Russia as a natural gas supplier over time within 
cases, as well as to compare relative dependence across cases. The data presented above is a 
snapshot of energy dependence scores across cases at the first time data point (either 1991, 
1992 or 1993) and the most recent data point. Please refer to Appendix B for the full Index 
with all time series data. As demonstrated above, for these data periods the scores range 
from 236.35 in the UK in 2015, to 747.1 in Belarus in 2015. This is of course, unsurprising 
given the geographic and historical development of the gas trade, but it does provide 
quantitative evidence beyond anecdotal sources for the fact that Belarus is almost completely 
dependent on Russian gas supplies for all of its energy needs. This data shows several 














































Average Index Score 1991-2015 
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relatively similar levels of dependence, only Lithuania has decreased its level of energy 
independence from Russia, while Latvia and Estonia have increased their relative 
dependence. We can also observe that in general, former Soviet states have failed to make 
substantial improvements to their energy dependency on Russia with the notable exceptions 
of Ukraine and Georgia. Another interesting observation is that Poland, which has been very 
vocal about the dangers of energy dependence on Russia actually has lower levels of gas 
dependence on Russia than does the Czech Republic, and similar levels of dependence as 
France, which has continued to increase energy cooperation with Russia. Overall, the index 
data demonstrates that there is a wide variety of dependence on Russian supplies across the 
region, but also between neighboring states.  
Below are several examples of energy dependence across time within cases. Please 
see Appendix B for a full comparison of within case index scores across time. The most 
important thing to note when examining within case energy dependence scores is that almost 
all countries become more secure over time. This is to be expected for a number of reasons. 
First, due to technological advancements, energy intensity should decrease over time as 
efficiency increases. We should see the most dramatic decrease in energy intensity in post-
Soviet states who were previously highly inefficient and had no incentive to improve 
efficiency under central planning. Additionally, we should see an increase in renewable 
energy across all states due to technological advancements and environmental concerns.  
Technological advancements in LNG over the past 25 years have also dramatically decreased 
the cost of establishing LNG terminals and has also increased the availability of LNG as an 
alternative energy source. Finally, technological advancements have also increased the natural 
gas storage capacity of states due to new exploration and pressurization possibilities. 
Therefore, even states that are still highly dependent on Russian gas supplies should see a 
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decrease in their energy dependence scores. States with scores that are relatively stagnant or 
even increase over time have failed to diversify their energy security and are either unable to 





As shown by the cases of Belarus and Ukraine, energy dependence over time can vary within 

















over time, Ukraine’s remained relatively stagnant until 2014, when the Maidan Revolution 
brought about dramatic institutional changes and war that resulted in a drastic energy 
security transformation. As explained above, Belarus’ increase in energy dependence is 
especially problematic as it signals that it has not only failed at achieving any sort of energy 
independence, but that it has also not increased efficiency or benefited from the 
technological and market changes over the past 25 years that should have led to the 
development of alternative fuel sources. Ukraine’s dependence index is fascinating as it 
shows a marked increase in dependence between 2006 and 2010, the period during which 
the two “gas wars” took place. Interesting, this graph shows how the disastrous gas contracts 
post gas cut-off increased Ukraine’s insecurity vis-à-vis Russia even after the crises. This will 





















The comparison of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is interesting because it demonstrates how 
the energy security paths of the three Baltic States have diverged. Estonia and Latvia have 
increased dependence on Russian gas supplies over time, while Lithuania has decreased its 
dependence. The Index score is especially helpful in providing a comparable metric by which 
to compare outcomes in these states. Although Latvia holds the only natural gas storage 
facility in the region, it is surprisingly no less dependent than neighboring Estonia. The 
reason for this lies primarily in the fact that Latvia has made a number of unfavorable gas 











The energy dependence indexes of Germany and Poland show us the necessity of 
constructing an index that takes into account a variety of factors. Although Poland is much 
more vocal about the dangers of dependence on Russian energy supplies, in fact Poland is 
not much more dependent on Russian gas supplies than is Germany. Although of course 
Germany’s energy mix is much more diversified than Poland’s, it relies on increasingly large 
proportions of natural gas in its TPES and has actively pursued an increase in commercial 
relations with Russia, particularly in its energy sector. In contrast, Poland uses a much higher 















to decrease the amount of Russian gas in its fuel mix, including pursuing the possibility of 
extracting domestic shale gas supplies. The following chapter uses this index data, amongst 
others, to assess the impact of property rights institutions on energy dependence over time. 
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Chapter 4 – INITIAL QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
 	 Despite numerous policy publications by the European Commission and others 
outlining the extent of energy dependence, there have been relatively few studies that seek to 
understand the determinants of changes in energy dependence over time and between 
similarly placed consumers. With this lack in mind, this chapter presents a cross-national and 
within case over time study of energy dependence using the original dataset described in 
Chapter Three. First, I outline a research design and describe some of the problems inherent 
in quantitative analysis of property rights and institutions. Second, I describe a set of 
explanatory variables of energy dependence, their coding and their hypothesized effects. 
Finally using a panel of 28 countries with a country level fixed effects multivariate regression 
I examine why certain states are more energy dependent than others, and why some states 
increase or decrease their energy dependence over time. 
 To preview the results, I find evidence that weak property rights correlate with 
increased energy dependence on Russian commodities. Conversely, the better the property 
rights regime, the less likely is a country to be energy dependent. 
 
Research Design 	
 The unit of analysis for this chapter is country year. The universe of cases is all of 
Gazprom’s Eurasian clients (see Scope in Chapter One for a more detailed description) from 
independence ranging from 1990 to 2015. Using these guidelines, I identify a total of 728 
observations.  
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 As described in the previous chapter, I examine the dependent variable (energy 
dependence) via the Energy Dependence Index scores, which captures energy dependence 
on Russian commodities based on ten principle components: TPES, Energy Intensity, 
Dependence on Russian Gas Supplies, Ownership of Downstream infrastructure, Reverse 
Flow, Storage Capacity, LNG Capacity, Nuclear Power, Renewables, and Contract score. 
For the methodology used to compose this Index please refer to Appendix A. To facilitate 
the analysis, I have expanded my indicator to include every country year from first point of 
gas commercialization to 2015. Because the Index is composed based in part on contract 
year event, I have expanded the indicator beyond contract year keeping the contract event 
score constant until the next event. For country years before the first contract observation 
the Index score is composed based on best available information of sales and/or barter 
agreements. As a result, I identify a total of 728 observations on the DV (Country Year 
observations of Gazprom consumers from first point of commercialization).  
 The factors determining energy dependence range from factor endowments such as 
geography to the institutional determinants explored in Chapter Two. I hypothesize that 
weak property rights lead to increased energy dependence. Finding a measure for property 
rights is a difficult endeavor for a number of reasons. One of the most common indicators, 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) includes six dimensions of 
governance including Rule of Law and Corruption. While the WGI is a useful tool for 
broad-cross country analysis and broad-trends over time, due to the nature of indicator 
(broad reforms and their progress) is not recommended for by year within and across 
country analysis. Reforms such as property rights and measures of corruption need to be 
informed by more detailed and country specific diagnostic data that can identify relevant 
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constraints on governance in particular country circumstances.90 Further, the WGI does not 
begin recording data until 1996 and so does not work for within country comparisons before 
this date. 
The Heritage Foundation provides a dataset of Property Rights scored from 0 
(Private property is outlawed and all property belongs to the state) to 100 (private property is 
guaranteed by the government, the court system enforces contracts efficiently, the justice 
system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property and corruption is nearly 
nonexistent).91 The more certain the legal protection of property both de jure and de facto, 
the higher the country’s score. The Heritage Foundation relies on a number of sources to 
compose its Index, including the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Commerce; the U.S. 
Department of Commerce Country Commercial Guide; the U.S. Department of State Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices; and various news articles. However, Heritage scores are 
problematic for the initial years after independence: many newly independent states are given 
a medium score for the first several years and then rapidly decline due to better information. 
Heritage is therefore not a good measure of property rights for our purposes because within 
country change over time of the IV is crucial to understanding outcomes. 
Another way to proxy property rights uses the amount of money held inside the 
banking and investment sector (as a proportion of all money), on the assumption that more 
secure property rights means that people are happier to keep their money inside banks and 
make investments. This indicator, known widely as “contract-intensive money,” is a good 
indicator of realized property rights and has been used by Clague et. al (1996), Dollar and 
																																																								
90  World Bank. “Worldwide Governance Indicators: Introduction.” 2017. < 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc> 
 
91 Heritage Foundation. “Property Rights,” 2017 Index of Economic Freedom. 
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Kraay (2003), Compton and Giedeman (2011), and others.92 Another benefit of using 
contract-intensive money as a proxy for property rights is that rather than focusing solely on 
the legislative framework, which may not capture de facto conditions on the ground, money 
tracks “human behavior in response to institutional changes and thus gives an objective 
indicator for property rights.”93 I therefore use as a variable the Broad Money indicator from 
the World Bank, which is a measure of the money supply that includes demand deposits at 
commercial banks, any money held in easily accessible accounts, foreign currency deposits of 
resident sectors other than the government, other securities including certificates of deposit 
and commercial paper, and non-institutional money market accounts. The World Bank 
creates this indicator based on data from the International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics and data files and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates.94 According 
to the theory and generally speaking, we should expect states with lower broad money scores 
to have increased instances of dependence on Russian commodities.  
Another important indicator of de facto property rights is corruption. For the 
analysis I have used the component Corruption indicator from the WGI. Despite the 
problems acknowledged above about the WGI indices, the Corruption indicator is the most 
comprehensive variable of corruption because it captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption, as well 
as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.95 To construct this variable the World 
																																																								
92 Hartwell, Christopher. Two Roads Diverge: The Transition Experience of Poland and Ukraine. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
 
93 Ibid, 377. 
 
94 OECD (2017), Broad money (M3) (indicator).  
 
95 World Bank. WGI Control of Corruption (variable) 2017.  
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Bank uses over 30 individual variables including corruption among public officials, public 
trust in politicians, irregular payments, state capture, levels of corruption across sectors, 
transparency and more.96 According to the theory, we should expect states with higher 
corruption to have higher dependency on Russian commodities.  
For the initial analysis I use GDP per capita as a control. The logic of using this as a 
control is that richer countries may be able to control their energy dependence by either 
paying for alternative sources of energy, or by investing more domestically through upgraded 
infrastructure, modernization and efficiency measures. I expect that states with higher 
GDP/capita will have lower levels of energy dependence over time.  
 
Results 	
 My central hypothesis is that energy dependence is conditional on the nature of 
property rights regimes. I employ multivariate regression with country level fixed effects to 
test my claims about the correlates of energy dependency.  
 





Broad Money -0.0029** 	 [-3.48] GDP2 -1.51*** 	 [-49.55] t statistics in brackets 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 																																																								
96 For full construction of the Corruption variable please see: Worldwide Governance 


















t statistics in brackets 





In Model 1, BroadMoney is, as expected, negative and significant. This suggests that as 
BroadMoney increases, energy dependence decreases confirming the central hypothesis that 
energy dependence is conditional on realized property rights. Since the BroadMoney variable 
captures individual responses to institutional changes and perceptions about the 
trustworthiness of state institutions, these results also suggest that states with higher 
BroadMoney values are more likely to experience pervasive corruption, which was theorized to 
lead to increased energy dependence in the region. The control also performs as expected, 
with GDP per capita decreasing as energy dependence increases.  
 In Model 2, corruption is as expected, positive and highly significant. This suggests 
that as corruption increases, energy dependence also increases. Since the corruption variable 
captures perceptions about corruption as well as the extent of state capture, this is a good 
indicator of de facto property rights regimes. However, since this indicator only runs from 
1996-2015, it drops the number of observations down to 415. The next stage of this project 
will include finding another comprehensive corruption indicator based on similar 
methodology that includes data for the missing years. 
 113 	
 The results highlight the difficulty of trying to test energy dependence using large-N 
tools. First, the small number of cases paired with numerous potential interactions cause 
methodological difficulties. Because energy dependence is such a complex and nuanced issue 
it is difficult to design a large-N model that adequately addresses issue, even with an index 
score. Part of the problem lies with the fact that energy dependence does change over time, 
but in very small increments because of the complex nature of the issue. This therefore 
makes it difficult to assess outcomes in a large-N analysis. As a result, although the 
regression analysis is in the expected direction, the extremely small numbers are indicative of 
the methodological difficulties of this type of analysis. 
 Because of these difficulties, I believe that the descriptive statistics and tools 
presented in Chapter 3 are both more appropriate and reliable indicators of energy 
dependence. First, the descriptive tools show subtle changes over time that are good 
indicators of the slow and complex processes that drive energy dependence. Because energy 
dependence should gradually improve due to technological changes over the past several 
decades, a relatively flat index score skews the large-N results but in descriptive tools 
demonstrates a stalled or lack of diversification. The results of the analysis confirm that this 
project is better investigated with the tools presented in Chapter 3.  
  
Discussion and Conclusion 	
 This chapter has sought to illuminate the conditions under which states pursue 
various energy security strategies that increase, decrease or retain a similar level of energy 
dependence on Russia. Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, I found that energy dependence 
is conditional on property rights (through both a traditional measure of the IV and a realized 
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proxy). Specifically, where property rights are weak and more associated with the 
nomenklatura system, states are likely to be more dependent on Russia for energy. Not only 
does this relationship hold across cases, but also within case overtime. Using two measures 
of property rights, one an informal proxy and one that captures attitudes towards corruption 
helps support the conclusion that property rights are correlated with energy dependency.   
 These findings may have some implications for the body of work on the relationship 
between institutional reform, property rights, financialization and energy dependency. 
Recent scholarship has found that increases in basic financial intermediation improves 
realized property rights and that high order financialization appears to have a negative 
impact on the development of broad-based property rights during transition from 
communism to capitalism.97 In subsequent research scholars should explore the extent to 
which financialization affects property rights overseeing the privatization of strategic sectors 
such as energy.  
 This chapter has tentatively established that there exists an empirical relationship 
between property rights and energy dependency. The next stage of this project will be to 
expand quantitative analysis and to delve deeper into the methodological complexities of 
evaluating endogenous institutional changes. I have not yet established, however, that these 
relationships are correlated for the precise reasons elucidated in Chapter Two: namely that 
weak property rights empower strong actors and corruption that hijack government control 
over policy making in the energy sector. To explore the validity of this logic, I conduct 
qualitative analysis of the hypotheses in the following three chapters. Using process tracing 
and the comparative method I examine the formation of energy security policy in post-
																																																								
97 Hartwell, Christopher. “The Coevolution of Finance and Property Rights: Evidence from 
Transition Economies,” Journal of Economic Issues 51 no. 1 (2017): 73-97. 
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Soviet Ukraine and Lithuania and in independent Hungary after 1989. Do Hypotheses 1, 2 
and 3 explain a persistent lack of energy security in Ukraine and a transformation from active 
dependence to diversification in Lithuania? Do they also explain Hungary’s policy shift from 
diversification to active dependence after the election of Viktor Orbán? 
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Chapter 5 - WE’VE GOT WHAT WE’VE GOT: THE CASE OF UKRAINE 	
“We hope that you will not freeze.”98 




In January of 2009, less than three years after a Ukrainian-Russian gas dispute that 
resulted in Ukraine’s gas supplies being halted, Hungary, Romania, Poland and Bulgaria 
reported that the pressure in their gas pipelines had dropped. Soon images of freezing 
Bulgarian pensioners were splashed across the news media along with accusations that 
following a gas further dispute between Russia and Ukraine, Russia had completely cut off 
the gas supplies to all of Eastern Europe. Gazprom responded by charging Ukraine with the 
theft of gas bound for EU member states while Ukraine furiously denied the charges. A 
flurry of lawsuits resulted and on January 5, President Putin instructed Gazprom CEO 
Alexey Miller to reduce gas exports to Europe via Ukraine and then to stop them altogether 
until the crisis was resolved. Ukraine was without Russian gas supplies for 15 days, during 
which the average temperature was 19 degrees Fahrenheit.99 This was a serious crisis for 
Ukraine, who had been importing 47-57bcm/year of gas from Russia while only producing 
19-21 bcm/year.100 Further, Ukraine was the main corridor of gas supplies to Europe, 
accounting for approximately 80% of transit volumes. 																																																								
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This was not the first time that Ukraine’s access to Russian gas supplies was cut off: 
less than three years earlier following a dispute over pricing, the CEO of Naftogaz Ukraine 
refused to sign a supply contract for 2006. As a result, President Putin ordered Gazprom to 
cease shipments to Ukrainian consumers on December 31, 2005. Despite enormous pressure 
from the EU, Ukraine was unable to substantially reduce its dependence on Russian gas after 
the gas disputes of 2006 and 2009. 101  In fact, following the 2006 dispute, Ukraine 
renegotiated a contract with Gazprom that actually increased its dependence on Russian gas 
and contractually tied Ukraine to a single supplier controlled by Gazprom. 102 This is puzzling 
behavior considering that Ukraine’s energy vulnerability vis-à-vis Russia was at the forefront 
of the European agenda for much of the second half of the 2000s. Why, despite a 
contentious relationship with its main supplier, did Ukraine fail to increase its energy 
security? 
In this chapter, I examine Ukraine as a case study of active-dependence policy. My 
theory predicts that states that failed to radically restructure their property rights regimes 
during transition are unlikely to pursue a policy of diversification because patterns of Soviet 
era energy efficiencies are reproduced through existing institutions. Further, where rule of 
law property rights regimes were not in place before privatization of state energy assets, 
strong actors with ties to Moscow are empowered as “energy veto players” with an interest 
in maintaining ties with their main suppliers. Without a strong institutional frame to guide 
the privatization process, corrupt practices grew around a number of industries, but 
particularly the energy sector. Soviet era corruption not only continued, it proliferated under 																																																								
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the new market conditions. In this sense, Ukraine is a particularly egregious example of a 
middle-income-trap country103 that lacks the modern institutions necessary for intensive 
market-led development. To test my theory on this case, I first review Ukraine’s institutional 
history to establish that there has not been a significant de facto reframing of its property 
rights regime from the Soviet period. I then look at the historical record to determine 
whether Ukraine’s energy security policy was constrained by its property rights regime, 
privatization process and empowerment of energy veto players.  
Since Ukraine is an important strategic ally for both the European Union and Russia, 
there has been a plethora of policy research on Ukraine’s energy policy since 1991. However, 
there has been relatively little academic literature on the subject and none on domestic 
institutional factors and how they contribute to the formation of Ukraine’s energy policy. 
Therefore, I have constructed the narrative below through a combination of primary source 
research, new media reports, interviews and field observation. To collect data I made several 
trips to the region: one trip to Russia and Ukraine in August 2013, a trip to Ukraine in 
August 2015 and a prolonged stay in Berlin from January 2014-July 2015.  During my trips, 
to Ukraine and Russia, I spoke with government representatives, energy industry leaders, 
journalists and academics. I conducted 14 formal, on-the-record interviews on the origins 
and goals of Ukrainian energy security policy with individuals ranging from the Deputy 
Minister of Energy of Ukraine, to the CEO of Naftogaz Ukraine to the Head of Contract 
and Price structuring of Gazprom. I also conducted 32 additional interviews in Berlin, 
Warsaw, London, Moscow and Budapest about the institutional determinants of Ukraine’s 
energy policy with EU representatives, journalists, academics and researchers. Finally, 
interview data is supplemented by observation at five international energy security 																																																								
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conferences that took place between February 2014 and April 2015 in Berlin, Warsaw and 
London. 
I combine this information with extensive primary and secondary source research to 
document first both the de jure and de facto property rights history of Ukraine in the last 
years of the Ukrainian SSR and the first years of transition, then the process of privatization 
of the energy sector and the empowerment of energy veto players. Finally, I review Ukraine’s 
changing energy security over time and find that as my theory predicts, Ukraine has been 
unable to pursue a policy of diversification due to a continued nomenklatura property rights 
regime that mismanaged privatization and empowered energy veto players with deep 
connections to Moscow. Further, I find that despite dramatically changing international 
conditions and incentives, Ukraine’s failure to substantially improve its energy security is due 
to domestic level variables rather than the traditional explanation of an aggressive producer. 
Although at time Moscow behaved belligerently, the driving force behind continued 
dependence on Russian commodities was in fact a Ukrainian domestic issue. Ukraine is a 
particularly strong demonstration of my theory because despite a lack of substantive change 
in the outcome of Ukraine’s energy security, there were a number of opportunities for 
reform. The Orange Revolution stands out as a potential critical juncture: despite the 
promise of a new modern state, deep change never materialized. Despite the fact that the 
leaders of the new regime held their predecessors to a democratic legal standard, they did not 
do any substantial institution-building themselves and therefore a Western rule of law regime 
never emerged. What lies behind the persistent inability to reform despite revolutionary 
change? In this chapter I argue that failure to reform in Ukraine is influenced by the unique 
geopolitical position of Ukraine straddling East and West, which resulted in incoherent 
policies and the inability of elites to craft a vision of the future. The conflict between a vision 
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of Ukraine as pro-West or pro-East contributed to its disastrous vendetta politics. This had 
far-reaching consequences for Ukraine’s energy security and for the Ukrainian state in 
general. The case of Ukraine shows that initial institutional arrangements are persistent and 
very powerful in the energy sector: even in the face of major energy security threats from 
abroad, Ukraine failed to meaningfully decrease its energy dependence.  
 
Soviet Ukraine: “We’ve Got What We’ve Got” 
 
 
Property Rights and Institutions in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 
 
 Prior to incorporation into the Soviet legal system in 1920, Ukraine had a long 
history of public law. A code of laws was implemented as early as 1743, and prior to this 
Ukraine was governed by customary law that was codified beginning in the 11th century.104 
The Soviet legal system that was imposed on Ukraine fused socialist ideological principles 
into the legal code. Adhering to Vladimir Lenin’s statement that “everything was public law 
by nature,” the Soviet legal system abolished the concept of private law and property 
entirely.  The Soviet Constitution of Ukraine (the last came into force in 1978) governed the 
legal system of the state and provided very few protections considered to be the component 
parts of the rule of law in the western legal tradition. 105  Although Article 10 of the 
constitution guaranteed the right of citizens to retain “personal ownership of their incomes 
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from work and savings” the constitution also declared that all property exists only in the 
form of state property or in “the form of cooperative and collective farm property.”106  
In the Soviet Union, the aim of socialist was law not to define standards of conduct 
in the private or public sphere and thus law was not clear or accessible to ordinary citizens. 
Under the socialist system, contract enforcement was not a priority because most 
agreements were between government entities and the government’s control over assets 
always assured that contracts were upheld.107 Further, the communist ideal was a society in 
which government and law were superfluous. In contrast, Western style rule of law requires 
that legal rules be applied as uniformly as possible and with minimal discretion. Regarding 
the energy sector, Soviet law explicitly stated in Article 6 of the Constitution that all natural 
resources were state property, and thus there is no further clarification of the property rights 
regime. 
The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and 
air transport, banks, post, telegraph, and telephones, large state organized agricultural 
enterprises (state farms, machine and tractor stations and the like) as well as 
municipal enterprises and the bulk of the dwelling houses in the cities and industrial 
localities, are state property, that is, belong to the whole people.108 
 
Of course, despite a de jure abolition of private property in Soviet Ukraine, the de 
facto distribution of resources was far from egalitarian. Soviet elites used the vague language 
in the Ukrainian constitution to their favor, manipulating both Soviet inefficiencies and the 
legal system to gain access to favored state resources. Soviet elites with ties to the 
government took over prized directorships of powerful state enterprises including those in 
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the metal and chemical industries as well as the energy sector.109  Although the stickiness of 
this institutional legacy in the energy sector will be explored in depth later in the chapter, in 
1990 53% of Soviet executive officials were from the industrial region of Dnipropetrovsk.110   
One way they used the system to distribute benefits in their favor was through the 
Union Procuracy, a hybrid of administrative, prosecutorial and civil law institutions through 
which laws and rules were enacted and enforced.  The Procuracy has a storied history in the 
Russian and Soviet legal tradition: it has the distinction of being the longest single serving 
legal institution in Russian history, founded in 1722 by Peter the Great.111 A unique balance 
of power between the procurator and judge made the outcomes less reliable than in Western 
civil law systems because the supervisors of the judiciary (the procurators) enjoyed an 
unparalleled degree of authority in relation to the judges. A procurator could issue decisions 
on “matters arising in the hearing of cases” to protest the decision in any case and could stay 
the execution of criminal judgments.112 The Communist party also wielded undue influence 
over the Procuracy. The Procuracy “has always been the arm and the eye of the Party, not its 
overseer,” and “as a part of the state apparatus, it constitut[ed] an instrument of the 
regime.”113 For example in 1968, the Procuracy of the Ukrainian SSR submitted a dictate to 
the Minister of Municipal Services aimed at reducing the amount of proposals, applications 																																																								
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and complaints of citizens particularly in the Chief Directorate of the Gas Industry.114  In 
1990, the Ukrainian Procuracy was involved in a Communist party scheme to remove a 
progressive Deputy from the Supreme Council.115 This nomenklatura system of property 
distribution resulted in powerful red directors gaining control of prized state assets, including 
energy infrastructure.  
The relationship between the Soviet era legal architecture in Ukraine and its energy 
dependency cannot be understated. Current outcomes of Ukrainian energy security have 
their roots in the way law and power were organized under the Soviet Union, as they not 
only continue to influence institutional outcomes, but because they also greatly contributed 
to the dangerous combination post transition of a highly energy intensive development 
strategy and a lack of domestic resources with which to fuel it.   
 
Soviet Era Ukrainian Energy History 
 
Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas at the time of independence has its roots in the 
beginnings of the Soviet-Western European gas trade in the 1960s. After signing a landmark 
deal to provide natural gas to Austria in 1968, the Soviets realized that it would be difficult to 
provide the promised volumes due to a lack of long-distance pipelines linking its abundant 
gas fields in Siberia and Central Asia with the West. Since the pipelines could not be 
completed before the early 1970s, Mingazprom (the Soviet state gas company) decided to 
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meet its export obligations using the gas from the Galician (western Ukrainian) fields.116 At 
the time, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and the Ukrainian SSR were all dependent on Galician 
gas. Galician gas was also exported in small volumes to Poland via pipelines built by Nazi 
engineers.117  
As demand rose in all of these markets production increased and by 1965 it became 
clear that the fields were overexploited. Mingazprom’s use of the fields to provide gas to its 
Austrian partners rapidly depleted reserves and by 1970 it was estimated that no more than 
11bcm remained extractible. At the time, annual demand in Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Ukraine was around 15 bcm/year.118 Having already experienced gas shortages for years, 
local party organizations in Ukraine were understandably concerned about the prospect of 
exporting more Galician gas to the Austrians and feared “severe deterioration of gas supply 
to the population and local enterprises”.119 
In response to the mounting crisis, the Soviets launched a plan to construct a much-
needed link between Eastern and Western Ukraine so that the giant Shebelinkia field in the 
Kharkov Oblast could supply some of the regions reliant on Galician gas. However, due to 
delays in construction, regions served by the Galician gas fields were undersupplied by nearly 
half. The missing volumes of 2.5mcm/day corresponded almost exactly to the volumes 
Mingazprom had promised to deliver to the Austrians.120 When the pipeline was finally 
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completed in late 1970s and despite a large increase in gas supplies, Western Ukraine was still 
plagued by structural supply problems. Because the Galician fields were in steep decline 
while demand from Austria and Czechoslovakia were increasing, the newly constructed 
trans-Ukrainian pipeline did not have enough capacity to meet all of its supply demands. 
During the winter of 1971-1972 the Soviets were finally able to meet demand volumes to the 
Austrians. Unfortunately for the Ukrainians this meant that pressure dropped in their 
pipelines and there was a severe energy shortage during an unusually cold winter (with 
temperatures reaching below -22 degrees Fahrenheit). Areas in northwestern Ukraine, which 
had to compete with Austria and Czechoslovakia for Galician gas, were forced to close 
school and municipal buildings. Exacerbating the problem was an increase in the 
unauthorized use of extra gas by industrial enterprises that had run short of reserve fuels. 
The Ukrainian Council of Ministers accused Mingazprom of having failed to create adequate 
gas storage facilities and choosing to supply the Austrians over its own citizens.121 
The period of the 1960s-1970s was an important one in terms of setting the stage for 
later constraints on post-Soviet Ukrainian energy policy. As Soviet commitments to Western 
Europe grew, the Soviets were forced to fundamentally reorganize their domestic natural gas 
infrastructure. In 1973 construction began on new compressor stations to supplement the 
trans-Ukrainian export corridor. However, worker morale was low and construction was 
once again delayed. Worried about domestic gas supply for the coming year, the Ukrainian 
Council of Ministers begged Moscow to increase worker bonuses to prevent further delays 
ahead of winter but their request was flatly denied by Moscow.122 In order to meet export 
commitments, Moscow embarked on a long-term plan to transform Western Ukraine from a 																																																								
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producing region to a transit region for gas from Siberia and Central Asia to Central and 
West Europe. This was codified in a 1974 Treaty with Austria outlining an agreement to 
deliver natural gas to Austria until the year 2000 in exchange for hard currency as well as 
pipeline materials.123 As a result, Ukraine was turned from a self-sufficient gas producing 
state to one that was almost entirely reliant on Eastern fields. Further, all infrastructure 
created during this period was export oriented rather than focused on connecting Ukrainian 
grids.  
The persistent Soviet choice of prizing export markets over domestic ones had large 
consequences for many Soviet Republics but perhaps no more so than on Ukraine, which 
was left with a development strategy of energy intensive heavy industry with very little gas to 
support it. Ukraine’s industrial policy was inherited from the former Soviet Union, which 
was strongly biased toward energy intensive heavy industry: particularly the production of 
military equipment. By the 1970s, Ukraine produced more steel than France and the UK 
combined and more than 40% of the Soviet Union’s total iron ore and steel. 124 
Consequently, its production of consumer goods and services was seriously underdeveloped. 
Moscow also developed Ukraine as a gas transit state for its Western consumers, building up 
massive energy infrastructure in Ukraine aimed at providing the West with natural gas. 
During the Soviet period most gas flowing through Ukrainian territory was not meant for 
end users in Ukraine and thus at independence different Ukrainian regions had completely 
disparate infrastructures. As will be demonstrated later, this unique pattern of Soviet legacies 
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both greatly restricted the institutional choices available to leaders post-transition and 
exacerbated the consequences of institutional choice. 
Beyond the consequences for energy security, the development of the Soviet gas 
market during the Soviet era is a prime example of how Ukraine’s strategic geopolitical 
position has contributed to its persistent lack of reform.125 The arrangement governing the 
provision of Soviet gas to Western Europe was beneficial to both the Soviets and 
Europeans: the Soviets received desperately needed and valuable hard currency, while the 
Austrians received cheap, plentiful energy. The only loser was Ukraine, which lost most of 
its domestic energy supply while at the same time was developed with the goal of serving 
Moscow’s commercial interests with the West. Between 1974 and 1980 the USSR signed 
more bi-lateral treaties with Austria, the majority of which were about the sale and transport 
of natural gas through Ukraine, than any other Western European state.126 Thus even though 
Ukraine was positioned firmly behind the iron curtain, it was already being entangled in a 
web of conflicting institutional principles and practices.  
The Kravchuk Era (December 1, 1991-July 19, 1994) 
 
On July 16, 1990, the Ukrainian Supreme Council (Verkhovna Rada) announced its 
declaration of sovereignty, 127  and on August 24, 1991 Ukraine declared independence 
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following a 90% vote for independence in a nationwide referendum on December 1, 1991.128 
On the same day, Ukrainian voters formally elected the former Chairman of the Supreme 
Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine’s first president. Kravchuk had 
previously been temporarily empowered with presidential authority by the Verkhovna Rada 
on August 24, 1991.129 While some viewed the post communist transition as the beginning of 
a new era or even the end of history,130 in Ukraine its particular communist legacies 
dampened enthusiasm from the get go. Upon assuming the presidency, Kravchuk famously 
and fatalistically proclaimed “maeimo te, shcho maiemo” (we’ve got what we’ve got).131 
Given its starting conditions, it is perhaps unsurprising that the first few years of 
independence were painful. Because of the nature of cross-subsidization during the Soviet 
period, at independence Ukraine was not only heavily dependent on Russian commodities 
but was simultaneously one of the most energy-intensive states in the world. During the 
period between 1991-1995, at which time the Ukrainian economy was in free-fall, Ukraine’s 
energy-intensity increased by 30 percent. 132   Ukraine’s energy mix was also heavily 
unbalanced, so that in 1993, natural gas comprised 43 percent of its total primary energy 
supply (TPES).133 At the same time, Ukraine experienced hyperinflation, reaching a peak in 
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As the following sections demonstrate, despite constant and often contradictory 
reforms to the property rights regime, legal system and enforcement mechanisms, 
institutional conditions on the ground changed relatively little from those that had been 
established during the Soviet period. This had grave consequences for Ukraine’s energy 
security as policymakers were either entangled in a corrupt system themselves, or were 
unable to make the necessary changes to the policy due to actors with entrenched interests in 




In most states, the market develops at the same time as its legal system so that 
necessary institutions grow in tandem with refinements to the legal code as well as 
enforcement mechanisms. Across Eastern Europe, but particularly in heavy industry 
centered former Soviet states like Ukraine and Lithuania, the state of its capital stock 
exceeded its institutional development at transition. During the communist period, rapid 
industrialization produced a large concentration of capital that was organizationally 
dysfunctional, both in internal governance structure and in terms of inter-firm coordination 
(Rapaczynski, 1996). As a result, at the time of transition, Ukraine was a developed country 
with considerable capital, yet a lacked legal structure and property rights regime to support a 
large market.  
At independence one of the first tasks of the new regime was to establish a set of 
laws around which to govern society. However, because Ukraine did not have a 
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revolutionary moment or violence to dislodge the Soviet elite, there was very little incentive 
to introduce meaningful reforms. Through a December 1991 law regarding the Procuracy, 
the government of independent Ukraine subsumed the Procuracy as a unit of national 
government. Unsurprisingly given the timing constraints, the 1991 law failed to advance rule 
of law principles: the powers assigned to the Ukrainian Procuracy were the same as during 
the Soviet period. Most important, the Procuracy law did not fully embrace the principle of 
separation of powers: instead it dictated an imbalance of powers between the judicial, 
legislative, executive and administrative functions of government. The Procuracy was also 
given a large role in the interpretation of the law including the power to interpret customary 
international law and international treaties such as contracts with foreign governments 
(including gas contracts). In practice, this meant that the same nomenklatura system remained 
in place post transition: old communist elites were able to use the legal system and the 
Procuracy to their advantage, retaining control of their former spheres of influence in the 
energy, fertilizer and metallurgical sectors, Ukraine’s most profitable economic areas.  
Although the Constitutional Drafting Committee of the Supreme Council completed 
a draft of the new constitution in June 1992, Ukraine was without a formal constitution until 
1996.135 In the interim, there was no significant advancement in restructuring the property 
rights regime. According to data from the Ukrainian parliament’s Institute of Legislation, out 
of 30,000 legal acts, laws comprised only 4.6 percent. This means that it was impossible to 
live by the constitution or laws because citizens had to abide by numerous and constantly 
changing acts, resolutions and directives designed by bureaucrats and various branches of 
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the Ukrainian government. 136 Until 1995, the president, parliament, the cabinet of ministers, 
the supreme court, the central bank, 25 ministries and many other agencies were entitled to 
initiate draft legislation, and most of these agencies had more than one department that 
prepared draft legislation.137 
A key moment in Ukraine’s institutional development revolved around a battle over 
the 1993 election of members to the Constitutional Court (itself a legacy of the Soviet 
Procuracy). Because members of the Court would be making most of the important 
decisions regarding enforceability of rule of law principles, politicians were concerned about 
the ideological position of candidates. Conservatives sought socialist theorists while liberals 
sought the appointment of reform-minded individuals. This debate resulted in a 
confrontation in the Council on March 2, 1993 when conservatives attempted to change the 
Council’s agenda and confirm only conservative candidates. In response, democratic 
deputies walked out and handed their pay envelopes to the chairman in protest.138 Almost 
from the moment of independence, the battle between powerful conservatives and 
reformers was staunching the institutional development of the Ukrainian state. As the 
conflict shows, institutional reform of the constitutional court was needed, but was blocked 
by those in power. While there were democratic actors, they quit in protest rather than 
continue the battle.  
Overall, the era of the Kravchuk presidency was characterized by a continuation of 
the Soviet era property rights regime. Institutionally, many of the same features remained in 																																																								
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place with different names, and the overall legal situation was such that citizens could not 
reliably predict what the law was at any given time. The Wall Street Journal’s rating system of 
attractiveness of doing business rated Ukraine a 3.9 out of a possible 10 points in 1998. Two 
sub-sections of this index address the institutional environment: “rule of law” and 
“corruption”. On the rule of law measure Ukraine scored 2.1.139 This had several effects on 
Ukraine’s nascent energy security policy. First, as will be elaborated below, because the 
institutional environment was so unpredictable, the privatization process (particularly in the 
energy sector) was delayed, with long-lasting consequences. Second, because the legal system 
and the political system were not institutionally separated, it was difficult to prevent 
corruption, especially in profitable industries such as the gas trade. Third, because there was 
no initial radical restructuring of the property rights regime, old elites remained in de-facto 
control over their Soviet era enterprises. 
Why did Ukraine fail to make radical institutional changes at the crucial moment of 
independence? First, as mentioned above, without a revolutionary moment or violence, there 
old elites remained entrenched in the political system. Second, unlike Poland or even 
Estonia, there was not a clear vision about what the post-communist transition should look 
like. In Poland, the collapse of the disgraced socialist state created fertile ground for radical 
institutional, economic and social policies. Poland had experienced a shocking economic 
disintegration in the 1980s and there was a sense that the socialist experiment was 
responsible for this. The only viable alternative was neoliberalism, and Poland faced a 
relatively friendly international environment to support this radical transition. In contrast, 
Ukraine had neither the material incentives from the West for radical transformation nor the 
desire to pursue it in the first place. Although political turnover in the first few years of 																																																								
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Polish independence was high, there was very little sense that a return to communism was a 
viable alternative because most of the Communist elites had been dispensed with. Poland 
made a series of constitutional changes immediately: between 1989 and 1990 amendments 
changed the name of the country, reinstated various legislative mechanisms and generally 
removed the communist character of the document. In 1992 the Soviet Era Polish 
constitution was replaced by the “Small Constitution”, which refined legislative and 
executive relations as well as set out clear rules for the management of private property.140 
Survey data in the 1990s shows that the perception of property rights grew steadily in the 
early years of independence.141 In fact, using the amount of money held inside the banking 
system as a proxy for property rights, Ukraine’s realized property rights in 2014 were still 
below the level that Poland’s were in January of 1993.142 
 The clear divergence between the institutional developments of Ukraine and Poland 
had long-lasting consequences on the ability of both states to pursue energy security. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, despite relatively similar historical patterns around the energy sector 
and similar levels of dependence, from independence Poland was concerned with decreasing 
its energy dependence on Russian gas and oil.143 As a consequence it now has a relatively 
well-diversified energy sector. In contrast, Ukraine’s failure to reform at the initial juncture 
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of independence had a major impact on its ability to formulate coherent policies both in its 




Privatization of formerly state-owned enterprises revolves around solving two main 
questions. First, how are the state’s assets valued? There are two main types of valuation, the 
first through administrative means whereby an agency or agencies responsible for 
privatization assesses the economic viability of firms, selecting some for closure and others 
for privatization. The second type of valuation is directly through market mechanisms such 
as public auctions.144 The second, and arguably more important question addresses with what 
resources are ownership rights acquired. Obviously, actors need the monetary resources to 
acquire ownership rights. However, while it is necessary to view the period of 1989-1991 as a 
critical juncture, it is impossible to ignore the fact that actors in the transition differed in 
power according to their pre-transition position. Notably, under socialism, the prohibition of 
private property meant that the class system of socialist societies was organized more around 
differences in position rather than wealth.145 Therefore, if a rule of law property rights regime 
was not implemented prior to the privatization process, it is more likely that actors used the 
advantages of their Socialist position to increase their economic power post-transition. This 
is exactly the case in Ukraine, and is particularly salient in the energy sector, where most of 
the wealth is concentrated and where Soviet era development strategies are most entangled 
with Moscow. 
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In Ukraine, the economic elite began amassing wealth even before the fall of the 
Soviet Union because of late 1980s era economic reforms. Although privatization was 
initiated first in 1992, it was repeatedly blocked by the Rada, which happened to be 
dominated by the lobby for the red directors.146 No privatization began at all until 1993, by 
which time many former socialist states including Poland and the Czech Republic had 
already made tremendous progress in the privatization of state assets. Throughout 
Kravchuk’s tenure, privatization was largely ignored, which allowed the red directors to 
retain their roles as managers over large state-owned enterprises. The main difference 
however, was that now Ukraine was nominally a market economy, meaning that these 
individuals could now use their Soviet-era positions of power to make large profits in a 




How did Ukraine’s lack of institutional development and delayed privatization affect 
its post-independence energy security policy? First, a lack of clarity in the policy making 
apparatus as well as in the government itself led to a number of initial energy security policy 
decisions that would have long-lasting consequences on Ukraine’s energy security. Second, 
the delay in privatization allowed actors with a vested interest in maintaining Ukraine’s 
energy dependence to consolidate power. Because Ukraine’s property rights regime was so 
underdeveloped, these actors became energy veto players who blocked efforts to pursue 
diversification strategies (both geographically and through increasing energy efficiency).  
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The structure of the energy policy-making apparatus evolved over the first few years 
of independence. However, high-level energy security decisions have always been under the 
direct purview of the Presidential office, which monitors the energy sector directly through 
establishing, organizing, and liquidating executive bodies as well as issuing decrees and 
directives on the operation and development of the fuel and energy complex. The President 
appoints the Fuel and Energy Minister, the Minister for Economy and the Head of the State 
Committee for Natural Resources, as well as the heads of the two state-owned gas 
companies: NA Naftogaz Ukrainy and NAK Nadra Ukrainy. From the outset, the President 
also had the power to appoint and dismiss the Head of the State Property Fund, which is in 
charge of the state privatization process.147 Despite the strong concentration of power in the 
executive, the Rada was vested with the power to consider and approve laws and regulations 
concerning the energy sector and approve the list of state properties not subject to 
privatization. Similarly, although political oversight of national level energy decisions rests 
firmly in the political sphere, Naftogaz is a very powerful actor in terms of setting energy 
policy and in particular because of its role in international relationships.  The Chairman of 
the Board of Naftogaz is also First Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy. Further, Naftogaz 
is responsible for the strategic development of the company and its subsidiaries as well as the 
implementation of international projects in the oil and gas sector and relationships with 
equivalent foreign companies (such as Gazprom).148  
The structure of the Ukrainian policy making apparatus is important for this analysis 
for several reasons. First, the initial arrangement concentrated power over the entire energy 
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apparatus within the branch of the executive, while giving the Rada the crucial power over 
approving laws and contracts. This set the stage for later political struggles between the 
parliament and the executive that would manifest in negative outcomes for the overall 
energy security of Ukraine. This arrangement was doubly problematic because it was already 
institutionalized before the ratification of the 1996 constitution, which created one of the 
most powerful executives in the world. As a result, when executive power grew, the 
concentration of the entire state energy policy-making apparatus was essentially in the hands 
of the President. Second, because Ukraine’s property rights had not been substantially 
revised from the Soviet era regime, questions about ownership, privatization and what the 
overall goals of the energy sector were not systematically addressed. Rather they were 
addressed in an ad-hoc manner at times of crisis by the presidential office and later the Rada, 
which had a conflict of interest in the process. 
During the period of 1991-1995, energy assets were still largely state owned and 
controlled, and this was the main vehicle for the implementation of energy policy. 
Enterprises did not have any say in production, investment, pricing or marketing: instead 
there was a system of centrally administered subsidized energy prices. Further, more than 75 
percent of gas consumed was imported from Russia and Turkmenistan under contracts 
guaranteed until the end of 1995.149 It is important to emphasize again that there was no 
public oversight of these contracts whatsoever, although the Procuracy was nominally in 
charge of contractual oversight, the contracts themselves were under the purview of the 
Chairman of the Board of Naftogaz. Because of the lack of institutional reform at transition, 
there was very little impetus to dramatically change Ukraine’s energy relationship with 
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Russia. Soviet elites who had been profiting off energy inefficiencies remained in power as 
policymakers in the Ukrainian government.  
Domestic gas prices were subsidized for all customer classes until 1995, and 
combined with widespread domestic payment arrears this led to the accumulation of 
approximately $6 billion in gas debt to Russia by mid 1995.150 To cover the difference 
between energy prices and supply costs, the government took long-term credit from Russian 
suppliers and the domestic banking sector in the form of subsidized credit for working 
capital and investments. These budget subsidies were enormous: equal to 8.1 percent of 
GDP in 1992 and 10.8 percent in 1993, most of which were concentrated in the gas and coal 
industry. 151 
Given that Ukraine’s energy intensity was increasing from already one of the most 
energy intensive economies in the world, its status as a highly dependent consumer of 
Russian and Turkmen gas (although in reality gas purchased from Turkmenistan was actually 
Russian gas marketed as the product of Turkmenistan) contributed to its severe energy 
insecurity. In addition, the initial decision to provide huge subsidies to industrial and 
household consumers meant that the costs of energy dependency were absorbed by the state 
rather than by consumers, which gave them little incentive to reduce consumption or 
improve efficiency.  
During the 1990s, most of Ukraine’s gas was imported through the Russian 
company, Itera, a Gazprom subsidiary. Through Itera, Ukraine was paying absurdly low 
prices for gas, around $4 per thousand cubic meters. While the Ukrainian state usually paid 																																																								
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around $50-80 (still well below the European market level), Itera chose to receive only a 
third of that. The rest, about $2 billion per year per side, was divided between Ukrainian and 
Russian gas middlemen. These middlemen could then sell the gas to the European market at 
an average rate of $110/thousand cubic meters, which even allowing for $10m in bribes, 
could have generated another $360 million.152 What facilitated this obviously problematic 
relationship was the fact that Ukraine had no property rights regime to oversee these types 
of arrangements, and Ukraine had no energy policy-making apparatus to prevent it. The 
deep connections between local Ukrainian actors and Russian ones was particularly prevalent 
in the gas sector: in 1994 70% of all gas industry workers in Siberia were Ukrainians (as were 
a majority of Gazprom’s board members), which reflected the Soviet gas industry’s origins in 
Ukraine in the 1920s.153 
 
Ukraine’s First Energy Security Crisis: A Critical Juncture  
 
 
Ukraine’s first major energy security crisis began in 1992, when Naftogaz reported a 
drop in the pressure of their gas pipelines from Russia. This was at first interpreted as a 
result of extreme weather conditions, which had been a common occurrence during the 
Soviet period. A few weeks later however, it was revealed that Russia had reduced gas 
shipments to Ukraine because of “unresolved problems regarding prices and volumes.” 
Because of a clause in the gas contract between Russia and Ukraine that allegedly stipulated 
that “any curtailment of gas deliveries by Russia’s Gazprom through pipelines crossing 
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Ukraine’s territory must be applied proportionately among all customers” Naftogaz decided 
that they were entitled to siphon some gas destined for export for domestic purposes.154 
Germany, Austria, Italy and Switzerland experienced gas cutoffs as large as 50-75 percent 
over a two-week period.155 This incident was the first of many attempts by Gazprom to 
induce the Ukrainians to pay their gas debts by reducing supplies. After further reductions in 
supply in February 1993 and November 1993, the vice-Chairman of the Ukrainian State 
Committee for Oil and Gas proclaimed defiantly, “no gas for Ukraine, no gas for 
Europe.”156  
However, as a result of Ukraine’s strategy of siphoning off gas bound for European 
consumers, several major European buyers (Gaz de France, Snam, Ruhrgas) rushed to Kiev 
to lobby the Ukrainians not to cut off their supply. This move by European consumers 
directly contributed to the failure of Ukraine to diversify its supply and increase its energy 
security for a number of reasons. First, it incentivized Ukraine to continue an unsustainable 
policy of racking up huge energy bills for which it had no way to pay. Second, the arrival of 
the huge Western energy companies in Ukraine during a period which there was no rule of 
law property rights regime in place led to huge opportunities for corruption amongst 
politically connected elites who were making tremendous amounts of money off of the 
Ukrainian state. Although privatization had not “officially” begun, Western companies were 
now lobbying managers of state owned enterprises to keep a flawed and unsustainable 
system in place. Finally, because the energy policy-making apparatus was still developing and 
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not yet completely institutionalized (it is important to note that until 1996 Ukraine still did 
not have a constitution), it was very difficult to make long-term strategic decisions. The 
arrival of the Western energy companies in Kiev during the first few years of independence 
was a critical juncture for Ukrainian energy security and also weakens the alternative 
explanation that Ukraine’s energy dependence is a consequence of aggressive Russian foreign 
policy.  
Making matters worse, in 1993, Ukraine introduced its own currency, which meant 
that Ukraine gave up its monetary union with Russia. This policy was not well received by 
Moscow, and although they did not refer to Ukraine explicitly, the Kremlin ordered 
Gazprom to “charge world prices for oil, gas and other natural resources to former Soviet 
republics that no longer use the ruble.”157  Exiting the ruble was hardly a choice for Ukraine: 
at the time Ukraine was experiencing hyperinflation and Russia’s monetary policy prevented 
them from issuing enough currency to support their monetary policy. Further, worsening 
relations between the two states as a result of the gas debt- gas restriction cycle contributed 
to a desire on the part of the Ukrainians to have more sovereignty in the sphere of monetary 
policy.158  
 The Kravchuk Era was characterized by little substantive change from the previous 
Socialist regime. Institutionally many of the same Soviet Era legal regimes (the Procuracy) 
remained in place under different names, and most of the same actors remained in power. 
The most substantive changes took place around the energy industry: although Ukraine’s 
serious asymmetric dependence on Russian commodities and outrageously high energy 																																																								
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demands remained in place from the Soviet era, Ukraine was now required to pay for its 
energy imports.  Without a rule of law property rights regime in place and through a lack of 
institutions around the energy policy-making apparatuses, Ukraine’s energy insecurity 
increased after independence. Initial choices including the delay of privatization that 
empowered energy veto players as well as the huge subsidization of energy credits to 
industrial and household consumers set Ukraine on a difficult path.  
 Would Ukraine have been able to decrease its energy dependence if it had made a 
radical break from Soviet era institutional arrangements? The Polish example shows that that 
may have been possible, albeit extremely difficult. At transition, both Poland and Ukraine 
had development strategies based on uncompetitive, inefficient heavy industry and poor 
infrastructure. They were also both highly dependent on Russian commodities (coal 
notwithstanding). Poland embarked on a program of institutional reform almost 
immediately, putting in place clear rules and dispatching with the old communist elite. As a 
consequence, Poland made much more progress instituting a property rights regime than did 
Ukraine even more than 25 years after transition. Further, Poland made quick and early steps 
to privatize state-owned enterprises while Ukraine’s delayed reforms led to smaller, 
incremental privatization gains that resulted in a huge culture of corruption around its energy 
industry. As a result, Poland did not develop a corrupt cohort of oligarchs that continually 
acted as veto players blocking energy reform. 
 On the other hand, Poland is a nation state with a long history whereas Ukraine was 
subjected longer to Soviet rule. The comparison is not perfect: Poland had a stronger 
incentive from the European Union to enact swift reforms whereas in the mid 1990s the 
EU’s mandate to engage with Russia and build commercial ties often took precedence over 
Ukraine’s needs. Polish foreign minister Radek Sikorski argued, “The Poles took tough 
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decisions on painful reforms knowing that the carrot of EU membership was there.” 
Ukraine did not have this immediate incentive. Nevertheless, at transition and at several 
other key points in its post-Soviet history, Ukraine was presented with and failed to take 
advantage of the opportunity to make radical changes to its institutions, political system and 
energy dependence. 
 
The Kuchma Era (July 19, 1994 to January 23, 2005) 
 
 Perhaps no one individual had a greater impact on Ukraine’s post-Soviet energy 
security than did Leonid Kuchma, who was elected president on the platform of restoring 
economic relations with Russia and faster privatization. Kuchma, who had previously served 
as PM from 1993-1994, was the successful former Soviet era red director of a machine plant 
in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, which was the traditional home of Soviet Ukrainian elites (and 
of former General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev). Kuchma’s position as a member of the 
Dnipropetrovsk clan is significant because within months of taking office, Kuchma had 
moved 206 of his key Soviet era apparatchiks from Dnipropetrovsk to Kiev to take over key 
positions in the state administration.159 It is also crucial for understanding the dynamics of 
Ukraine’s energy security because under Kuchma, regional differences became the most 
salient political cleavage in Ukrainian politics.  
The role of regional clans in Ukrainian politics dates back to the Stalin era, when 
communist activists formed exclusive regional teams to avoid persecution from the Stalinist 
political police. These clans were formed according to the region’s Soviet era development 
strategy: Donestk was the center of the mining metallurgic industry, Kharkiv the machine-																																																								
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building region and Dnipropetrovsk was highly industrialized and the center of the Soviet 
Union’s military industrial sector and therefore the center of the Ukrainian Socialist elite. 
Leonid Brezhnev is considered the father of the Dnipropetrovsk clan, having been educated 
at the Dnipropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute. During his 18 years as General Secretary of the 
Russian SSR, Brezhnev used the region as a “private patronage reserve”. 160 In a 1990 report 
on the Central Committee of the USSR, 53% of Ukrainian executive officials were originally 
from Dnipropetrovsk.161 
This is significant because when Kuchma brought the members of his 
Dnepropetrovsk clan to Kiev, they brought with them their identity as the favored sons of 
the Soviet empire as well as a long history of deep connections with the Russians. Originally, 
inaugurated by Catherine the Great in 1787 as the administrative center of “New Russia”, 
Dnipropetrovsk was the home to the key nuclear, space and arms industries of the Soviet 
Union and was therefore a “closed city” until the 1990s, meaning that no citizen of a foreign 
country (including Socialist countries) was allowed to visit the city.162 Members of the 
Dnipropetrovsk clan played a large role in Ukrainian post-Soviet politics and in particular 
had a crucial impact on the development of its energy sector through two central actors: 
Pavlo Lazarenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. 
 
Institutional Development During Kuchma’s First Term 
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There were several crucial institutional developments under Kuchma that greatly 
affected the ability of the Ukrainian state to make substantive changes from its Soviet era 
energy policy. First, in the March 1994 Rada elections, enterprise directors were the third 
largest individual group in parliament.163 This strong strategic bloc enabled the group to 
introduce the July 1994 moratorium on privatization (lifted in December) designed to halt 
economic reforms in a partial reform equilibrium.164 This group also helped pass the 1995 
Law on State Power and Local Administration, or the “Power Bill”, that was a decisive step 
in the shift of formal decision-making powers from the parliament to the president. 
Although through this bill the president was vested with considerable power, parliament was 
given significant influence over the economic arena and the privatization process, which 
made parliamentary representation an attractive goal for enterprise directors and economic 
actors.165 The Power Bill gave the parliament the official power of “approving the list of 
state-owned objectives which would not be made subject to privatization, determining the 
legal principles for approving privately owned objectives’ and put it in charge of the State 
Property Fund, which supervised privatization”. 166  The president however, gained the 
exclusive right to form a government, issue decrees, and appoint elected chairmen of local 
and regional councils as heads of their respective state administrations. 
Allowing members of the Rada, the very directors of many state owned enterprises, 
almost complete control over deciding when and what state industries were to be privatized 
was a blatant conflict of interest and had major consequences for Ukraine’s nascent energy 																																																								
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security policy.  This is another example of a pattern of constant reforms that had very little 
impact on the institutional conditions on the ground. In fact, as will be discussed below, the 
Power Bill actually increased the probability of corruption around the privatization process 
of prized state assets, particularly in the energy sector. 
On June 28, 1996, Ukraine adopted a new constitution, making it the last of the 
former Soviet Republics to establish its own constitution. There were several key 
propositions in the new constitution that had long-term implications for the energy sector. 
First, the constitution officially declared that the economic system of Ukraine operated on 
the basis of a market economy, with all types of ownership (state and private) being equal. 
The new constitution also curtailed the number of actors able to draft legislation, but did 
nothing to exercise control over executive rulemaking.167  
The main feature of the 1996 constitution was an increase in power in the executive 
branch, creating one of the most powerful presidencies in the world. Formally, the 
constitution granted the president the power to appoint the government (subject to approval 
by the Rada) as well as the power to appoint regional governors.168 This provision proved to 
be extremely problematic in terms of energy security: throughout Ukraine but particularly in 
the East, regional governors had close relationships or were directly involved with energy 
clans. This new constitutional amendment empowered the president to formally create and 
engender energy veto players with real political power. The constitution also put limits on 
the independence of the Cabinet of Ministers and strengthened the regional governor’s 
direct dependence on the president. The constitution created an interdependent relationship 																																																								
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between the regional governors and the president that got rid of almost any public oversight. 
The provision led directly to the institutionalization of corruption of Ukraine’s energy sector, 
particularly in Eastern Ukraine. As will be discussed below, the consequences of this for 
Ukraine’s long-term energy security were far-reaching. 
Under the new constitution, Ukraine’s existing judicial system (still based on the 
Soviet era Procuracy) was combined into a Court of General Jurisdiction that was 
responsible for enforcing criminal law and eventually, the civil code. The constitution vested 
the following powers to the Procuracy:  
 
Prosecution in court on behalf of the state; representation of the interests of a citizen 
or of the state in court cases determined by law; supervision of the observance of 
laws by bodies that conduct detective and search activity, inquiry and pre-trial 
investigation; and supervision of the observance of laws in the execution of judicial 
decisions in criminal cases, and also in the application of other measures of coercion 
related to the restraint of personal liberty of citizens.169 
 
Although these powers far exceed those of prosecutors in many Western states, the power 
of the Procuracy continued to grow with a constitutional amendment in 2004 that gave it the 
function of supervising “over the observance of humans’ and citizens’ rights and freedoms 
and the observance of laws on these matters by bodies of state power, local self-government, 
their officials and functionaries.” Its broad mandate and relationship with those in positions 
of political power had a major effect on Ukraine’s energy security during the Kuchma era 
and beyond. One direct example of this is the case of Ihor Bakai, head of Naftogaz Ukrainy 
from 1998-2000, who embezzled a minimum of $100 million during his tenure and was not 
prosecuted for his crimes. Prosecutor General Oleksandr Medveko dismissed the case for 
“lack of evidence” despite the publication of a taped conversation between the President and 
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the Head of the Tax Inspection Agency acknowledging his crimes. This case will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following section (Energy Policy in Kuchma’s Second 
Term). 
Despite its inception mid 1996, Ukraine’s constitutional court was not operational 
until over a year later because Ukrainian elites argued that a court could not be established 
until the entire constitution had passed.170 This had the negative affect of creating a period of 
a year in which there was no clearly defined legal system in place whatsoever: the Procuracy 
was more or less subsumed into a general body but there was no highest level court over 
which to make national level decisions on property rights regimes or international energy 
contracts. 
This lack of legal architecture amplified the affect of a constitutional provision that 
granted parliamentary immunity to members of the Rada. Following the 1998 parliamentary 
elections, more than 20 members of the parliament faced criminal prosecution only after 
being stripped of their immunity while 44 legislators elected to parliament had previous 
criminal backgrounds. 171  One member of the presidential administration commented, 
“Business in Ukraine if it is not entirely criminal is semi-criminal. The status of the Deputy 
gives [the businessman] more or less four years to cover and to solve the problems of his 
business.”172 This made participation in the Rada even more attractive to those with criminal 
backgrounds or who were engaged in business in legal grey areas and because there was a 
lack of legal oversight during this period, there was no legal way to change it. 																																																								
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Overall, the 1996 constitution did little to improve Ukraine’s property rights regime 
and in many respects, reduced the power of the state vis-à-vis private interests. Even after 
the implementation of the constitution excessive bureaucratic requirements, arbitrary 
business legislation and a disastrous tax system made it very difficult to do business without 
major political affiliation. In concert with the parliamentary immunity provision and the 
concentration of power within the hands of the executive branch, there was very little 
institutional development that could be interpreted as affecting energy security in a positive 
way.  
By the 1998 parliamentary elections the lack of Ukraine’s institutional development 
had a profound effect on politics and particularly energy policy. It was in the 1998 elections 
that parties that represented the interests of regional oligarchs who had benefited from 
flawed and delayed privatization made their major entry into Ukrainian politics. 127 business 
representatives (28% of the total number of legislators) were elected to the parliament, with 
the energy sector gaining 15 new deputies. 173  Most of these deputies were politically 
connected members of the Dnipropetrovsk clan. 
In 1998 Pavlo Lazarenko’s (himself a member of the Dnipropetrovsk clan) Hromada 
Party which was comprised of ‘dissident oligarchs” obtained 4.67 percent in the election and 
entered parliament. 174  Lazarenko, previously appointed regional governor of 
Dnipropetrovsk, had been head of the Ukrainian gas distribution network and during his 
tenure as PM, increased the market share of his own regional Dnipropetrovsk gas supply 
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it is estimated that Lazarenko personally made approximately $200 million per year through 
designing legislation favorable to his gas supply companies.175 However, due in part to 
presidential ambitions, huge wealth and open hostility to President Kuchma, Lazarenko was 
removed as PM and had to flee the country after his parliamentary immunity was revoked. 
Lazarenko was charged by the United States with laundering $114 million in energy related 
deals during his tenure as PM and was the second highest ranking foreign citizen to be 
prosecuted in the US since Manuel Noriega.176 As part of his defense, Lazarenko’s lawyers 
attempted to show that the division of the gas market in the 1990s was part of systemic 
corruption that stretched higher than their client.177 Shortly after he declared his intentions to 
run in the 1999 elections, he was indicted by Ukraine on petty corruption charges of 
embezzling millions of dollars from the state.  
After his withdrawal from Ukrainian politics Yulia Tymoshenko’s Fatherland Party 
co-opted Lazarenko’s former cadre and became Kuchma’s opposition. Tymoshenko, who 
was the deputy PM for energy in the Yushchenko government and the billionaire former 
head of United Energy Systems, later made controversial deals with Gazprom that resulted 
in accusations of treason. Further, before entering Ukrainian politics, Tymoshenko’s United 
Energy Systems was granted a monopoly on the Ukrainian gas market by PM Lazarenko. In 
2005, Tymoshenko had been arrested at the Zaporizhzhia airport on charges of trying to 
smuggle $26 million to Moscow. Conveniently, the case was moved from Zaporizhzhia to 
Dnipropetrovsk where Lazarenko was then regional governor. The regional procurator 
happened to be promoted to a position in Kiev at the express request of Lazarenko and as a 																																																								
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result the charges againwere dropped.178 After Lazarenko fled Ukraine, she created her own 
political party, Fatherland.  
  
Privatization: Kuchma’s First Term 
 
Because Kuchma had been elected on a platform of increasing the pace of market 
reform, one of his first tasks in office was to appoint a chairman to Ukraine’s privatization 
agency, the State Property Fund. Until 1995, the Ukrainian state maintained 100 percent 
state ownership of gas production, transmission, storage and distribution assets. However, in 
1995 the process of limited privatization began with the corporatization of gas distribution 
companies (but not pipelines or compression stations). 179  In 1995, the government 
postponed indefinitely the establishment of a wholesale gas market. However, in 1996 a 
small number of companies were licensed to import gas and market it to final consumers in 
distinct geographical areas. These licenses were issued directly by the cabinet based on 
recommendations by the State Committee for Oil and Gas Industry headed by Yevhen 
Dovzhok .180  
Since the energy industry remained largely state-owned, the system of paying state 
subsidies to enterprises was still the common practice. The Ukrainian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs (UUIE) was a major organization that worked as both the political 
platform behind Leonid Kuchma and also as the intermediary of state subsidies paid to the 
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enterprises within its organization.181 A number of businesses with ties to the UUIE were 
granted these licenses before large-scale privatization even began.  
One consequence of delaying privatization in the energy sector was that most Soviet 
era enterprise managers attained de-facto property rights of the state enterprises they had 
previously managed. Small-scale privatization was completed through a process of “rent with 
buy out”, where enterprises had to submit a privatization application to local bureaucrats 
before being authorized to initiate the procedures. Naturally, this led to a system of bribery 
and corruption whereby privatization largely benefited insiders with political connections. By 
mid 1997 85 percent of all shares allocated had been acquired by incumbent managers or 
working collectives.182  
Ukraine’s privatization process, long delayed and stinted, was in many respects worse 
than even Russia’s flawed privatization. Russia’s mass privatization from 1992-1994 
transferred the bulk of shares to firm managers and workers who received large discounts in 
implicit prices. 183  Approximately 29 percent of the shares were reserved for auctions, 
ostensibly open to any participant and as a result there was a variety of ownership structures 
in Russia. Ukraine followed this pattern, but at a slower pace and much later, which provided 
even greater advantages to insiders acquiring shares in their companies.184 Thus while Russia 
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(famously) also developed a powerful class of oligarchs particularly in its energy sector, 
Ukraine’s oligarchs developed in a slightly different way, with different consequences. First, 
unlike Russia’s oligarchs, who tended to work together in groups185, Ukrainian oligarch’s 
displayed less trust, although two of the largest oligarchical groups each had three billionaire 
owners.186 Another major difference between Ukrainian and Russian oligarchy is the type of 
representation they get in parliament. Again, it is clear that the institutional development of 
Russia is also flawed, but due to a number of factors including an earlier privatization, 
Russian oligarchs are less able to block policy reform than in Ukraine. In Russia individual 
oligarchs finance parliamentarians in return for their support on corporate issues. Due to the 
institutional factors described above, Ukraine’s parliament has been at times overwhelmingly 
oligarchic: after the 2002 elections more than 300 of the 450 deputies in the Supreme Rada 
were millionaires, and until the Orange Revolution half of the Supreme Rada was dominated 
by nine oligarchic groups, each representing the interests of a major business group.187  
 
Energy Policy: Kuchma’s First Term  
 
 During the first years of independence, Ukraine’s energy security policy was non-
existent. There was an overall lack of investment in energy efficiency and diversifying the 
fuel mix and despite rhetoric calling for increased geographical supply, there were no 
attempts to either increase domestic production or seek alternate suppliers. In fact, Ukraine’s 
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initial energy security strategy was based around ignoring Ukraine’s energy insecurity by state 
guarantees of energy and the provision of huge subsidies to industrial and household 
consumers. This had the detrimental effect of cushioning consumers from Ukraine’s energy 
insecurity, which led to a situation in which there were no demands from the public to 
pursue alternate energy security strategies.  
The contractual framework of the gas trade between Russia and Ukraine for the 
period of 1994-2005 was that Ukraine imported Russian gas via a barter system whereby gas 
was paid for by transit services.188 The entire gas relationship (transit, storage, prices) was 
negotiated as one package where the transit and storage fees paid by Russia were extremely 
low by international standards, but Ukraine was compensated by the very low price of 
imported gas (nominally $50 per tcm).189 By 1995 the Ukrainian government was feeling the 
effects of these deleterious policies and signaled a reversal, which required most industrial 
consumers to pay the full (subsidized) cost of importing energy by the end of 1995. 
Household consumption, however, was still subsidized and the total household gas subsidy 
was equivalent to $530 million in 1995.190 The theory behind the new legislation was that by 
abolishing the practice of state-guaranteed gas imports, proper commercial relations between 
suppliers and customers could be established. Additionally, by 1995, the gas transit fee was 
increased to near international market levels. While these policies were ostensibly a step in 
the right direction for Ukrainian energy policy, a number of simultaneous contradictory 
policies dampened their effect. Although Ukraine had managed in its negotiations with 
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Gazprom to increase its transit fee, Gazprom also managed to include a contractual 
provision that stipulated that the transit fee be maintained for guarantees of payments for 
imports (in-kind payments as opposed to cash payments).191 The continuation of the barter 
system of gas transit for gas supplies meant that the perception of state-guaranteed gas 
imports remained in place. As a result, there was little to no incentive for consumers to pay 
their higher bills: even if they failed to make payments, they would still receive gas supplies 
guaranteed by Ukrainian transit fees.  
Simultaneously, the Ukrainian government decided to transfer the marketing tags 
from local gas distribution companies to the main importers Ukrgazprom (the importer of 
Russian gas from Gazprom) and UkrRezursy (the importer of Turkmen gas). Furthermore, 
Ukrgazprom and UkrRezursy were asked to sign contracts directly with consumers including 
local governments who were now responsible for purchasing gas directly for the consumers 
in their limited territories.192 Because regional distribution networks and local gas distribution 
companies were politically affiliated with local governments (and the regional governors 
were appointed directly by President Kuchma), this meant that this policy had practically no 
effect other than to increase potential rent seeking opportunities by local actors. 
 In the first year, approximately 3,000 contracts were drawn up directly with 
consumers. Ukragazprom struggled with the administrative task of overseeing the high 
volume of contracts and as a result (and most likely the intended outcome of this policy), the 
government indefinitely postponed the establishment of a wholesale market for gas. This is 
unsurprising considering the majority position of the red directors in the Rada at the time: 
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postponing a gas market allowed continued de facto control over state enterprises and 
facilitated further opportunities for rent seeking.  
Amid an increasing budgetary crisis, Kuchma dismissed the head of the Oil and Gas 
Committee, Yevhen Dovzhok, in August 1996. Although ostensibly his removal was because 
“he was of a pensionable age,”193 it is said that Dovzhok, the chief negotiator with Gazprom, 
was dismissed because of his failure to get along with Russian officials and his “failure to 
comply with the revenues of the national budget.”194 A well-respected an oil and gas explorer 
during Soviet times, Dovzhok had been involved in several disputes with Russia during this 
tenure and had been accused by Russia of making inappropriate claims on behalf of the 
Ukrainian government. During talks between Russia’s Mintopenergo and Ukraine’s 
Ukrhazprom in February 1996, Dovzhok demanded an increase in the Ukrainian transit 
tariffs. Russian officials accused Dovzhok of corruption and insisted that any increase in 
tariffs should be done only through agreement at the highest levels of government.195 In 
response, Dovzhok replied that Russia’s approach was “more than inappropriate” and 
canceled the rest of the talks. In fact, Dovzhok had been one of the few Ukrainian energy 
officials actually pursuing a strategy of increasing Ukrainian energy security. Not only had 
Dovzhok fought doggedly for increased transit fees from Russia that would have offset 
some of the costs of importing gas, but as early as one month before his dismissal he signed 
a deal in Baghdad overseeing the exchange of iron and other goods for 4 million tons of 
																																																								
193 The Moscow Times. “Energy Chief Sacked,” August 8, 1996.  
 
194 Kolomayets, Marta. “Presidential Decree Attempts to Counter Payments Crisis,” Kyiv 
Press Bureau, May 26, 1996.  
 
195 Markus, Ustina. “Russian-Ukrainian Oil Talks Suspended,” OMRI Daily Digest, 25 January 
1996.  
 157 	
Iraqi oil.196 This attempt at geographical diversification of supply angered the Russians and 
was later banned by the UN because it was believed Baghdad was trying to use a 
humanitarian clause to affect a broader suspension of sanctions.  
Kuchma’s dismissal of Dovzhok is a clear example of active dependence at work: 
Dovzhok’s attempts to diversify away from Russian supplies and assert Ukrainian interests in 
negotiation with Gazprom was a threat to the entire system of patronage and rent-seeking 
that had developed around the energy sector. It is also in part responsible for Kuchma’s 
decision to bring the entire energy system under his direct control: in 1998 he created the 
National Shareholding Company (NAK) and Naftgoz Ukrainy, which in concert completely 
monopolized Ukraine’s gas and oil market and transformed the Russian-Ukrainian gas 
relationship into bi-lateral monopoly, with Gazprom on one side and Naftogaz on the other. 
Although there were very few substantive policies aimed at increasing energy security 
during this period, in 1996 the government put forth the “Concept for the Diversification of 
Gas and Oil Supplies” that included proposals for diversification via new partners such as 
Turkmenistan, Iran and Uzbekistan. The National Security Doctrine adopted by the Rada in 
1997 also emphasized the security problem of Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas.197  But 
instead of ameliorating this problem or seeking potential new suppliers, in 1997 President 
Kuchma transferred the Black Sea Fleet to Russia in exchange for forgiveness of gas-related 
debt.198 While this did lessen the burden of increasing import costs by transferring the 
economic and political burden to the state rather than consumers, these policies were overall 
																																																								
196 Markus, Ustina. “Ukraine, Iraq Draw Up Barter Deal,” Newsline, RFE/RL, July 3, 1996. 
 
197 Balmaceda, Energy Dependence, 143. 
 
198 Gordon, Michael. “Russia and Ukraine Finally Reach Accord on Black Sea Fleet,” The 
New York Times, May 29, 1997.  
 158 	
detrimental to Ukrainian energy security because they once again made overwhelming energy 
dependence on Russia manageable to consumers. Although import prices rose rapidly, 
industrial and household consumers continued to have access to cheap energy at the cost of 
the Ukrainian state.  
Why was Ukraine unable to pass much needed energy policy legislation during this 
period? First, although there were various attempts at changing the problematic relationship 
between consumers and the state, they were almost always immediately undermined by 
contradictory or confusing implementation or policies. This is unsurprising given the fact 
that by this point the property rights regime was still substantially underdeveloped and had 
bad reforms enabled Soviet era actors to enter politics as energy veto players. Not only was 
the Rada dominated by MPs with a vested interest in keeping the current system going, but 
up until late 1997 there was no high court to challenge high-level decisions. The Soviet era 
judicial system was still largely in place (although reorganized and renamed) and this meant 
that corruption around both the judiciary and the legislative body was rampant.  
In addition, President Kuchma’s decision to bring the entire energy sector under his 
direct control had the consequence of locking in a commercialized political relationship 
between Gazprom and Naftogaz. This institutionalization of active dependence would 
continue to haunt Ukraine’s energy security in the years to come. Because the current 
inefficient and corrupt system was so profitable, actors seeking in any way to alter the system 
were removed from power.  When compared to Poland, or even Russia at the same period, 
it is clear that Ukraine’s policy-making ability was severely curtailed. Although Russia did not 
have a problem of energy dependence, it did face a similar problem in regards to subsidies 
for domestic consumers. During the 1990s, Gazprom also experienced significant non-
payment problems in the domestic consumer market, but in 2002 Moscow issued a 
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governmental decree establishing an FTS-based tariff regulation of gas sales that gradually 
increased prices. Of course, Poland was the most successful in achieving reforms to its 
domestic energy sector. In 1998 the Polish government reformed the coal industry, leaving it 
financially viable while achieving a substantial reduction in government transfer. Between 
1998-2002 the Polish government closed 21 inefficient mines, which resulted in the loss of 
over 100,000 jobs.199 Although painful in the short turn, the industry was profitable from 
2003 onwards. This type of painful restructuring of the Ukrainian energy sector was not 
possible given its institutional legacy.  
 
Kuchma’s Second Term (1999) 
 
 In 1999, Kuchma was re-elected to his second term. This period was crucial in the 
development of Ukraine’s long-term energy security strategy because it was during this term 
that previously empowered oligarchs attempted to monopolize power in Kiev and beyond. It 
also set the stage for the Orange Revolution and the two defining energy crises of 2006 and 
2009, which are critical junctures in Ukraine’s political history and therefore significantly 
change both the political incentives and energy security of the state.  
 
Institutional Development: Kuchma’s Second Term 
 
 Kuchma’s 1999 election campaign was largely financed by the members of the 
Dnepropetrovsk clan including Viktor Pinchuk (who was later rewarded with control of 
several metallurgical complexes and gas and oil companies),200 and Ihor Bakai, head of the 
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state property management office and later of Naftogaz. Upon election, Kuchma’s chose 
Viktor Yushchenko, former National Bank governor and reformer, as prime minister. Many 
of his donors were unhappy with this choice. 
 Yushchenko attempted to “clean up” the energy sector in several ways. First, he 
cancelled privileges for joint ventures in the energy sector. 201 These privileges were highly 
prized because they awarded profitable contracts to certain players with political connections 
(the joint ventures were distributed on recommendation of the State Oil and Gas Committee 
which was run by Kuchma cronies). Second, Yushchenko appointed Yulia Tymoshenko as 
Deputy PM in charge of the energy sector. Tymoshenko, herself a former billionaire energy 
executive and dissident member of the Dnipropetrovsk clan, began targeting energy 
companies owned by rival oligarchs. Most of these companies had taken advantage of large 
state credits, all while accumulating debts for energy supplied by Russia.  
 Because the red directors and oligarchs still had a large influence in the Rada, 
Yushchenko was removed as PM by a parliamentary vote of no confidence organized by 
President Kuchma (unhappy with Yushchenko’s performance and worried about losing 
crucial political support) and Social Democratic Party of Ukraine-United (SDPUo) leader 
Viktor Medvedchuk. Medvedchuk, a former lawyer and head of the Union of Ukrainian 
Lawyers was plagued by rumors of corruption throughout his career. In a March 2005 poll 
that asked if leaders could be trusted, Medvedchuk received the lowest rating at -32%.202 
Following the removal of Yushchenko as PM, Kuchma and his oligarchic allies 
embarked on a strategic plan to continue their legacy. On November 21, 2002, 234 members 																																																								
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of the Rada voted to support Viktor Yanukovych, who had previously served as the 
governor of Donetsk oblast since 1997, as PM. 203 In 2004, he was put forth as the 
presidential successor to Kuchma. The oligarchs further entrenched themselves through 
control of major institutions by the installation of Kuchma’s candidate for the head of the 
Supreme Court, Vasyl Malyarenko who was elected in November of 2002. Thus following 
the dismissal of Yushchenko, Kuchma’s faction of oligarchs not only had control of 
parliament, but also of the Supreme Court.  
President Kuchma made further constitutional changes in 2003 that were publically 
put forth as moving Ukraine toward Europe while increasing efficiency in the political 
system. In reality, they were an attempt to decrease presidential power ahead of the 2004 
elections in which Yushchenko was the leading candidate. These reforms were adopted by 
parliament on December 8, 2004 as part of a compromise package post-Orange Revolution. 
Therefore although Yushchenko would win again in a repeat election on December 26, 
2006, he would assume the presidency with vastly curtailed powers.204 
By Kuchma’s second term the lack of substantive reform of the property rights 
regime was apparent. Constitutional changes were put forth only to weaken the ability of a 
potential reformer to make changes. In many respects, Kuchma’s role as an arbiter between 
oligarchic interests served as a de-facto replacement for property rights. Because there was 
no real regulation of property rights or corporate power it was easy for Kuchma to create 
and consolidate an opaque and unregulated energy market. Instead of taking place in formal 
political settings, policy-making under Kuchma took place in informal networks of patron-
client relationships. This messy institutional setting allowed Kuchma to blackmail and 																																																								
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balance various institutions in his favor. Prior to the Orange Revolution, corruption around 
the political system, energy sector and judiciary were all entrenched, and this manifested 
itself in the persistent inability of reformers to make any substantive changes to Ukrainian 
energy security policy. 
 
Energy Policy: Kuchma’s Second Term 
 
 Kuchma’s second term started with a scandal at the highest level of Ukraine’s energy 
policy-making apparatus. In 2000, a scandal around the release of secret tapes recorded by 
Kuchma’s former bodyguard Major Mykola Melnychenko erupted. The tapes recorded a 
meeting between Mykola Azarov, head of the Tax Inspection Agency, and President 
Kuchma based on a conversation he had with Ihor Bakai, then head of Naftogaz. The 
conversation exposed a complicit knowledge by the president of corrupt practices by Bakai:  
Azarov: Well, concerning Naftohaz. I invited Bakai, as we agreed, showed him all 
these. My people did this, (people) I trust. I talked to Oleksandr Mykhailovych, 
found out how much of everything came in, and told him exactly the following: 
"Well, Ihoryok, at a minimum, you put in your pocket a hundred million, at least. I 
understand, of course, that I will not expose you. I give you two weeks, a month at 
maximum. (Here I showed him all the plans). Destroy all the papers that witness 
directly or indirectly about all your those... You did everything stupidly and 
senselessly." And I showed that he was doing everything stupidly and senselessly. 
Kuchma: Good. 
Azarov: And now the case is moving.... 
Kuchma: Well, Mykola Yanovych, I told him: "Listen, my dear, we will not protect 
your ass forever.205 
 
Bakai, head of the Ukrainian state gas company that was responsible for signing contracts 
directly with Gazprom, was embezzling huge amounts of money from the state. A criminal 
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investigation into Bakai was later closed for lack of evidence and in 2003 he was appointed 
the head of State Management of Affairs Department, an institution that managed property 
on behalf of the president and the cabinet under Kuchma.206 Prosecutor General Medvedko, 
the prosecutor responsible for the dismissal of Bakai’s case, was a known friend and 
associate of Viktor Yanukovych, Kuchma’s ally and chosen successor. In 2010, Yulia 
Tymoshenko accused Medvedko of being completely controlled by Yanukovych and the 
Party of Regions and attributed the lack of prosecution for wealthy oligarchs to his role as 
prosecutor.207 The Bakai scandal is powerful example of the failure of Ukraine’s legal 
architecture and reforms. Because the Procuarcy remained relatively untouched from the 
days of its Soviet inception, it remained a powerful institution whose functions 
overwhelmingly exceed the scope of prosecutors in most democratic states.  
 Because of the lack of institutional reform, delayed privatization and the 
empowerment of energy veto players, the gas sector was particularly vulnerable to corrupt 
practices. As previously discussed, the regional divisions of energy infrastructure meant that 
regional power organizations had almost complete control over the entire energy chain from 
import to distribution within their distinct regional area. Second, the absurdly low import 
prices of Russian gas meant that Ukrainian energy entrepreneurs could make money through 
re-selling the gas at higher prices in other markets. Gas traders could manipulate differences 
in levels of discount at various stages in the payment chain thereby making massive profits.  
For example, in 2000 Gazprom accused Ukraine of illegally re-exporting 10bcm of gas to 
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Poland and Hungary for huge profits.208  Third, well-connected private gas companies were 
often allocated highly prized industrial consumers leaving state owned gas companies with 
residential consumers who were less likely to pay their bills.  
One well publicized example of a “gas middleman” who profited from Ukraine’s 
lack of institutional development was Dmitry Firtash, who made money by buying Russian 
gas at subsidized exchange rates and selling it to Ukrainian consumers for hard currency. 
After a change in management at Gazprom in 2001,  Eural Trans Gas, an entity registered 
anonymously in a tiny Hungarian town replaced Itera. Both Gazprom and Naftogaz claimed 
that Eural Trans Gas was a transitional entity, which both companies would later acquire. 
Although the ownership of the company remains unclear, Firtash represented its interests. 
Through his role as an intermediary, it is estimated that Firtash’s organizations (Eural Trans 
Gas and later RosUkrEnergy) made more than $3 billion or between $3 and $5m a day.209  
 This scheme was not unique: other gas middlemen took advantage of barter 
arrangements to import gas and sell them onto domestic markets. They were then paid for 
their services in gas (for example RosUkrEnergo, owned by Firtash and Gazprom, received 
37.5% of supplied gas), which they would then export to Western Europe making enormous 
profits. Although the presence of gas middlemen did not help either Naftogaz or Gazprom 
in a national sense, their actions did profit individuals within the management at both 
companies. Firtash is said to have had the “support of the new Gazprom management” and 
his company’s entry into the Ukrainian market was facilitated directly by Yuri Boiko, who 
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was appointed head of Naftogaz in 2002. 210 During this period Firtash used an $11b loan 
from Gazprom Bank to back pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych in his 2010 
Presidential Campaign.211 
In her role as Deputy PM in charge of the energy sector, Yulia Tymoshenko 
embarked on a project to increase transparency in the industry and to increase cash 
payments over barter transactions. As a result, cash payments to Naftogaz grew from 15.8 
percent in 1999 to 87 percent in 2001.212 However, these reforms proved to be short-lived 
and did not completely curtail rent seeking. Many energy veto players invested their gas 
related profits in the metallurgical sector, which was both one of Ukraine’s most energy 
intensive industries and one of the main beneficiaries of subsidized energy prices.213 As a 
result, even though Tymoshenko’s reforms made it more difficult in the short-term to 
extract profits from the gas trade, energy veto players were still able to make profits via 
heavy industry.  
As my theory predicts, the largest opposition to Tymoshenko’s reforms came from 
within the energy policy-making establishment itself. The struggle came to head in the 
confrontation between Tymoshenko and the head of Naftogaz Ihor Bakai, who each sided 
with different factions within Gazprom that argued for different valuations of Ukraine’s 
debts to the company. The Bakai faction argued that Ukraine’s debt to Gazprom was $1 
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billion whereas Tymoshenko claimed the debt amounted to more $2 billion.214 Tymoshenko 
accused Bakai of concealing the true nature of Naftogaz’s debt to Gazprom and as a result 
Bakai was forced to step down in March of 2000.  
This struggle had serious consequences because in 2001, new contracts on gas 
exports to Ukraine and transit to Europe were signed with Gazprom. Given the 
disagreement over the actual amount of debt owed to Gazprom, Ukraine’s bargaining power 
in the contract negotiations was diminished. Between 2000-2005 Ukraine charged Russian 
affiliated companies $1.80/tcm for gas storage (later raised to $6.60 in 2005 and reduced to 
$2.25 in the January 2006 gas contract renegotiation) in comparison to the Czech Republic, 
which charged $87/tcm, and Germany, which charged $110/tcm in 2006.215 Although 
Gazprom dropped plans for a replacement pipeline project that would cut out Ukraine’s 
ability to extract transit fees, Ukraine agreed to the acceptance of absurdly low tariffs for 
transit and storage, as well as consistent increases in gas prices.  
Because there had not been any fundamental reforms over Ukraine’s energy security 
policy, Ukraine remained highly insecure: it remained highly dependent on Russian gas and 
was largely unable to pay for it. In 2002, Gazprom brought suit against Ukraine at the 
International Commercial Arbitration Court, which ordered Naftogaz to pay for $88 million 
in stolen gas. Although Naftogaz denied the charges, Tymoshenko eventually admitted the 
theft. Tymoshenko’s reforms were cut short because by early 2001 she was imprisoned on 
charges of forging customs documents and stealing gas from the state just as Yushchenko’s 
cabinet was dissolved. She was held in prison for six weeks in what many argue was a 
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politically motivated attack. Although she was later released and the charges dropped, most 
of the reforms made during her tenure were swiftly reversed by the powerful oligarchic 
lobby within the Rada and the energy policy-making apparatus. 
Why were the two reformers unable to follow through with their promises? 
Kuchma’s manipulation of the political system and particularly the energy sector had two 
major consequences that resulted in the blocking of reform. First, the lack of transparency in 
the energy sector both discouraged Western participation in the markets while also 
encouraging further entanglement with Russia, where gray market “expertise” was to be 
found as well as individuals willing to work in quasi-legal settings. Second, the 
mismanagement of privatization and the legal regime created a class of oligarchs who 
received rents by passing on the losses to the rest of the population. The creation of 
Naftogaz was a clear example of the capture of state institutions that allowed this process to 
proceed unchecked. Under Kuchma, informal politics led to a system in which major 
political decisions were made on the basis of individual economic profit, especially in the 
energy sector. Because of the manipulation of political institutions, these interests were so 
powerfully entrenched at every level of government that reformers had neither the support 
nor the institutional tools with which to tackle problems. 
 
 The Orange Revolution and the Yushchenko Era (November 2004- February 25, 
2010) 
 
 While the circumstances surrounding the Orange Revolution are beyond the scope 
of this project, the origins of the political struggle stem from the same explanatory variables 
identified earlier. Because Ukraine was never able to fully establish a rule of law property 
rights regime before privatization, a class of oligarchs seized hold of the policy-making 
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apparatus. After his removal from parliament in 2001, Yushchenko’s shift to opposition 
against Kuchma and his oligarchic allies set the stage for the 2004 presidential elections. The 
2004 election between Kuchma’s chosen successor, PM Viktor Yanukovych, and 
Yushchenko was fraught: during the campaign Yushchenko was poisoned with dioxin and 
following massive election fraud citizens took to the streets demanding a second round. As a 
result, Yushchenko was elected president on a platform of bringing Ukraine closer to the 
West and curbing the power of the oligarchs.  
 
Institutional Reform Under Yushchenko 
 
Given Yushchenko’s platform as a reformer and as the democratic hero of the 
Orange Revolution, we would expect a substantial revision of the property rights regime, 
which despite near constant reform remained largely unchanged in practice since the Soviet 
era. Unfortunately, although hopes were high, under Yushchenko very little changed in 
regards to de facto property rights institutions and their affect on transparent policy making. 
One of Yushchenko’s first acts in office was making a direct intervention into the arrest of 
former Naftogaz CEO Yuri Boyko, who had been arrested and charged with abuse of office. 
216 Boyko was released and in 2006 appointed Minister of Fuel and Energy. 
Yushchenko’s main contribution to the property rights regime in Ukraine was the 
establishment of a new constitution in January of 2006. The primary effect of the 
constitution was reducing the power of the president in relation to the PM and the Rada, 
which was now vested with the power to elect the PM and Cabinet rather than approval of 
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presidential appointments.217 While this was a necessary reform given the almost complete 
power vested in the Executive under previous versions of the constitutions, this did little to 
stem the already endemic corruption of the political system and energy sector. Much of the 
reason for the inability of the new regime to make substantive institutional changes to 
prevent rent seeking behavior and block the power of energy veto players was the role of the 
Ukrainian Rada.  
During this period, the inability of the main political parties to function as parties 
rather than vehicles for strong men leaders or energy veto players contributed to a lack of 
progress on main issues. Further, new electoral and Rada regulations actually reduced the 
incentives for parties to work together to pass legislation. The problem was so severe that by 
2008, many MPs in Yushchenko’s own party stopped supporting his initiatives. Adding to 
the problem was the fact that Yanukovych’s Party of Regions played spoiler with its 
unpredictable opposition: at times it allied with Yushchenko through bargaining with 
oligarchs. 218  Most important, although it had been a key issue in the 2007 elections, 
parliamentary immunity remained in place throughout the Yushchenko presidency. In effect, 
despite numerous promises and attempts at making major institutional changes, Ukraine’s 
polarized politics and legacy of bad property rights institutions made it impossible to curb 
the influence of energy veto players. Once they were empowered through the initial choices, 
energy veto players continued to block reforms that would curtail their influence.  
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While Yushchenko was struggling to make reforms to the political arena, a crisis 
around the energy sector was erupting on an international scale. Although Yushchenko and 
PM Tymoshenko once again pledged to clean up the energy sector, during his presidency 
Ukraine’s energy security dramatically worsened. In February 2007, a law proposing a ban on 
the lease, sale or rent of gas pipelines was passed by a vote of 430 deputies including 
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions members. 219  This was a further attempt to block 
privatization in the energy sector because the transport of gas remained an industry around 
which energy veto players profited.  
 
The Gas Crisis of 2006 
 
During the winter of 2006, a major energy crisis erupted in Ukraine. The 
Yushchenko administration was unhappy with the low transit fees it was getting from 
Gazprom and the lack of transparency in the barter system. In spring of 2005 Ukraine 
suggested moving away from the arrangement to a more traditional cash payment model. On 
the other side, Gazprom wanted to increase the artificially low price Ukraine paid for gas. As 
2005 wore on, Gazprom demanded an increase from the current price of $50/ tcm to $95, 
then $150, then $230. Ukraine refused. Following a suspension of gas services due to a 
failure to renew the gas contract before expiry an emergency meeting was held. A solution to 
the crisis was that gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo would supply gas to Ukraine at Russia’s 
original offer of $95/tcm. Dmitry Firtash was present during the January 2006 negotiations 
with Gazprom as part of the Ukrainian delegation. Strangely, Ukraine neglected to take 
Gazprom to arbitration despite the fact that the 2004 contract between Gazprom and 
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Naftogaz stipulated that the “sale price of $50 per 1000m^3 that Ukraine received as transit 
payment was not subject to change” from 2005-2009.220  
On January 4, 2006 the parties reached an agreement and signed a new five-year 
contract to govern gas sales.221 The major change from previous versions was a clause ending 
direct purchases from Gazprom to Ukraine in favor of the sale of all gas to Ukraine through 
RosUkrEnergo and an establishment of a joint venture between Gazprom and Naftogaz to 
market gas in Ukraine. Further stipulations ended the linkage between transit and supply and 
started the process of moving gas prices paid by Ukraine closer to market levels.222 It also 
decreased Ukraine’s control over its own natural gas sector. 
The implications of the 2006 contract on Ukrainian energy security were severe. 
First, although the agreement locked Ukraine into low transit prices until 2006, it also set up 
yearly increases in the price of gas. The contract also lowered the gas storage prices Ukraine 
charged Russia.  Finally, agreeing to the provision stipulating that RosUkrEnergo as the sole 
provider of Russian gas to the Ukrainian market meant that Ukraine was dependent on a 
single supplier with ties to Gazprom and the Russian state in its domestic market. Not only 
was Ukraine dependent on international imports from Russia, but they also had to pay a 
middleman for his completely unnecessary services. The only explanation for such an 
obviously bad deal is corruption. Therefore despite a major crisis that resulted in a complete 
cut off of imported gas during the year’s coldest month Ukraine’s energy security actually 
deteriorated in the wake of the crisis.  
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Following the crisis, the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy did attempt to pursue 
geographical diversification by increasing the amount of gas imported from Turkmenistan by 
more than 50%. However, due to the practice of gas swapping, the “Turkmen” gas imported 
to Ukraine was actually Russian gas renamed as Central Asian gas with the “express purpose 
of charging Ukraine higher prices.”223 This did not increase Ukraine’s energy security. 
 
The Gas Crisis of 2009 
 
When Yulia Tymoshenko returned to power as PM in December 2007, she 
immediately called for an end to RosUkrEnergo’s involvement in favor of reestablishing a 
direct relationship between Naftogaz and Gazprom. President Yushchenko, however, 
continued to justify RosUkrEnergo’s role because it kept gas prices low. Tymoshenko went 
to Moscow in March and October of 2008 for direct negotiations with President Putin. 
Although they agreed on a potential increase in prices in exchange for doing away with 
RosUkrEnergo, this never took place and instead by November 11, 2008 relations between 
Gazprom and Naftogaz had soured again with the result that no new contract was reached 
ahead of the January 2009 deadline for renewals.  
Citing huge unpaid debts, on January 1, 2009 Russia suspended gas exports to 
Ukraine. Once again, European consumers reported that the pressure in their pipelines had 
dropped. Gazprom accused Ukraine of the theft of gas purchased by EU member states. 
Ukraine furiously denied the charges but several officials have since confirmed the theft.224 
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Following the failure to reach a contract, Gazprom demanded Ukraine pay its debt of $2.4 
billion owed to RosUrkEnergo. Following a terse 19-day standoff, PM Tymoshenko 
travelled to Moscow for direct negotiations with President Putin. An agreement was reached 
on January 18, and although both Naftogaz and Tymoshenko’s own cabinet refused to sign 
the contract, Tymoshenko forcibly passed the agreement (this would later be the main 
charge in an abuse of power trial brought against her). Supplies were restored on January 20, 
2009 and Tymoshenko hailed the agreement as a great step in securing Ukrainian energy 
security policy. To this day, the fight over gas theft remains an important political issue 
between Russia and Ukraine. While most analysts agree that theft occurred, Naftogaz CEO 
Andriy Kobolyev proclaimed angrily in 2015, “Gas to Europe was stopped by Gazprom. 
Not Ukraine. There was no siphoning or stealing whatsoever. There is a very easy way to 
check. No formal evidence was every presented. Ukraine is always a reliable supplier.”225 
The agreements did have several benefits for the Ukrainian side. First, they did away 
with the role of RosUkrEnergo and established direct sales from Gazprom to Naftogaz. 
Second, they also included a clear price formula based on European net-back principles.226 
Finally, they also guaranteed a minimum of 110bcm/year in transit; allaying Ukrainian fears 
that Russia could cut them out of transit income by building alternate pipelines. 227 
However, Tymoshenko’s assessment that the agreement was a large step towards 
greater energy security for Ukraine was mistaken. Although the contract included clear price 
formula, Ukraine’s base price of $450/ tcm was one of the highest prices paid in Europe. 
Making matters worse, the contract did not raise gas transit prices, so that while Ukraine was 																																																								
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paying higher prices for gas, it did not receive greater prices for its transit services. The 
contract also included strict take-or-pay contracts and large fines for late payment.228 If 
Naftogaz was late in sending payments, it would automatically be subject to 100 percent pre-
payment for gas received for the duration of the 10-year contract. Finally and most damning, 
a contract provision allowed Gazprom through a subsidiary to market 25% of imported gas 
directly to industrial users on the Ukrainian market. This allowed Gazprom to charge the 
Ukrainian government high prices for gas imports, and then re-sell it to Ukrainian industrial 
consumers who pay substantially higher prices, and are more reliable payers than are 
residential and district consumers.  
The contract was so unfavorable that President Yushchenko accused Tymoshenko 
of treason.229  In response, Tymoshenko accused Yushchenko of a shady alliance with 
Dmitry Firtash. She was later sentenced to seven years in prison for abusing her power in the 
gas deal, which her opponents say saddled Ukraine with a long-term contract of exorbitant 
gas prices.230 While the political fight intensified, RosUkrEnergo, now officially cut out of 
direct interstate deals, continued to control regional gas distributors.  RosUkrEnergo also 
brought a suit against Naftogaz in the Stockholm Arbitration Court accusing them of 
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2010 Naftogaz was ordered to return the 11 bcm of gas with an additional 1.1 bcm of gas in 
lieu of penalties. 
 The Yushchenko period is a crucial test of the theory because it demonstrates that by 
the time of the 2006 and 2009 crises, Ukraine’s energy insecurity was at its apex. The 
persistent inability to make practical reforms to the property rights regime meant that 
attempts at energy policy change were continually stymied in favor of the status quo. The 
Yushchenko period represents the worst energy insecurity since independence. The two gas 
crises and the contracts that ended them made Ukraine more dependent on Russian gas 
supplies. In addition, Ukraine had failed to make any substantial investment into 
geographical diversification, had not substantially reduced the portion of natural gas in its 
fuel mix, did not increase storage capacity and did not significantly invest in alternative 
sources of power.  
Figure 5-1: Energy Dependence Index Score Ukraine 
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of the people did not result in meaningful reform is useful for underlining the fact that 
throughout Ukraine’s post-Soviet history reform was spiked over and over by the problems 
resulting from Ukraine’s position between East and West. Although Yushchenko was 
ushered into office on the promise of instituting coherent reforms, eradicating corruption 
and increasing ties with the West, he lacked any strategic vision about how to pursue these 
goals. The ideology of the revolution was anti-corruption and anti-Kuchma first, vaguely 
pro-democracy and pro-market second. This lack of vision about the future of Ukraine was a 
persistent problem that is evidenced by both the failure of the political revolution, and the 
increase in energy dependence during a major window of opportunity.  
 The Yanukovych Era (February 2010-February 2014) 
 
 By the time the January 2010 presidential elections approached, it was clear that 
Yushchenko had failed to live up the promises of the Orange Revolution. Ukraine’s 
economy was in shambles and the political feud between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko 
continued to sour Ukrainian politics. As a result, Yushchenko was knocked out of the first 
round of elections. Yanukovych, who had been playing spoiler with his Party of Regions for 
years, won the election based largely on support from Russophile Ukraine and on the 
platform of better relations with Russia.  
 From the outset, there was little hope that Yanukovych would make the drastic 
institutional reforms so desperately needed. Instead, he focused his initial efforts on policies 
such as the new language law which preserved Ukrainian as the state’s national language, but 
which also permitted local authorities to declare Russian the official language in certain 
cases.232 But despite a promise to maintain a close relationship with Russia, Yanukovych 																																																								
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instead embarked on a costly strategy of playing East and West against each other. This 
would later result in a second and more serious crisis for Ukraine in late 2013 that resulted in 
the annexation of Crimea, regime change and a protracted separatist war. 
 
Institutional Change Under Yanukovych 
 
 Given his past involvement with the election fixing scandal in the 2004 presidential 
campaign, it is unsurprising that Yanukovych neglected to make any real institutional reform 
during his tenure. One of his first moves as president was changing the rules of the Rada 
under which political parties could form coalitions, getting rid of a 2006 provision that 
stipulated coalitions could only be formed by the entire parliament. This enabled the 
dissolution of Timoshchenko’s government. Yanukovych and his Party of Regions helped 
pass this change to parliamentary regulations even though it violated a 2008 ruling of the 
constitutional court that explicitly prohibited individual MPs from joining parliamentary 
coalitions. In April 2010, the Constitutional Court issued a new ruling that permitted this 
practice.233 
 Once again highlighting the fact that Ukraine had still fundamentally failed to break 
away from the Soviet era style judicial system which made judges reliant on politicians and 
precluded judicial independence, Yanukovych decided to use the Constitutional Court to 
achieve his main political goal: reinstalling a strong presidential system. In October 2010, the 
court reversed the constitutional reforms of 2004, even though it had refused to do so in 
2008. Included in these changes was a provision that extended parliamentary terms in the 
Rada from four to five years and one that revived the president’s unilateral power to 
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nominate candidates for PM without parliamentary ratification. It also restored the 
president’s ability to appoint cabinet ministers, dismiss the government without 
parliamentary approval and to cancel any government resolution.234 
 Throughout his first year in office Yanukovych embarked on a number of efforts to 
reform the judiciary, decrease corruption and reform taxes. However, almost all of these 
efforts failed completely and in many cases made some of Ukraine’s endemic problems 
worse. First, Yanukovych approved a number of measures throughout 2010-2011 that would 
allow prosecutors to bring high-profile corruption charges against politicians and minor 
government officials. However, many observers noted that corruption charges were only 
filed against political enemies of Yanukovych and no corruption charges were initiated in a 
number of high profile cases connected to his regime. During this period a scandal erupted 
in the media accusing former Energy Minister and CEO of Naftogaz Yuri Boyko of 
approving the purchase of oilrigs at wildly inflated costs. One oil-rig cost Naftogaz $400 
million, while the market value was no more than $250 million. Ultimately, it was revealed 
that the seller of these oilrigs was a company owned by Donetsk businessman Igor 
Filipenko, a supporter of Yanukovych whose ventures profited from an estimated $1b in 
government contracts during Yanukovych’s presidency.235 Second, Yanukovych initiated a 
June 2010 law on the Judiciary aimed at reform, but which actually decreased judicial 
independence through a number of measures including establishing short deadlines for the 
examination of cases that risked dismissal of cases that did not meet the deadline. Further, 
the new law did not establish competition based principles for judicial nominations and did 
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not define criteria for appointment.236 Finally, during Yanukovych’s presidency, there was a 
trend by which Ukrainian courts routinely stuck down or ignored contractual provisions that 
assigned legal responsibility for dispute resolution to a foreign court or arbitrator.237 As will 
be demonstrated below, this also had severe consequences for Ukraine’s energy security 
because Ukraine’s bi-lateral energy contracts with Russia (and most bi-lateral international 
energy contracts) include third-party arbitration and monitoring clauses. 
 
Privatization Under Yanukovych 
 
Privatization of the energy sector, so long delayed under previous administrations, 
began in earnest under the Yanukovych regime. Unfortunately, given the lack of property 
rights reform and subsequent emergence of massive corruption around the energy sector, 
privatization over key assets in energy were marred by scandal and as a result, greatly 
reduced the ability of the Ukrainian government to make energy policy choices 
independently of vested interests in the industry. In April of 2013, the government proposed 
draft legislation concerning the privatization of the state gas company Naftogaz Ukrainy, 
which would break it into several subsidiaries and privatize the pipelines. First Deputy PM 
Serhiy Arbuzov, a member of Yanukovych’s Eastern Ukraine cadre, said that he expected 
parliament to vote quickly on the law and approve it. During this period, the energy 
companies Dniproenergo, Zakarpattyaoblenergo, Vinnytsyaoblenergo and Zahidenergo were 
all privatized under murky circumstances.238 In 2015 after Yanukovych had fled the country, 
																																																								
236 Sushko, Alexander. “Eighteen Months Under Yanukovych: Ukraine’s Reform Records 




238 Interview with Ukrainian official. 
 180 	
all four transactions were challenged in court and in the case of Dniproenergo was found to 
have been unlawful. 
Throughout Yanukovych’s tenure state energy assets in both Dnipropetrovsk and 
Donbas were sold off for low prices to regime insiders such as Rinat Akhmetov (Ukraine’s 
richest man). Akhmetov’s DTEK company paid $147 million for a 25 percent stake in 
Dniproenergo’s state assets in 2012. A controlling 61 percent stake over Donbasenergo went 
to a close friend of Akhmetov and member of Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions in 2013 
for $90 million. A fifty percent share in the Zakarpatya power distribution network was sold 
in early 2012 for $18 million to a company owned by Russian businessmen (names not 
disclosed).239 The selling of state assets to individuals both close to the regime and in some 
cases with direct ties to Gazprom had the effect of ensuring that Ukraine remain dependent 
on Russian commodities. Despite the fact that this greatly reduced Ukraine’s energy security 
vis-à-vis Russia, it did have the effect of further institutionalizing energy dependency because 
it ensured steady streams of revenue to energy veto players that had entrenched themselves 
into the political system. There was no political accountability for the sales until after the 
Maidan Revolution. In 2015, the Kiev prosecutor’s office issued a statement arguing that 
“these privatizations were drawn up in such a way as to artificially create the conditions for 
acquisition of the state assets by specific individuals, which significantly narrowed down the 
circle of potential purchasers.”240  
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Upon taking office in 2010, Yanukovych’s reform program made no mention of the 
need to diversify the country’s gas supply despite the fact that the highly unfavorable 2009 
contract made by Yulia Tymoshenko remained in force. This is a clear example of an active 
dependence strategy at work. At this time, Ukraine was paying one of the highest prices in 
the European Union for natural gas, and so Yanukovych’s main concern was not 
diversification, but rather with reducing the cost for Russian supplies. Yanukovych 
capitulated and gave Russia all of the concessions then Russian president Dmitri Medvedev 
demanded in August 2009 open letter to President Viktor Yushchenko.241 However, this 
strategy failed to extract any price concessions from Gazprom in the 2009 Russia-Ukrainian 
gas contract. Instead, in April 2010, Yanukovych signed the Kharkiv agreements with Russia 
which provided for a nearly 30% discount on gas imports in exchange for an extension on 
the lease of the base of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Crimea until 2042. Despite the discount, 
this did little to ameliorate the increase in gas prices that were contractually embedded into 
the 2009 contract signed by Tymoshenko. As a result, by 2012 Ukraine was paying 
approximately $432/tcm, (more than most other consumers including Germany) while its 
revenues for gas transit declined by 19.1 percent.242  
Despite Yanukovych’s efforts to increase ties to Russia in the hopes of maintaining a 
steady supply of energy, by February 2011 his strategy of playing East against West became 
apparent when Ukraine joined the European Energy Community. Despite obligatory 
membership regulations and an earlier adaptation of a gas market law, Ukraine did not make 
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any substantive reforms until 2012. To announce his initiative, Yanukovych wrote an op-ed 
in the Wall Street Journal declaring that Ukraine’s future was with Europe and blaming Russia 
for Ukraine’s precarious energy security. Although he declared the need for improved 
relations with Russia, Mr. Yanukovych declared, “While our historical connection to Russia 
will continue to be very important, the key to prosperity for our people and the development 
of our natural and human resources lies in a deeper and more developed integration with 
Europe and the West.”243 This puzzling about face in terms of geostrategic posturing can be 
explained by the fact that Ukraine was in a desperate economic situation and was in need of 
IMF funds to avoid sovereign default. The 2008 financial crisis had hit Ukraine hard: not 
only was Europe buying less fuel (which meant a decrease in transit revenues) but Ukraine 
was still locked into the disastrous 2009 contract with Russia which stipulated a price 
Ukraine could not afford to keep paying. 
 By 2012, both Russia and Ukraine were frustrated with their energy relationship. 
Yanukovych was frustrated by Russia’s unwillingness to make further concessions to him on 
the basis of “Slavic brotherhood,” while Moscow was frustrated with Yanukovych’s pursuit 
of personal interests and corruption. Yanukovych’s turn towards the West was clearly a 
strategy to incentivize Russia to concede on three main points in the 2012 gas contract 
renegotiations: price, take-or-pay volumes and transit fees. Ultimately, Russia did not agree 
to revise the legally binding contract and therefore in early February 2012 Kiev decided 
unilaterally to reduce the contracted volume of gas it would purchase from Russia by nearly 
50 percent.244 In retaliation, in February 2013 Moscow sent Ukraine a $7 billion bill for 
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penalties as stipulated by the contract.245 Although Ukraine balked at the bill, Moscow later 
agreed to forgive this debt if Ukraine joined its Custom’s Union in favor of the European 
Union’s Association Agreement. 
 During this acrimonious period, Kiev finally embarked on a limited program to 
diversify it supply (although efforts to increase efficiency and reduce subsidies were still 
notably lacking). However, as had been the pattern since independence, these efforts largely 
failed. In one bizarre incident, Ukraine signed an agreement with Spain’s Gas Natural Fenosa 
and Excelerate Energy to create a consortium of investors for an LNG terminal with a 
capacity of 10bcm. On November 26, 2012 Prime Minister Azarov declared, “This is a 
historic moment…we’ve taken the first really big step in securing Ukraine’s energy 
independence.” However, later that day, the Spanish company denied signing the agreement. 
Kiev was forced to admit that the Spanish signatory to the alleged agreement did not have 
power of attorney to sign it and therefore the historic moment did not happen. That same 
month, Ukraine began importing small amounts of gas from the German electricity giant 
RWE, who reversed flow from Poland at lower prices than Ukraine paid Gazprom (it should 
be noted that this was still Russian gas purchased by Germany at lower prices then sold on at 
a markup to Ukraine). As the gas-debt balance with Russia continued to worsen in 2012, 
Ukraine made ambitious goals for diversification in the Updated Energy Strategy of Ukraine 
for the period of 2013.246 
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In November 2013, Yanukovych decided to back away from the Association 
Agreement, which would have increased trade between Ukraine and the EU after receiving a 
$15 billion loan from Russia.247 When this news was made public protestors moved onto the 
streets of Kiev and violence erupted when Yanukovych decided to use force to quell the 
rebellion.  Violence continued and grew worse until February 2014, when Yanukovych, with 
EU mediators present, signed an agreement with the leaders of the rebellion which provided 
for the formation of a “national unity” government, a roll-back of presidential powers and a 
restoration of the 2004 constitution, which had been amended in Yanukovych’s first year in 
office. Although Western and Russian leaders praised the agreement, key figures in the 
opposition rejected it, and the next day February 22, 2014, Yanukovyh fled to Russia. 
Instead of calming the crisis, Yanukovych’s departure threw Ukraine into further chaos: 
Russia formally annexed Crimea and armed rebels in the Eastern regions of Donetsk and 
Donbas declared independence. 
Although violence in the Eastern provinces continues, following Yanukovych’s 
departure there was a sense of hope amongst Western leaders that Ukraine might finally rid 
itself of the endemic corruption, venal politics and lack of reform that had plagued it since 
independence. Certainly, the new government has positioned itself as much more pro-
Western than was Yanukovych’s regime, although the election of oligarch Petro 
Poroshchenko as president has troubled some analysts. However, over two years after the 
Minsk II agreement of February 2015, Ukraine remains in a precarious position. 
Nevertheless, and despite continued violence, the new government has embarked on 
a platform of radical reform of its institutions. However, Ukraine’s constitutional reform 
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process is for the most part, under the control of a nontransparent group outside the 
parliament, which is both attached the presidential administration of Poroshchenko and 
controlled in large part by leaders of the “unofficial sector” (oligarchs and energy veto 
players). On August 31, 2015, a constitutional package of decentralization passed its first 
hurdle in the Rada. The package gave local councils the right to establish executive offices 
and gave equal rights to all local communities. However, this council also gave the executive 
the power to dissolve local councils and overrule their elections.248 Considering the political 
climate in Ukraine, it is unsurprising that this reform was controversial: after the vote in the 
Rada members of several radical groups protested against the granting of self-administration 
to communities in Ukraine’s disputed eastern regions. These protests became violent, 
resulting in the deaths of four policemen and leaving many others injured.249  
More important was a package on judicial reform that aims to shield judges from 
political influence, a problem that had plagued the Ukrainian judicial system since its failure 
to redesign the Soviet era property rights regime at independence. Although it still has to 
pass through the Rada On September 4, 2015 a presidentially appointed constitutional 
commission approved the. However, several members of the commission and civil society 
groups have criticized the proposal, arguing that it does not go far enough to limit the 
president and Rada’s influence over judges. 250  On November 25, 2015, President 
Poroshchenko submitted amendments to the reform package that many pro-democracy 
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reformers argued would make it impossible for the Rada to hold a vote of no confidence in 
the general prosecutor. They also argued that this process may hinder ongoing efforts to 
oust civil servants employed under the Yanukovych regime and may actually increase judges’ 
dependence on politicians.251 
Despite the radical break with the Yanukovych regime and pro-reform government, 
a major institutional transformation has yet to occur. Instead, the government remains 
seriously divided on a number of issues. Although the government has embarked on an anti-
corruption platform, two major arrests of former Dnipropetrovsk figures has led to 
accusations that the current government is simply using the judicial system to settle political 
scores, as has been the pattern in Ukraine for several years.252 Further, after an audit by the 
Ministry of Economic Development Trade of the 183 largest state owned companies 
showed losses of over $5.3 billion in 2013, the new government has tried to sell off these 
assets quickly. Privatization of large enterprises such as the Centrenergo company and the 
Odessa portside chemical plant was blocked due to opposition from “vested interests” and 
veto players who continue to profit off the state’s loses.253  
During the crisis, Ukraine’s position on energy security has changed markedly. 
Unlike Yanukovych who entered office in 2010 making no mention of the need to diversify 
Ukraine’s energy sources, the new administration under PM Arsenyi Yatsenyuk made 
reforming the gas sector one of his government’s main priorities. One of his first moves as 
PM was installing 35 year old Andriy Kobolev as CEO of Naftogaz. Kobolev then embarked 
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on a PR tour of Europe where he spoke at length about his goals to transform Naftogaz and 
Ukraine’s energy security. In an interview, he acknowledged that reform of the gas sector 
would be painful because “the enemy is ourselves. Gas consumed per consumers is still 
tremendously high. Prices will be increased and this will be painful.”254  
In April 2014, the Rada passed a long awaited law on the gas sector that began the 
long-overdue and difficult process of reforming and de-monopolizing the gas sector. This 
law provided for the breakup of Naftogaz and the creation of a competitive gas market so 
that Ukarine would comply with the EU’s Third Energy Package. It also called for a long-
overdue threefold price increase to both household and industrial consumers. Although 
there continue to be incremental price increases for consumers, there has been little room 
for radical restructuring of the gas sector during periods of energy crisis. 
During the crisis, maintaining energy supplies was of crucial and timely importance, 
and thus there were several crisis meetings held between Russia and Ukraine with EU 
mediators present. During the initial stages of the revolution, Ukraine was unable to pay its 
gas debt arrears to Russia, and so began importing 70% of its gas needs from the European 
Union through reverse-flow mandated by the EU. As of May 2015 the proportion of 
imported EU to Russian gas was 55% to 45%. Kobolyev argued, “Ukraine will stayed 
diversified, but we will take into account prices.” 255  Prior to the critical April 2015 
negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the European Union, Gazprom CEO Alexey 
Miller argued to keep the 2009 contract framework in further negotiations and committed to 
maintaining supply to Ukraine. “We have no critical issues in regards to fulfilling gas to 
Ukraine. We will follow our agreement. Second issue is price: the contract allows 																																																								
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concessions. This will be based on prices in neighboring countries. We will not demand or 
pay fees.”256 In the end, Russia decided to forgo its contractual ability to penalize Ukraine for 
failure to fulfill the ‘take-or-pay’ clause in the 2009 gas contract. 
On September 26, 2015, Russia, Ukraine and the EU reached a preliminary 
agreement overseeing gas purchase and transport for winter 2016 based on a price of $227 
per 1,000 cubic meters (reduced from $248).257 This purchase was financed and guaranteed 
with a $300 million loan from the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. 
Recently, both the PM and Kobolev announced that Ukraine would stop buying Russian gas 
altogether in favor of Russian reverse flow gas from Europe at lower prices. On November 
3, Kobolev told reporters in Kyiv, “We expect and hope that Russian gas sellers will be 
rational and propose competitive prices to us. If there is no such offer, we will be purchasing 
all gas from Europe.” While Ukraine has indeed stopped importing volumes directly from 
Russia, meeting its domestic gas needs through reverse flow imports is unsustainable. 
Further, if, as Kobolev argues, $200/tcm gas in available in Europe, there will be a host of 
buyers vying for the same volumes.  
Conclusion 
 
 Ukraine’s inability to make a radical transformation of its property rights regime at 
transition had long lasting implications for its energy security. Because there was a lack of 
major institutional reform around the property rights regime in the early days of transition, 
previously powerful actors were able to become energy veto players, who prevented major 
reform of Ukraine’s energy policy even when Ukraine’s energy insecurity became an issue of 																																																								
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international importance. Time and time again, energy veto players who took advantage of 
Ukraine’s delayed institutional development and privatization were able to block reforms in 
favor of upholding the status quo. Further, the complete institutionalization of corruption 
around the energy sector through constitutional, judicial and legislative reform upheld a 
system that sacrificed Ukrainian energy security for the venal interests of policymakers and 
private actors. 
 Unlike some other former Soviet and socialist states, Ukraine’s economic transition 
was buffered through the mismanagement of energy subsidies and the existence of the 
military industrial complex left over from the Soviet Union. The communist elite, who 
remained in place even after transition, exploited these factors for their own personal gain at 
the expense of the state. The initial delays in making any substantive legal regime reforms 
continually affected Ukraine’s development. In a domino effect, the lack of initial legal 
architecture enabled disastrous political and economic reform that resulted in both formal 
and informal corrupt practices, nowhere more so than the energy sector.  
 From a comparative standpoint, comparing Ukraine’s institutional trajectory with 
Poland’s is instructive. Although the road to a market economy for both countries was 
rocky, Poland made incisive yet painful initial reforms that resulted in a vastly different 
outcome. Today Poland is an economic success story, a firmly entrenched member of the 
European Union and has successfully managed its energy dependence over time. In contrast, 
after two revolutions, a civil war and the loss of territory, Ukraine finally seems to be making 
slow progress on a number of issues, most notably its energy dependence. However, despite 
the fact that Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas has decreased dramatically since the 
Maidan revolution, there are two reasons why we should be skeptical about the long-term 
prospects for Ukraine’s energy security. First, although Ukraine managed to increase its 
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geographical diversity significantly, this is largely due to reverse flow capacities from other 
European states. This has enabled Kiev to buy Russian gas from European states at lower 
prices. However, this is an unsustainable model, as many European states sell gas back to 
Ukraine under pressure from the European Union. As incentives change in those markets, 
reverse flow gas might not be so readily available. Second and most important, the large 
reduction in energy imports is due to the collapse of Ukraine’s heavy industry and economic 
output because of the protracted war. Because has been no major improvement to efficiency 
or investment in alternative sources of energy, when (and if) the conflict finally ends and 
industrial production comes back online, Ukraine will be back to a similar state of pre-
Maidan dependence, but this time without a long-term gas contract guaranteeing supply. 
Ukraine remains highly energy inefficient and dependent on foreign commodities to fuel its 
energy intensive economy. As the history of Ukraine’s energy security has demonstrated, 
fixing this problem is no small feat and will take years of painful reform. 
 The account above, which details major developments in Ukraine’s institutional 
history as well as its energy security, provides support for the hypothesis that states with a 
nomenklatura system of property rights regime are less likely to decrease energy dependence. 
Thus, even though various actors in Ukraine have at times attempted diversification policies, 
energy veto players, whose livelihood is based on a system of active dependence, prevented 
their institutionalization. The case of Ukraine shows how failure to make initial radical 
reforms can have persistent implications even decades later, and despite major changes to 






Chapter 6 - FROM ENERGY POVERTY TO INDEPENDENCE: THE CASE OF LITHUANIA 
 
“Don’t let Ivan close to the pipe!” 




On October 27, 2014, a vast ship making its way into the port at Klaipeda, Lithuania 
was greeted by screaming crowds waiving Lithuanian flags, a naval brass band, red flares and 
a cannon salute. The ship, FRSU Independence, was a floating LNG re-gasification terminal, 
which would allow Lithuania to purchase liquefied natural gas from a variety of producers 
rather than rely on pipeline gas from its previous supplier, Russia.  Speaking on a lectern at 
the harbor, Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaite announced, “We are now an energy-
secure state. Nobody else from now on will be able to dictate to us the price of gas, or to 
buy our political will, or to bribe our politicians.” In reference to Gazprom, previously 
Lithuania’s only supplier of crucial natural gas supplies, Grybauskaite proclaimed, “If we 
don’t like it we can drop it fully and totally!”258 
For Lithuania, as well as the European Union and even the United States, the FRSU 
Independence marked a victory in the battle against Russia’s monopoly over European 
energy supplies. Although Lithuania is a small Baltic state of just under three million people 
and a landmass smaller than West Virginia, the significance of its pursuit of energy security 
had far reaching geopolitical consequences. Both the European Union and the United States 
had spent vast resources helping Lithuania break free of Russia’s grip, and thus the 
inauguration of the terminal was greeted with jubilance not only in Vilnius, but also in 
Brussels and Washington. Lithuania, which had previously been 100% dependent on Russian 
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gas supplies, had now broken Gazprom’s economic and political grip, and the West 
considered it “the inspiration for the rest of Europe.”259  
Lithuania’s successful, though modest,260 pursuit of energy security was all the more 
striking considering the powerful legacies of Soviet economic planning, which, at the time of 
independence, left it an isolated energy “island” with no infrastructure links to Europe and 
an energy intensive economy with no significant domestic resources of energy. Further, 
Lithuania had no oil or gas storage facilities that could guarantee emergency supplies in case 
of a supply disruption or even demand fluctuations. This was a major threat to Lithuanian 
security from the very moment of independence, as evidenced by the severe effect of a 
three-month energy blockade imposed by Moscow after Lithuania’s initial declaration of 
independence in April of 1990. The consequences of this blockade were so severe that 
Lithuania was forced to withdraw its formal declaration of independence from the Soviet 
Union for six months. But despite the realities of its energy insecurity, Lithuanian policy 
makers did not pursue a diversification strategy until 2007, and did not successfully 
implement this policy until the FRSU Independence sailed into Klaipeda Harbor in 2014. 
Why did Lithuania wait so long to pursue energy diversification, and what prompted 
a change in their strategy? In this chapter, I examine Lithuania as an outlying case that is on 
active dependence path before switching to diversification. My theory predicts that states 
that failed to radically restructure their property rights regimes during transition are unlikely 
to pursue a policy of diversification because patterns of Soviet era energy efficiencies are 
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reproduced through existing institutions. Lithuania however was able to break from path 
dependence due to a number of factors, including a volatile political system, an overarching 
European Union level energy policy that coincided with Lithuanian political actors’ aims, 
significant material resources, and environmental concerns of EU citizens.  
Counter-intuitively, Lithuania’s success versus Ukraine’s failure is not a story about 
democracy. Although Lithuania had relatively robust democratic institutions from soon after 
independence, it was stuck on a path of insecurity and dependence for nearly two decades. 
My theory instead points to the crucial nature of property rights, structure of ownership of 
the market, and the extent to which rule of law actually had control over these structures. 
Although most indicators show Lithuania as a robust democracy with relatively low levels of 
corruption for a post-Soviet state,261 Lithuania had inherited from the Soviet Union a 
problematic ownership structure over which government had little control. For many years, 
particularly in the energy sector, which was considered a strategic asset, Lithuania’s economy 
was neither governed by the free market, nor designed by the government. Instead, it 
remained governed by Soviet economic legacies that left it highly centralized in the hands of 
the elite and plagued with corruption. Delayed and flawed privatization of state assets further 
entrenched power in the hands of those whose primary interest was extracting rents from 
the Lithuanian state, rather than Lithuanian energy security. 
This phenomenon is exceptionally hard to reform. Even though Lithuania stands out 
as a case of success, the story also points to the fact that the murky cross-section between 
market structure and political institutions is difficult to break. Remarkably, Lithuania was 
able to do this in the energy sector because it happened to receive enormous amounts of 																																																								
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money from the West for this express purpose. In fact, the moderate success of the energy 
sector stands out noticeably because other parts of the market not subject to Western aid 
have been unable to break the cycle. As a result, although Lithuania is a unique success in 
terms of reforming its energy sector and increasing its security, this is not a wholesale story 
of reform. Other profitable sectors that were highly entangled with the Soviet economic 
systems, including the chemical and food industries, remain blighted by corruption. The 
findings of this case do however have important policy implications for both Russia and the 
West. While the European Union continues to invest significant resources towards energy 
programs, success has been mixed. The use of the EU aid regime in Lithuania however was 
successful in disrupting the cross-national investment networks that Russia has used to 
achieve foreign policy goals in its former sphere of influence. This may be an explanation for 
why Russia is so keen to thwart EU enlargement in Ukraine and others.  
To explain the Lithuanian case, I first review Lithuania’s institutional history to 
establish a lack of significant de facto property rights reform from the Soviet period. I then 
examine the historical record to determine how Lithuania’s energy security policy was 
constrained by its property rights regime, privatization process and empowerment of energy 
veto players. I will also show in this chapter the effect of adding a third actor: the European 
Union, and how additional monetary incentives shifted the interests of energy veto players 
towards a policy of diversification. Because Lithuania is a small country, there is relatively 
little secondary literature on the changing nature of its energy policy. Therefore, I have 
constructed the narrative below through a combination of primary source research, news 
media reports, interviews and field observation. To collect data, I two trips to Lithuania, one 
April 2015 and a second in July 2015. During my trips to Lithuania, as well as a prolonged 
stay in Berlin from January 2014-August 2015, I spoke with government representatives, 
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energy industry leaders, journalists and academics. I conducted several formal, on the record 
interviews with the CEO of Litgas amongst others, and a number of off-the record 
interviews with government officials. Finally, interview data is supplemented by observation 
at five international energy security conferences that took place between February 2014 and 
April 2015 in Berlin, Warsaw and London. 
I combine this data with extensive primary and secondary source resource that 
documents both the de jure and de facto property rights history of Lithuania, as well as its 
energy inheritance from the Lithuanian SSR. I examine the privatization process, energy veto 
players and review Lithuania’s changing energy security and energy policy over time. I find 
that although Lithuania was able to reform its property rights regime as applied to certain 
segments of the economy, the fact that energy was a strategic asset hampered reform. 
Delayed privatization allowed the nomenklatura system to dictate ownership of the energy 
sector long after independence. Interestingly, Lithuania was only able to escape these legacies 
when the European Union offered substantial resources that changed the incentives of 
actors who had previously profited from inefficiencies. Like the Ukrainian case, Moscow 
continually tried to dissuade Lithuania from pursuing energy independence, but despite these 
efforts, the primary source of Lithuania’s continued dependence, and its subsequent shift 
towards diversification, was a domestic issue. Further, I argue that in contrast to the 
Ukrainian experience, Lithuania’s position on the boundary between East and West did 
contribute to its ability to break free from Soviet legacies. Although Lithuania’s volatile 
politics prevented coherent reform for two decades, a fortuitous alignment of pro-reform 
politicians in power and the European Union’s commitment to pursuing continent wide 
energy reforms allowed the ruling class to “buy” its freedom with Euros and Dollars, 
replacing rents received in Rubles. 
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 Soviet Lithuania: Two Dangerous Orphans 
 
Property Rights and Institutions in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic 
 
 Although the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has a long and storied history of which 
Lithuanians are very proud, the system of legal architecture governing property law under 
the Soviet system began after the third partition of Poland in 1795, when the Baltic states 
were annexed by Russia and the Russian administrative system introduced. Even under 
Russian imperialism, the Baltic legal system was unique from the rest of the empire. In 1864 
the Baltic Civil Code was enacted, greatly influenced by both Roman and Baltic customary 
law. The Civil Code was more liberal than the Russian system, even leading to the 
abolishment of serfdom between 1817-1819 some 40 years before their Russian 
counterparts.262 Thus while Lithuania was technically under the rule of the Russian empire, 
the legal architecture under which it was governed was substantially more liberal than their 
neighbors. 
By the end of the 19th century, especially under Tsar Alexander III, Lithuanians were 
subjected to a strong policy of Russification, resulting in a decree that banned printing in the 
Lithuanian language and ordered Cyrillic for all official documents. In response to this and 
other policies, including the persecution of Roman Catholicism, a strong Baltic resistance 
emerged against the Russians and ultimately became the founding political parties that would 
continue to control Lithuanian politics even after the fall of the Soviet Union: Social 
Democrats on the left, peasant groups in the center, and Christian Democrats and 
Nationalists on the right. These groups were instrumental in the independence movement 
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and helped to cement both the political and legal systems that were re-activated in post-
Soviet Lithuania. 
 During the interwar period of independence, Lithuania adopted a democratic 
constitution that enshrined the main rights of citizens, political freedoms and outlined basic 
property rights.263 This constitution was short lived however, and after a coup in 1926 it was 
disregarded and changed in favor a document that granted greater powers to the president 
and introduced the notion that the state was the foundation of existence for its citizens and 
not the other way around.264  The new document also disregarded the notion of separation 
of powers and certain property rights.265  Although the constitution did protect the right of 
ownership a clause was inserted that stated, “Property imposes an obligation to the one who 
holds it to use the property in line with the interests of the state.”266 Thus although property 
was nominally protected, it gave the state the power to expropriate property based on the 
underspecified concept of “state interest”. The consequences of these changes is significant, 
as the 1938 Constitution was later revived on March 11, 1990 upon Lithuania’s declaration 
of independence. 
 Interestingly, the 1938 Constitution was also used by the Soviets to justify their 1940 
occupation by concentrating power in the hands of the executive. Like Ukraine, Soviet 
Lithuania was governed under two constitutions, 1940 and 1978, that were adopted based on 
the Soviet constitutions of 1936 and 1977. Both of these constitutions nominally guaranteed 																																																								
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the right to personal ownership of their incomes, but also declared that all property exists 
only in the form of state property. Also similar to the Ukrainian case, there was little 
definition of standards and no emphasis on contract enforcement, or clear rules to govern 
the distribution of assets. These vague definitions were of course designed precisely because 
they allowed Soviet elites to gain access to prized state assets. While the assets up for grabs 
in Lithuania were far less valuable than those available in Ukraine, the nomenklatura system of 
distribution proved to be incredibly difficult to reform, particularly in the energy and 
chemical sectors. Thus while the Baltic States were some of the earliest political reformers, 
these industries remained mired in corruption for decades. 
Throughout the Soviet Union, the decentralization of decision making over 
ownership and the use of property caused tensions between the All-Union government and 
the Union Republic governments. For example, in November of 1988 the Supreme Soviet of 
the Estonian Republic amended its constitution in an attempt to establish greater sovereignty 
over its economic affairs and minimize a severe crisis. These amendments provided for 
mixed and private property in certain sectors and also dictated that the means of production 
were exclusively Estonian property rather than that of the USSR.267 The USSR Supreme 
Soviet promptly nullified the offending amendments, but the idea that establishing national 
control over the economy as well as introducing mixed ownership became popular in the 
Baltic region. In response to agitation in Estonia and other republics, on March 13, 1989 the 
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the “Draft General Principles for 
Restructuring of the Management of the Economy and the Social Sphere in the Union 
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Republics”. This confirmed the necessity for state ownership of property yet admitted the 
need for republics to administer the land and natural resources within their own territories.268 
 
It has now become necessary to grant union republics and regions new rights—and 
legislatively enshrine these rights—with regard to the administration of property and 
natural resources as prerequisite for restructuring the leadership of their economy.269 
 
Of course, the immediate effect of this legislation was not to improve property rights or 
even the administration of state resources, but rather to entrench control over prized assets 
in the hands of the union-Republic level elites. In June of 1989, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania became the first republics to propose their own laws on financial autonomy from 
the Soviet Union, to begin on January 1, 1990.270 
 
Energy in the Lithuanian SSR 
 
 Similar to the institution of legal architecture in the USSR, Lithuania’s energy needs 
were subsumed under Union-level goals, with the result that its entire energy infrastructure 
was constructed without taking into consideration the particular needs of the Lithuanian 
state. Like Ukraine, prior to the 1960s Lithuania’s energy needs were served by the Galician 
gas fields that were subsequently depleted to meet the export volume demands of Austrian 
consumers. The consequences of this decision by Soviet economic planners, was of course, 
gas shortages for the union republics. On January 19, 1967 the gas supply along the 																																																								
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Dashava-Minsk-Vilnius-Riga pipeline broke down completely due to insufficient supply of 
gas. Mingazprom responded by shipping volumes of Russian gas to Kiev so that some of the 
Galician gas normally supplied to Ukraine could be shipped to the Baltics. Despite this and a 
series of other stopgap measures, severe shortages were a regular feature of life in the 1960s 
and resulted in many industrial enterprises at the end of the pipeline being forced to shut 
down.271 
 Because it was located at the end of the pipeline, Latvia was most heavily affected by 
the gas shortages and thus was the most vocal in calling for Moscow to find a solution. 
Latvian Prime Minister Vitalii Ruben complained that upstream users in Lithuania and 
Belarus used more gas than they were entitled to, and since long-term economic planning 
foresaw a rapid increase in Latvia’s natural gas consumption, he argued that Latvia’s gas 
supply must be diversified through a new pipeline from another source.272 Finally in May 
1972, construction began on a new connector that would bring Siberian gas to Latvia, and 
indirectly to Lithuania because of existing connections between the two Baltic States. 
Although both Latvia and Lithuania celebrated the news as an important energy victory, 
poor implementation resulted in a failure to ship sufficient amounts of gas through the new 
connector. During the first years of operation, the new line only brought half of the amount 
planned to Latvia, which meant that Lithuania did not benefit from the diversification at all. 
From January 1974 on, both Latvia and Lithuania would have to compete with Finland for 
scarce gas from the Komi fields, and Lithuania was further affected by delays and problems 
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on the Ukrainian system.273 As a result, Lithuania was left with no direct connections to its 
gas Russian supplies, instead relying on gas shipped via either Ukraine or Latvia. 
 Although it experienced severe gas shortages throughout the Soviet period, 
Lithuania’s industry was less well developed than either Estonia or Latvia, and thus the state 
could not lobby as effectively for new direct gas connections from Russian fields. Around 
the time construction began on new connections to Latvia however, preparations for a 
nuclear power plant near the Belarusian border at Ignalina began. The Ignalina Nuclear 
Power Plant (INPP) contained two Soviet designed reactors, which were at time of 
construction, the most powerful in the world and the same design used at the Chernobyl 
NPP. The first unit came online in December of 1983, but the second unit, scheduled to 
come online in 1986 was delayed after the Chernobyl disaster.274 Without any modifications 
in reactor design or containment system, the Soviets completed the second reactor and it 
became operational in August 1987, a year after Chernobyl brought to light the severe design 
flaws that led to the most disastrous nuclear power plant accident in history. After 
independence, the two reactors were known as Lithuania’s “two dangerous orphans” of the 
Soviets. 
 Although the INPP would later go on to provide over 70% of Lithuania’s electricity, 
it was not intended by Soviet economic planners to contribute to Lithuania’s energy security, 
but rather to supply electricity to the entire northwest region of the USSR.275 As a result, the 
Soviets constructed the energy infrastructure surrounding INPP to orient away from 
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Lithuania to the other Baltic States, Belarus and Ukraine. Because of its geographic position 
and other factors, Soviet Lithuania’s energy infrastructure was almost entirely oriented 
towards the export of energy to other countries, to an even larger extend than Ukraine. 
Further adding to the problem, because it was designed to power large portions of the 
USSR, Ignalina was administered directly in Moscow and manned by an exclusively Russian 
crew. Lithuania was thus in the extremely odd and precarious position of being both highly 
dependent on Moscow for energy supplies, but also a large exporter of electricity to 
neighboring states.276 These quirks of Soviet centralized planning would go on to have 
enormous consequences for the energy security of Lithuania post-independence. 
 Independence to 1992: A Rush of Reform   
      
 Lithuania was the first Soviet republic to declare independence from Moscow and 
form a new coalition government. However, after announcing the intention to secede in 
March 1990, Moscow protested by threatening to disrupt energy deliveries if the declaration 
was not withdrawn. Vilnius refused to give in and so the Soviets instructed Mingazprom to 
reduce deliveries of oil and gas by up to 80%. Because of Lithuania’s position on the Baltic 
Sea, the government immediately began sourcing alternative oil suppliers, but due to a lack 
of gas pipelines and LNG ports, they could not seek a similar replacement of gas. Lithuania’s 
only potential savior was Latvia, with which it was connected by gas pipeline and which also 
possessed one of the USSR’s largest gas storage facilities. Gorbachev explicitly forbade 
Latvia from sending gas supplies.277 
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 Due to the energy embargo, the Lithuanian Council was forced to suspend the 
implementation of its declaration of independence on June 29, 1990. However, following 
months of fruitless negotiations between Vilnius and Moscow, head of the pro-
independence movement Sajudis, Vyatautas Landsbergis, reasserted Lithuanian 
independence. The ensuing Soviet blockade had a severe impact on Lithuania. On January 8, 
1991 Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimira Prunskiene was forced to resign over unpopular 
energy price hikes necessitated by the blockade.278 Later that week, Soviet troops occupied 
government buildings in Vilnius, causing clashes that would result in the death of fourteen 
people and leave over 700 wounded.279 In February 1991, 90% of Lithuanians voted in favor 
of independence from the Soviet Union, which was finally accepted by Gorbachev on 
September 6, 1991.  
 
The Construction of a Post-Soviet Property Rights Regime 
 
Immediately following independence the Sajudis movement began a program of 
rapid political and economic reform including a program of mass-privatization and energy 
price liberalization, beginning with the drafting of the first post-independence constitution. 
Because the reformist Sajudis was a right-wing nationalist movement, they began their 
reforms by reviving the interwar 1938 constitution, which was discussed at the first 
Lithuanian constitutional workshop. The first draft introduced a number of principles of 
Western constitutionalism including democratic and representative government as well as 
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separation of powers and judicial review. Although the 1992 draft aimed at setting up a 
parliamentary system with checks and balances, the concept of division of powers was not 
fully established as the draft provided that “full and absolute power may not be concentrated 
in any one state institution” but simultaneously declared that “the Seimas [The Lithuanian 
parliament] is the supreme and sole organ of state power representing the Lithuanian 
people.”280  
The constitution did however completely restructure the judicial system and 
demonstrated the intention of the authors for an independent judiciary. But despite these 
aims, the constitution also assigned the Constitutional Court the role of reviewing all statutes 
adopted by the parliament, presidential decrees, government directives, resolutions, 
international agreements, as well as adjudicating all disputes between government branches, 
agencies and political parties.281 Several commentators at the time pointed out that without 
refinement the Court would be an “exceedingly busy” institution.282 
Despite praise from the West, the adoption of the constitution proceeded slowly, 
partly due to the question of establishing a formal presidency. After a failed referendum on 
the matter, the question of presidential powers was instead put on the ballot for the 
parliamentary elections of October 26, 1992, where voters approved the constitution that 
established presidential institutions. These elections also saw former communists, led by 
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former Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Algirdas Brazauskas, return to 
power as the first president of newly independent post-Soviet Lithuania.  
In addition to several problems with the constitution, setting up a strong post-Soviet 
property rights regime was hampered by an intense struggle between the executive and 
legislative powers. The Lithuanian Supreme Council, which doubles as a parliament and 
constituent assembly, was split between two groups, one favoring Chairman Landsbergis and 
strong presidential power, and a group favoring absolute parliamentary supremacy. The 
disagreement became so intense that the pro-Landsbergis Sajudis coalition boycotted 
parliament several times to disrupt the passing of ordinary legislation and prevent 
unfavorable decisions on constitutional questions.283  
Although Lithuania was able to overcome most of these issues and would go on to 
become one of the earliest and most robust democracies of the post-Soviet states, former 
Communists retained a strong foothold in crucial areas of both the economy and 
government. The fact that many of the former nomenklatura controlled the Bank of 
Lithuania as well as the Ministry of Energy meant that the reformist Sajudis could not pursue 
needed reforms in the energy sector. Making matters worse, Moscow continued to pressure 
the government by blocking payments and by contracting the supply of oil.284 As a result, 
while reformers were making rapid changes to the constitution and other areas of the 
economy, they were blocked from reforming the ownership structure of key areas including 
the energy sector. 
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The Beginnings of Privatization 
 
Mass privatization was aimed at undermining the Soviet era legal architecture that 
gave access to valuable state resources through the grace and favor of those in power. The 
path to destroy the nomenklatura system was through corporatization: which was a 
theoretically ideal way of redefining property rights because a company is a separate legal 
entity capable of owning and disposing of assets and incurring liability.285 The main objective 
of Lithuanian privatization was to rapidly develop the private sector to abolish the non-
effective monopoly of state property and the goal of the initial reformers was to privatize 
2/3 of all state owned property within two to three years. They further aimed to set up an 
autonomous privatization body and ban employees and managers of state owned enterprises 
from buying more than 10% of shares of the enterprise.286 
However, Lithuania’s privatization faced several distinct challenges. First, Lithuania 
experienced a rapid and severe economic crisis accompanied by a recession in the standard 
of living. This was exacerbated by the fact that in 1989, only 10% of Lithuania’s enterprises 
reported directly to the Lithuanian Republic’s administration, the remaining 90% of 
Lithuania’s enterprises were All-Union or All-Republic enterprises administered directly in 
Moscow. Because of this, Lithuanian trade with other Union republics accounted for 61% of 
net material production in 1989.287 Coupled with non-existent controlled economic borders 
with the USSR and the resulting threat of interference into privatization by Soviet actors 
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who had access to large sums of rapidly devaluating currency, reformers designed 
privatization to be carried out extremely rapidly.  
The reformers first eliminated rubles as the main means to acquire shares and limited 
selling possibilities. They established an autonomous privatization body, the Central 
Privatization Committee (CPC) within the Ministry of Economics and dictated that the 
Chairman of the CPC would be appointed by the President (upon the motion of the PM).288 
Plans for rapid initial privatization did not proceed smoothly. Sajudis reformers faced 
significant resistance, especially from former Soviet officials interested in maintaining control 
over favored industries. Indeed, many of the early initial reforms were significantly amended 
after the 1992 parliamentary elections, won by the former Communists in a surprise 
defeat.289 
Part of the reason for this defeat was the disenfranchisement of the industrial 
sectors. Despite the fact that managers and employees of industrial enterprises were able to 
extract certain policy concessions from the government (including stalled privatization), it 
did not always translate directly into active participation in policy decision-making. 
Throughout the post-Soviet Baltic experience, these groups often clashed directly with 
reformist governments because of the very nature of the groups themselves. In Latvia for 
example, the share of the non-indigenous population in industrial employment was the 
highest of the three Baltic States (with Russian speakers comprising 59.4% of the industrial 
work force). Estonia had similar numbers, with Russian speaking populations heavily 
concentrated in industrial centers in the east of the countries. In Lithuania, Russian-speaking 
workers dominated the nuclear sector and had a large presence in the energy and chemical 																																																								




sectors. Many of the Russian speakers were nervous about their fates and distrusted right-
wing nationalist governments that had been in power at independence, therefore becoming 
fertile ground for Soviet loyalism. Many of these movements proclaimed their loyalty to the 
USSR and opposed any action of nationalist movements by staging mass demonstrations 
and industrial actions. These movements contributed to the image of large industrial 
enterprises as pro-Russian fifth columns and were thus regarded by decision makers as 
illegitimate participants in the reform process. Industrial workers were therefore excluded 
from the post-Soviet political discourse.290 
Thus reformers faced pressure not only from insiders who wished to retain their 
favored positions in the economy, but also from large segments of the voting population. 
This led to stalled and sometimes distorted privatization in certain sectors of the economy, 
most notably heavy industry and the energy sector, which were intertwined and which grew 
out of Soviet economic planning. Because voters did not want to see their livelihoods taken 
away, politicians had to be careful about privatization and its effect on the labor market. This 
also led to the most severe split in Lithuanian politics: between reformers who wished to 
turn west to Europe, and conservatives who wished to stay rooted in the East. The 
antagonism between these two groups was often centered on the energy sector and energy 
policy, which became a fault line for contention.  
 
Post-Independence Energy Policy 
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 The severe economic crisis that challenged privatization had the greatest impact on 
Lithuania’s energy-intensive sectors. Lithuania’s economic and industrial decline was one of 
the worst in the post-Communist world. In 1992, Lithuanian industry comprised 40% of 
GDP, by 1996 industry had shrunk to only 28% of GDP.291 Lithuania also experienced a 
severe energy price shock: by 1993 it was paying an estimated $80-85 per tcm of gas, not 
including transit fees. Unlike other post-Soviet states, gas and oil prices were liberalized at 
the same time and so Lithuanians did not have the more gradual path to “market prices.”292 
As early as 1993, Lithuania had lost most of its preferential pricing from Russia and yet still 
relied on Russian supplies for 100% of its natural gas needs. 
 Because the Baltic States had left the Union and refused to join the CIS, they were 
required by Russia to pay prices in hard currency. The Lithuanian government responded to 
the price increase by deregulating prices on fossil fuels. Residential gas and electricity prices 
were increased and equalized with industrial prices, but district heating and heating oil 
remained heavily subsidized. Despite these reforms, basic energy policy including the 
unbundling of electricity production and distribution were not pursued.293  As a result, 
Russian gas deliveries soon fell to less than half of their Soviet era levels. 294 
 
Table 6-1: Russian Gas Exports to the Baltics 1990-2003 (bcm) 
 1990 1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Lithuania 6 3.2 2.5 2.57 2.8 2.7 2.94 
Latvia 3.2 1.6 1.2 1.36 1.7 1.4 2.44 																																																								
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Estonia 1.9 0.9 0.7 0.79 1.3 0.6 0.81 
Source: Stern p. 126 
 
Russian gas was now more expensive than ever during the midst of a severe economic crisis,  
and Lithuania was still entirely dependent, not only because it received all of its supply from 
Russia, but because it now came through only one pipeline (via Belarus) that was owned and 
operated by Gazprom.295 This would continue to be a problem for Lithuania throughout the 
1990s. 
 Despite a failure to reform the fossil fuel sectors, Lithuania was most proactive in 
pursuing reform in the nuclear sector, primarily because of the presence of the Ingalina 
NPP. The most significant challenge facing the government was “preserving its existing 
capacity at an economically difficult time, and making it work for, Lithuania’s, not Russia’s 
energy needs—not a trivial question considering the fact that the NPP had long been 
administered by Moscow and that as of 1991, it was manned by an almost exclusively 
Russian crew.”296 Ignalina was supplying over 70% of Lithuania’s power generation needs, 
and so to help keep the plant running the government offered technical employees 
immediate Lithuanian citizenship and high salaries. The project was so crucial that Ignalina’s 
director, Viktor Shevaldin, an ethnic Russian, was retained, given a Lithuanian passport and 
even given a vote of confidence by the Energy Minister when he was later enmeshed in a 
large tax scandal in 1996. He remained director of the plant until its closing in 2009.297 But 
despite continued operation, Lithuania remained dependent on the particular nuclear fuel, 
manufactured only in Russia that powered the plant. Lithuania’s ability to export electricity 
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for profit abroad was also hampered by the Soviet legacy that left it with no storage capacity 
and no connection to the EU electricity grids. Finally, electricity generated at Ignalina was 
entirely dependent on transit facilities that remained owned and operated by Russia’s RAO 
UES.  
 Although the energy sector as a whole was a major problem for the reformist 
government, the oil sector was especially problematic. Because Lithuania’s oil refinery and 
distribution infrastructure was one of the largest employers, privatization became a political 
issue. Unlike in Estonia, where the heavy industry sectors were dominated by the politically 
disenfranchised, employment in the Lithuanian oil sector was dominated by important 
Lithuanian voters. When the Sajudis coalition began to implement pro-market and pro-
Western reforms Russian energy subsidies were yanked away, with devastating consequences 
for the oil sector. The “ill-effects of these policies were immediate, dramatic, and 
unfortunately for the coalition, followed promptly by a round of national elections. The 
disenchanted Lithuanian population elected a left-wing government that put the breaks on 
marketization and sought accommodation with Russian instead.”298 
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Figure 6-1: Map of Gas Pipeline Connections to Lithuania 
Source: New Europe Investor, July 27, 2015.299 
 
1992-1996: The Return of the Left 
 
 In the fall of 1992, the successor to the Lithuanian Communist Party, the 
Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania (LDLP), won a surprise victory on the back of 
decisive support from farmers and the Russian and Polish minorities. The reformist Sajudis 
only managed to win 30 seats. In the aftermath of this election the leader of the LDLP, 
former head of State of the Lithuanian SSR Brazauskas, was elected speaker of the Seimas 
and acting President of Lithuania. He was later elected to a full term on February 14, 1993.300 
Bronislovas Lubys, a prominent business leader and former Soviet factory director of the 
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Azotas Chemical Plant, was appointed Prime Minister. Under this new regime privatization 
stagnated and state subsidies kept many unprofitable enterprises alive. Nowhere were the 




 On October 25, 1992 a new referendum on the constitution was held, which 
established a mixed parliamentary-presidential system. From that day on the amended 1938 
constitution of Lithuania was officially defined as a legal act that could be applied directly. 
However, its text remained full of references to statues yet to be adopted.301 This had the 
effect of putting into law a document that was not fully specified, leaving many aspects of 
governance up to interpretation. One important provision in the newly adopted constitution 
barred foreign citizens and foreign countries from owning any property in Lithuania. This 
was of course a significant barrier to foreign investment and had the consequence of making 
it easier for Lithuanian elites (generally former enterprise directors) to purchase vast 
quantities of land and state assets during the initial stages of privatization. By 1994, a number 
of attempts by Sajudis to amend the provision failed because a rule existed that stipulated a 
mandatory 3/5 support in parliament to even propose a constitutional amendment.302 
Naturally, those that were profiting off of this provision did not want to change it. 
The new regime under the LDLP consisted largely of the same communist elites 
who had controlled the Lithuanian economy in the Soviet period. Theoretically, under the 
Soviet regime, property rights in socialist state enterprises were controlled by the people. In 
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practice however, an elite oligarchy de facto controlled these rights, and thus key “ministries 
had extensive powers to approve (or disapprove) many key elements of the operations of 
enterprises…local governments controlled access to land …managers gained increasing 
autonomy in operational control and were able to sell assets to themselves at less than their 
true value or simply assume possession of those assets.”303 So when the Brazuaskas and 
Lubys coalition of former Soviet ministers and enterprise directors returned to power in 
1992, they immediately slowed reform over key areas of institutional reform. 
In 1995 a group of prominent opposition members, including former PM Gediminas 
Vagnorius, petitioned the Constitutional Court to review several articles of law on the joint-
stock companies, which in effect allowed state companies to be registered to private owners 
without passing through the privatization procedures established by law. The petitioners 
argued that this loophole gave unfair privileges to individuals already working at firms by 
allowing them to purchase shares at huge discounts. They also argued that this violated 
Article 29 of the Constitution, which established equality of all citizens under the law. The 
Constitutional Court found no evidence of constitutional infraction and upheld government 
policy.304 
The issue of the property rights of foreign owners remained a hotly debated issue 
throughout this period, but on June 20, 1996 the Seimas finally adopted an amendment to 
Article 47 of the Constitution legalizing the sale of land and property to non-citizens and 
private entities. This was the first amendment passed since the adoption of the Constitution 
																																																								
303 Webb, Douglas A. “The Legal Framework for Mass Privatization,” in Between State and 
Market: Mass Privatization in Transition Economies, edis. Ira W. Lieberman, Stilpon S. Nestor 
and Raj M. Desai. (World Bank (OECD) 1997): 28. 
 
304  “Constitution Watch: Lithuania,” East European Constitutional Review, 5, no. 1, 
(Winter1996): 16. 
 215 	
in 1992.305 Although this was a victory for the pro-market reformers who had been pressured 
heavily by the European Union, rules remained in place that dictated who could buy 
particular parcels of land earmarked for specific purposes including a provision barring 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus from the right to purchase any non-agricultural land.306 Thus 
while the Seimas did make changes to open up the market and decrease state control over 
industry, rules remained in place that unfairly biased the system towards those with de-facto 
control over certain sectors, particularly the former managers. 
 
Stalled Privatization: How the Nomenklatura Retained Control over Energy 
 
 The rapid privatization policies set up by Sajudis coalition began in earnest in 1993 
with the initiation of voucher distribution. The Lithuanian model (also followed by Estonia, 
Latvia and Slovenia) relied on non-tradable vouchers and granted fewer discounts to insiders 
during the auction process. However in Lithuania (and Slovenia) insiders were allowed to 
acquire shares on favorable terms through other mechanisms. This model therefore 
established a larger initial role for insiders than in the Czech-Slovak or even Polish models of 
privatization.307 
 By 1994, more than half of former state enterprises had been privatized (46% total 
enterprises in industry, 30% in transportation, 55% of trade and commerce and 77% of 
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services).308 But the private sector was distorted by delayed reform of the financial and credit 
system, as well as a lack of a securities market. To tackle this problem, the new LDLP 
government modified the early rules on privatization allowing employees and managers to 
acquire up to a 50 percent share of an enterprise. The government also adopted a resolution 
allowing shareholders and employees the right to purchase state shares, either for vouchers 
or money. Coupled with a lack of indexation system for asset values, this created favorable 
conditions for the plunder of state assets. 
   In addition, the lack of cash based privatization and rules barring foreign ownership 
contributed to a result of overwhelming insider ownership. Most enterprise assets ended up 
in the hands of employees, managers and local investment funds. Although there is little 
evidence of share trading, managers acquired a significant number of employee shares, and a 
small number of influential citizens, including PM Lubys, took control of large chunks of 
industrial branches.309 Under the Soviet system state and market were one and the same, and 
thus those who controlled large enterprises like the Lubys’ chemical giant or the Mazeikiai 
Nafta oil refinery also held influence in the political sphere. After independence, this 
relationship proved very hard to break because the pain and economic shock of the 
transition to market persuaded Lithuanian voters to aid the former nomenklatura in their 
return to political power, while still retaining de facto control over their former economic 
spheres of influence. The new left wing government, led by former communist apparatchiks, 
deliberately stalled privatization of the country’s most profitable sectors. 
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Corruption proliferated in a number of industries, most notably energy and other 
“strategic” (and therefore the most profitable) sectors. This was exacerbated by another 
unintended consequence of the Lithuanian privatization: crime. Because under the previous 
government privatization had been designed to proceed rapidly, law enforcement systems 
were unprepared for the prevention of new economic crimes, which gave rise to a new class 
of criminals and criminal structures.310 In 1993, former state comptroller Kazimieras Uoka 
stated, “the managers of economic government structures and the operators of the shadow 
economy have accumulated such enormous funds and acquired such influence in the past 
two and half years of business dealings that I can no longer assert myself or cope with 
them.”311 Organized crime with shadowy links to government and state security apparatuses 




The success of the LDLP and subsequent proliferation of corruption in the energy 
and industrial sector had profound effects on Lithuania’s energy security over the next 
fifteen years. Although the government pursued a number of small changes to its energy 
policy, Lithuania did not pursue any substantial diversification away from Russian energy 
supplies during this period. In fact, during this period Lithuania became further entangled 
with Russia over energy issues. In March 1993, Lithuania concluded the Energy Barter 
Agreement with Russia, under which Russia would supply Lithuania with oil, gas and nuclear 
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fuel in exchange for Lithuanian agricultural and manufactured goods.312 Although this was 
necessary given the severe economic crisis Lithuania, concluding a barter deal meant an 
increase in rent-seeking and grey market opportunities in the energy trade. The barter deal 
also further institutionalized the Soviet pattern of ceding control over key resources to 
Soviet era managers and elite groups.  
Interestingly, during the time the barter agreement was signed with Moscow, a young 
Vladimir Putin was working in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office and was in charge of 
negotiating barter deals with foreign governments. Putin and a deputy, Aleksandr Anikin 
signed dozens of contracts, many of which were signed before Putin had received 
permission to do so from the appropriate federal ministry in Moscow. Many of these 
contracts were legally dubious, and went to companies with links to the mayor’s office and 
Putin himself. Eventually the city council launched an investigation into corruption, and 
while they did not explicitly accuse Putin and Anikin of wrongdoing, charged then with 
“complete incompetence bordering on bad faith.”313 Anikin resigned in the wake of this 
scandal and was replaced by Alexey Miller, who would later become one of Putin’s closest 
aides and the Chairman of Gazprom. Putin however did not resign, and was instead 
promoted to deputy mayor with the purpose of attracting foreign investors to the city.  
While it cannot be proven that Putin was the one who signed the Lithuanian barter 
agreement, examination of economic treaties of the period and the barter agreement itself 
reveal that unlike all other economic agreements signed by Russia and Lithuania during this 
period, the barter agreement document is the only such document without signatures of 
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individuals.  Instead it bears the signatures “Government of Lithuania” and “Government of 
the Russian Federation.”314 
In 1995, the Seimas did manage to pass the Law on Energy, which was responsible 
for setting the main outlines of Lithuanian energy policy including the National Energy 
Strategy and a five-year implementation plan developed by the cabinet of ministers. Under 
this document, Lithuania’s primary energy policy objectives included increasing energy 
efficiency, increasing domestic production of resources and increasing diversity of energy 
supply.315 However, in 1996 the Ministry of Energy was dissolved and placed within the 
Ministry of Economy, which was known to have links to powerful figures in industry 
including PM Lubys. Further, although the energy implementation plan was under the 
purview of the cabinet of ministers, de facto energy policy was created at the ministerial level 
at the Ministry of Economy.316 This meant that the government could state their energy 
policy goals, but the Ministry of Energy could ignore them altogether or even create a 
completely different de facto policy. One example of this is the beginnings of discussions 
between the government and Gazprom over the privatization of Lietuvos Dujos, the 
Lithuanian state gas conglomerate. During these talks Vilnius expressed an interest in the 
construction of an additional gas pipeline to Kaliningrad, which would have provided 
Lithuania with gas transit income as well as increased security of supply.317  The Ministry of 
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the Economy, however did not lobby for the pipeline citing cost concerns. Gazprom refused 
the request.318 
A number of scandals illustrate how the conservative government and links to Soviet 
era institutions prevented Lithuania from pursuing a more active energy security policy. At 
the time of his appointment to PM, Lubys was simultaneously the head of the Confederation 
of Lithuanian Industrialists (CFL), as well as the former Soviet factory director of the Azotas 
Chemical Plant (later renamed Achema), which happened to be the largest consumer of 
natural gas in Lithuania. Between the years of 1992-1993 Lubys gained control over the 
factory through murky privatization processes and invested in various other businesses, 
making him one of the richest men in Lithuania.319 Lubys sought an increased role in 
governance, particularly in increasing control over the privatization process. One way he 
accomplished this was by increasing the role of the CFL from a powerful lobby to one with 
direct control over policy. In the run up to the 1996 general elections, the frontrunners, the 
Homeland Union-Lithuanian Conservatives (HULC) signed a co-operation agreement with 
the CFL, and after a successful performance in the elections, Lubys placed several of his 
cronies into high level policy positions: most notably Vincas Babilius as the minister of 
Economic Affairs.320 
During Babilius’ three-year term, privatization (under control of his ministry) faced 
severe criticism from his political opponents. In just one of the scandals over the 
privatization of the energy sector, he was accused of selling Lithuania’s oil industry at bargain 
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prices and receiving kickbacks for orchestrating the sale.321 Through Bablilius, Lubys also 
tried to gain control over the so-called “Power Bridge” project that would link Lithuania’s 
power grid to Poland’s. This was a deeply unpopular move that led the leading daily 
newspaper Lietuvos Rytas to suggest, “a dangerous financial and political force has appeared 
in Lithuania” that wields not only economic power but also “real state power.”322 The public 
outcry against Babilius would later play a large role in the collapse of the government of 
Gediminias Vangorius in 1999.323 
During this period Lithuanian politics were extremely volatile, with numerous 
scandals exploding in connection with the energy industry. In August of 1996, police 
arrested independent MP Audrius Butkevicius (former Minister of Defense 1990-1993) for 
allegedly taking a $15,000 bribe from businessman Klemensas Kirsa to dismiss a case 
involving Kirsa’s company Dega Ltd. Dega had been implicated in a fraud case involving a 
missing $4.5 million payment from the state-owned Lietuvos Energija, an energy holding 
company, to US Mobil Oil Company.324 At the prosecutor general’s request, Butkevicius was 
stripped of his parliamentary immunity. During the scandal, Burkevicius accused former 
Sajudis and now HULC leader Landsbergis of being a KGB informer who had orchestrated 
the bribery charges in order to besmirch the reputation of the LDLC. The scandal reached 
enormous proportions, with the publication in national newspapers of interviews with four 
high-ranking KGB officers confirming Landsbergis’ role as a KGB informant. Landsbergis 																																																								
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denied the allegations, accusing Butkevicius of using the KGB story to detract attention 
away from his corruption case. Eventually, the commission (dominated by the HULC) 
investigating the KGB link dismissed the allegations due to lack of evidence. Following the 
Landsbergis affair, parliament amended the law on presidential elections to stipulate that all 
presidential candidates must make public any collaboration with former Soviet secret 
services. 
 
 1997-2004: Lithuania Joins the EU but Sells out to the East   
 
 The period between 1997 and 2004 is notable for several reasons. First, although 
Lithuania’s volatile politics once again turned the country in a different political direction, 
politicized and flawed privatization of the energy sector kept energy policy stagnant. 
Lithuania was working towards EU membership, but the failure to make radical changes to 
the Soviet ownership structure of energy and heavy industry in the initial stages of 
independence led to a major disjuncture between overall reforms and the specific ability to 
reform the energy sector. Finally, during this period several major privatizations occurred 
that had a long-lasting impact on Lithuania’s overall energy security. In particular, scandals 
that erupted around the privatization of the Mazekiai Nafta oil refinery and the national gas 
company Lietuvos Dujos revealed the severe extent of corruption in the energy sector and 
government and ultimately resulted in the sale of Lithuania’s strategic assets back to the 
Russians. By the time Lithuania joined the European Union in 2004, it was significantly 





 In November of 1996, parliament convened to discuss a government program to 
fight crime and corruption, reform the state administration and restructure the energy sector. 
First on the agenda of the HULC was reducing the power of the Brazauskas presidency. 
During this meeting the HULC (led by former Sajudis leader Landsbergis) attempted to 
wrest the nomination of the prosecutor general from the President and was successful, 
passing an amendment to the law stipulating that the Parliament’s legal committee, rather 
than the president, would nominate the prosecutor general for a seven-year term. The 
amended law also indicated that the deputy prosecutor general should be selected and 
dismissed by the parliament. President Brazauskas, who previously had the power to block 
candidates, called the law unethical and illegal. On March 6, 1997 Brazauskas vetoed the 
amendment to the law, which was then overturned again by parliament.325 The rancor 
between Brazauskas and Landsbergis’ HULC party would continue to characterize 
Lithuanian politics over the next several years, and contributed to a continued struggle to 
reform the corrupt energy sector. 
Amidst rising public scrutiny, Brazauskas and the LDLP had a small victory, when in 
May of 1997 the Constitutional Court ruled that that Article 16 of the “Law on Officials of 
the Republic of Lithuania” which states that “Officials shall be prohibited from being private 
owners of an enterprise or general or limited shareholders, acquiring or holding in trust more 
than 10 percent of the shares of an enterprise,” contradicted Article 23 of the constitution, 
which stipulates that “property shall be inviolable.” The ban against public servant 
																																																								




ownership was interpreted as “discrimination against those who serve as state officials.”326 
Although this ban had not previously been seriously enforced, this ruling set the stage for 
extremely political privatizations of key energy assets. 
In the January 1998 elections, independent candidate Valdas Adamkus, endorsed by 
President Brazauskas, was elected president by less than a 1% margin against Landsbergis. 
Landsbergis’ defeat coupled with Brazauskas’ decision to leave politics heralded the end of 
the first era of post-Soviet Lithuanian politics, which had been dominated by the bitter 
dispute between Landsbergis and Brazauskas.327 But the new era of politics under President 
Adamkus was no less antagonistic, especially on questions of energy and privatization. 
By April of 1999 President Adamkus publically announced that he did not trust PM 
Vagnorius, claiming that he could no longer adequately perform his presidential duties while 
Vagnorius was in office. Prior to the announcement relations between the government and 
the president had been steadily deteriorating, beginning with Adamkus’ public claims that 
Vagnorius was overseeing a flawed privatization process. In the ensuing months a media 
storm erupted over the scandal of Minister of the Economy Babilius, as well as a charge that 
Babilius was receiving kickbacks from Belarus in exchange for discounts (or some argue, 
completely free) Lithuanian electricity generated at Ingalina. Even after the scandal was made 
public Vagnorius continued to support Babilius and responded that Adamkus was unjustly 
interfering in government affairs and violating the principle of separation of powers. 
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Eventually Vagnorius resigned and Adamkus appointed HULC MP Rolandas Paksas as 
prime minister.328  
It is important to note that by 1999 Lithuania scored relatively highly on 
international indexes of political freedom and even property rights. But while Lithuania was 
indeed a relatively well functioning (though volatile) democracy and had made significant 
inroads into combatting corruption and setting up a market economy, delayed privatization 
as well as the presence of energy veto players at the highest levels of government left the 
energy sector lagging behind the rest of the state. Thus while de jure institutions were robust, 
de facto ownership and governance over the energy sector remained weak and opaque. One 
example of this was the return of Bronislovas Lubys (head of the Achema Chemical Plant) 
to the political sphere. In 2000, Lubys decided against supporting one political party and 
instead donated money to a wide variety of actors including the xenophobic Freedom 
Union. Ten percent of all funds donated during the 2000 parliamentary elections came from 
companies personally controlled by Lubys: Achema and the Klaipeda Shipping Company. 
Although there is no suggestion of rigged or flawed elections, many of the newly elected and 
even established actors were beholden to the interests of Lubys, one of which was 
uninterrupted access to cheap natural gas needed to fire his plants. 
 
Energy Policy in The Age of Privatization: “Don’t let Ivan Close to the Pipe!” 
 
 During the period of 1996-2004 the government made several small attempts at 
energy diversification including the development of infrastructure, meeting EU accession 
requirements and even seeking better contractual terms with Gazprom. Most of these efforts 																																																								
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were hampered however, by the saga of two enormous privatizations: the Mazeikiai Nafta 
Oil Terminal and Lithuanian state gas company, Lietuvos Dujos. The result of both of these 
dramatic and complicated affairs was unfortunately, greater dependence on Russian energy. 
This period also saw spectacular energy scandals at the highest levels of government and the 
security services of both Lithuania and Russia. They would eventually result in the 
impeachment of the President in 2004. 
 Despite this extraordinarily dramatic period in Lithuanian politics, policy makers did 
manage to make a few steps towards increasing energy security. First, Lithuania managed to 
gain access to Latvia’s Incukalns gas storage facility, one of the largest in Europe. However, 
because Incukalns is owned and operated entirely by Gazprom, this limited Lithuania’s 
ability to secure it as a real strategic asset.329 In an attempt to increase energy efficiency 
across sectors, the government finally halted the large-scale subsidization of energy prices 
that continue to hamper neighboring Ukraine’s ability to make substantive changes to its 
energy policy.  
 In September of 1999, the government released a new National Energy Strategy that 
set out a long-term energy plan based on increased consumption of natural gas. 
Unfortunately there was a lack of clarity on where the increased volumes would be sourced, 
because an attempt to create a “Baltic Ring” for gas supplies had failed due to lack of interest 
by Estonia and Latvia. The right-wing government did however begin construction on new 
small hydroelectric plants, and also sought new export energy markets through partnership 
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with the US consortium, Power Bridge. However, after accusations of corruption, the deal 
ultimately fell through and was set out to tender again in 1999.330 
 
The Saga of Mazeikiai Nafta 
 
 Commissioned in 1980, the Mazeikiai Nafta Oil Refinery was the Baltic’s sole oil 
refinery and provided approximately 25% of Lithuania’s tax revenue income for most of the 
post-independence period. 331  Owned, operated and supplied by Russia’s LUKoil, the 
Mazeikiai terminal had long been considered a Russian strategic asset because it served as a 
window to the West for Russian oil supplies. Thus even after Lithuanian independence, 
LUKoil remained its sole operator and supplier, contributing to a belief on behalf of LUKoil 
management that they had a certain “historical right” to the refinery.332 
 Even under the conservative government, privatizing the refinery became a key 
policy priority in the 1990s. But because of a number of supply disruptions, a perception of 
criminality around the energy sector, and EU pressure, many in government felt that it was 
crucial the oil refinery not be sold to a Russian company. Instead, an idea was floated to sell 
to a US based company, which would have the dual purpose of increasing the US’ 
commitment to Lithuanian energy security as well as, in the famous words of Babilius, 
keeping “Ivan” away from the pipe.333  Given Lithuania’s already contentious politics and 
deep divisions between pro-West reformers and former communists seeking 
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accommodation with Moscow, fights over the direction of the privatization were vicious and 
had long-lasting implications on Lithuania’s energy security. 
 President Adamkus and Economics Minister Babilius supported the sale of the 
refinery to the Williams International Energy Group, an American based energy 
conglomerate. Others, including PM Paksas and Brazauskas were vehemently against the 
sale, arguing that a US based company would not be able to guarantee oil supplies in the 
same way that LUKoil would. On October 27, 1999 Paksas resigned after expressing his 
strong disapproval of the sale to Williams. American born President Adamkus then 
appointed Andrius Kubilius as the new PM. Brazauskas’ LDLP continued to protest against 
the sale, but the anti-Williams arguments were weakened by accusations that the LDLP’s 
campaign in the 2000 parliamentary elections were funded by Vaizga, an oil trading company 
associated with LUKoil. It was later argued that Vaizga was created by Moscow with the 
specific aim of financing pro-Russian interests in Lithuania and Latvia.334 
 In competition with LUKoil over the tender, Williams International agreed to pay 
$150 million for a 1/3 stake in the refinery, with the option to buy a controlling interest over 
the next five years. The deal however, required Lithuania to provide $344 million to cover 
Mazeikiai’s debts and capital shortfall. The LDLP were enraged by what they saw as 
disastrous terms for Lithuania, and even the IMF and World Bank expressed concerns that 
the deal would drive Lithuania’s debt to over 10% of GDP. But the HULC led by President 
Adamkus believed the sale made long-term financial sense and was committed to the project. 
The public however was not convinced. An opinion poll in October 1999 revealed that 
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slightly more than half of respondents rejected far reaching reforms that would lead to short-
term hardship, including the Williams sale.335 
Despite an increasing public sense of Euro and Western skepticism in the public, 
Mazeikiai was sold to Williams International in 1999. But the saga of Mazeikiai was far from 
over; in October of 2000 the Constitutional Court ruled that the government guarantee of 
$344 million to Williams was unconstitutional. The court found that the government could 
not take on substantial financial responsibilities in favor of a strategic investor because it 
violated Article 4 of the constitution, which stated, “People shall exercise the supreme 
sovereign power vested in them either directly or through their democratically elected 
representatives.” But despite the clear ruling, the practical implications of the court decision 
were overly vague and the deal was not annulled.336 Nevertheless, the court case, as well as 
sustained opposition by the LDLP had made the sale a major public issue. Overall public 
sentiment opposed the sale and the LDLP accused the ruling conservative bloc of selling out 
the national interest. As a result of the sale public confidence in the president dropped from 
70 to 30% in a single month, and his approval rating dropped from 81 to 48%.337 
By 2002 the terminal was a failed enterprise. Because of clauses in the sale aimed at 
protecting Williams, the Lithuanian state was forced to compensate Williams for its losses, at 
an estimated cost of $200-365 million. Naturally, the news that the state would be 
responsible for paying such a huge sum of money for the failure of an enormously 
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unpopular deal caused considerable political upheaval. Paksas, who had resigned in protest 
over the deal, became immensely popular, as did Brazauaskas, who experienced a surge of 
public confidence. Paksas accepted Adamkus’ invitation to join his team of presidential 
advisors as his deputy charged with supervising the privatization of the energy industry. 
Although Paksas had little expertise in this area, public confidence in him was high after his 
disavowal of the Willaims deal. Adamkus distanced himself from both Landsbergis and the 
William’s deal, falsely implying that he had always been against the sale.338 
The Lithuanian government desperately sought a way out of its quagmire. Despite 
the fact that LUKoil had good supply links to the terminal and were anxious to acquire it, 
selling to LUKoil was not acceptable to a large portion of the Seimas and the general 
population. Instead, the government appealed to Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Yukos, which was 
Russia’s second largest oil company and presumed more independent from the Russian 
government than was LUKoil. By this time, Paksas, a staunch supporter of LUKoil, had 
returned to the position of PM and voiced his disapproval of the Yukos deal. Unable to 
prevent the agreement he resigned again shortly before the deal was inked. 
On June 18, 2002 the Lithuanian government signed an agreement with Williams and 
Yukos that stipulated that each company would hold a 26.85 percent share, with the 
Lithuanian government retaining 40.66 shares and the remaining shares being sold on the 
stock market. Yukos bought its stake for $75 million plus $75 million in investment and 4.8 
million tons of crude oil over the next ten years.339  In a shocking twist, less than a month 
later Williams announced the sale of its stake in Mazeikiai to Yukos, thereby completely 																																																								
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unraveling the 1999 terms of privatization. In a secret deal in New York on August 14, 
Yukos agreed to purchase Williams’ share for $85 million raising its total stake to a majority 
53.7 percent.340 Because Yukos was now the majority shareholder, it claimed management 
rights and took over operation of the refinery. The Lithuanian government claimed to be 
unaware of the secret talks and Adamkus publically denounced Williams, claiming that any 
discussion of a sale should have included the Lithuanian government. 
The news that Yukos, a Russian oil company, had taken over complete control over 
the refinery caused a huge firestorm in Lithuania because it completely undermined the 
stated goal of the privatization: decreased dependence on Russia. Further, because Williams 
had paid below market value for its original shares because its presence ostensibly helped 
Lithuanian energy security, Yukos had actually acquired majority control over the refinery on 
Lithuania’s dime. Adding fuel to the public fire was the fact that during this period Moscow 
also took control over the power plant at Kaunas, the second largest in Lithuania.  
Public reaction to the so-called Williams’ Affair was vehement anti-Western and 
particularly Anti-American sentiment. In the political sphere, the center-right opposition felt 
disappointed and betrayed, as it had made large financial and legal sacrifices to lure Williams 
as the cornerstone of its pro-West strategy. The scandal also gave credence to the arguments 
of the LDLP: Brazauskas claimed that pursuing the Americans had always been a bad 
decision. “Brazauskas and his Lithuanian Social Democratic Party subscribe to what can be 




occupation, when Lithuanian communists accepted the Soviet rule and, by “milking the 
Moscow cow,” sought the maximum wealth for the country  (and for themselves).”341  
 
The Sale of Lietuvos Dujos: “Not everything is bad just because it is Russian!” 
 
 One of Gazprom’s first commercial objectives after the breakup of the Soviet Union 
was acquiring equity in the national gas companies of its downstream partners. In the Baltics, 
Gazprom acquired stakes in Estonia’s Eesti gas by 1993, and purchased a large share of the 
Latvian gas company Latvijas Gaze by 1997.342 Because of Lithuania’s decision to delay 
privatization of its energy sector however, Lithuania’s national gas company Lietuvos Dujos 
remained state-owned and operated until 2000. 
 In 2000, the government proposed privatizing 30-35% of Latvijas Gaze while 
keeping the remainder state-owned. But by 2001 a number of politicians and energy-related 
businessmen proposed earmarking a set of shares for “private Lithuanian capital.” The 
proponents of this proposal included Arturas Paulauskas, speaker of the Seimas, and of 
course, Lubys. Ironically, these local allies of Gazprom framed their argument by claiming 
that reserving shares for domestic allies would defend Lithuanian interests from Russian 
interference.343 Finally, a third proposal for privatization was put forward that suggested 
earmarking a percentage of shares to a Western strategic investor. Taking place in the 
context of the William’s Affair, this was not a popular proposal. 
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 Adding to the difficulties, the debate over the direction of privatization took place 
within the context of a major period of political crisis where both LDLP and HULC lost 
power in favor of two populist parties: the Social Liberals/New Union and the Lithuanian 
Liberal Union. Disagreements around the formation of new coalitions further delayed the 
privatization. In what would seem to be a normal event in Lithuanian politics, a scandal at 
the highest level then erupted over the terms. 
 After the ruling coalition crumbled during the summer of 2000, Lubys chartered a 
plane to bring opposition leader and ex-president Brazauskas to Moscow to discuss the 
privatization of Lietuvos Dujos directly with Gazprom.344 Once the trip was made public, 
Brazauskas denied reports he was there to meet with Gazprom officials, instead claiming he 
went to Moscow for a friend’s birthday. When it was eventually revealed that he flew to 
Moscow on a flight chartered by Achema (Lubys’ chemical plant), Brazauskas claimed that 
he had only happened to hear the plane was flying to Moscow and had hopped on board to 
save money. Finally, after public uproar threatened to destroy government, he admitted that 
he had flown to Moscow expressly to speak to Gazprom. Lubys’ interest in negotiating good 
terms with Moscow was well known; a week before Brazauskas’ trip Lubys announced plans 
for a new consortium between Achema and Gazprom that would distribute gas to Lubys’ 
many industrial enterprises. When the news broke that Brazauskas was consorting with 
Gazprom after having already interceded twice in previous governments to prevent the 
Williams deal and then again to prevent the Yukos deal in favor of LUKoil, Brazuaskas 
pronounced that not everything should be rejected outright simply because it is Russian. He 
further claimed that he felt it was his duty to save plants that would not be able to operate 
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when exposed to Western standards and prices. To save Lithuanian industry, he announced, 
he had used his old connections in Moscow to secure special prices.345 
In the end, a compromise was reached that set out 34 percent of shares to a gas 
supplier,346 34 percent to a Western strategic investor, and 24 percent to the Lithuanian 
government. But despite public outcry over his ties to Russian interests, Brazauskas returned 
as PM in the summer of 2000 and appointed another close associate of Lubys and member 
of the CFL, Petras Cesna, as minister of economic affairs. Because the minister of economic 
affairs had direct control over privatization, Brazauskas’ and (Lubys’) interests in seeing 
Gazprom retain a leading role in Lithuania’s gas sector was ensured. 
Gazprom knew that it would be the only possibly gas supplier in the deal, and thus 
stated that should it not find privatization conditions acceptable, it would not participate. To 
further stress its key role, Gazprom side stepped Lietuvos Dujos and began selling Lithuania 
gas through small intermediary companies (often controlled by Gazprom or its local allies) 
directly to Lithuanian buyers. In 2001, it sold 75% of Lithuanian gas to intermediaries or 
direct sales, leaving only 25% of volumes to Lietuvos Dujos.347 To further cut out Lietuvos 
Dujos and thereby apply pressure to the Lithuanian government, in 2002 Gazprom 
established a gas marketing company in Lithuania called Dujotekana, and simultaneously 
purchased a 30 percent share in the Lithuanian gas company Stella Vitae. By 2003, 
Dujotekana had taken over 60 percent of the Lithuanian gas market from Lietuvos Dujos.348 
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As a result, Gazprom negotiated a dramatically undervalued price for its 34% share package, 
as well as other favorable clauses. According to Margarita Balmaceda in her study of the 
privatization  
Gazprom made its acceptance of the privatization condition on two related 
conditions: that it should be allowed to sell 30 percent of its gas through structures 
outside of [Lietuvos Dujos] and that there should be, in addition to a regulated 
market, also a non-regulated market for ‘free consumers.’ The contract also reflected 
Gazprom’s demand that it be contractually bound to sell LD only 70% of all gas sold 
to Lithuania. Any volumes above 70% were not subject to any limitations on 
markups, which created a huge potential for profit.349 
 
In April of 2002, the State Property Fund of Lithuania (under the control of the 
Ministry of the Economy) named a consortium between German Ruhrgas and E.ON as 
buyer of the 34 percent stake earmarked for a Western investor.350 Finally in 2004, Lietuvos 
Dujos was sold to Gazprom and E.ON Ruhrgas, with which Gazprom had a particularly 
friendly relationship. Immediately after the privatization, Lietuvos Dujos and Gazprom 
signed a long-term gas contract for the retroactive period of 2000-2015. Based on this 
agreement, Gazprom agreed to supply Lietuvos Dujos with no less than 70% of Lithuanian 
gas demand minus the consumption of Achema and the Kaunas Heat and Power Plant 
(KTE). The LTA also forbade Achema and KTE from re-selling gas provided by Gazprom. 
Under the agreement Dujotekana (controlled by Rimandas Stonys and close associate of 
Putin, Vladimir Yakunin)351 would fill the remaining 30% of Lithuanian gas demand.352 
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The result of both the Mazeikiai and Lietuvos Dujos privatizations was to increase 
Russian control over two key Lithuanian assets: its most profitable asset, and its entire gas 
sector. Not only did Gazprom continue to control the entire supply of gas to Lithuania, it 
now had a large stake in the infrastructure and distribution of that gas to Lithuanian 
consumers. Although Mazeikiai was owned and operated by Yukos, which at the time was 
thought to be independent from the Kremlin, in 2003 Khodorkovsky was arrested, and 
Yukos’ assets seized by the Russian government. By 2004, companies controlled directly by 
the Russian government gained control of Lithuania’s key strategic energy assets, decreasing 
its energy security dramatically. 
 
Ignalina: A Thorny Rose 
 
 It is important to remember that during the course of these two privatizations, 
Lithuania was in the midst of preparing to join the European Union, which had watched the 
events unfolding with increasing alarm. In June 2002, Minister of Foreign Affairs Antanas 
Valionis announced that Lithuania would shut down both reactors of the Ignalina NPP by 
2009. The plant, which had been one of the major obstacles in the EU accession talks, 
provided more than 70% of the country’s electricity. A number of member states, including 
Poland and in particular Sweden, had raised serious concerns about the safety of the plant, 
which had not had any significant safety upgrades since before the Chernobyl disaster. 
Although the public reacted with intense Euroskepticism and concern over losing their main 
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source of power, Valionis said that he had secured a promise from the European Union to 
assist financially in decommissioning the plant, which would cost an estimated $2.3 billion.353 
 Just a few months later, during a negotiation between Lithuania, the European 
Union and Russia regarding the visa regime in Kaliningrad, Lithuania managed to extract the 
promise of another $30 million to help fund the closure of the plant. The government, 
which had revised its cost assessment of the plant closure to €3 billion, adopted a new 
energy strategy prior to the summit that stated it would not lose the plant unless it received 
“large additional sums” from the European Union.354 Despite these promises, both the 
public and opposition members expressed concern that shutting down Ignalina would only 
make Lithuania more reliant on Russian commodities. Given the dire state of Lithuanian 
energy security, overcoming this problem would become the major political and economic 
issue of the coming decade. 
  2004-2006: Lithuania Joins the European Union But Gives up More Energy Security 
 
 On April 16, 2003, PM Brazauskas signed Lithuania’s accession treaty with the 
European Union, which would come into effect on May 1, 2004. But the enormity of the 
occasion was overshadowed by a scandal that would ultimately lead the impeachment of 
President Paksas, which was the first time an impeachment of this level occurred in Europe. 
Ultimately, what should have been a formative experience as part of a new era of European 
politics turned into an era characterized once again, by contentious politics and political 
scandals erupting around the energy industry. In the end, although Lithuania had made 																																																								
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significant progress towards meeting the institutional conditions necessary for EU 
membership, during this period the capture of the energy industry by energy veto players 




 By 2004, Lithuania had undergone a significant transformation of its property rights 
regime, although it still lagged behind most Western European countries in terms of 
corruption.355 But as the Paksas scandal would ultimately reveal, Lithuania faced a problem 
of inadequate property rights and murky relationships between state and market. This was 
exacerbated by a lawmaking process that was quick and prolific, which when coupled with 
often incompetent politicians and powerful interest groups often led to legal clashes with the 
constitution. Between 1994 and 2004 the Constitutional Court found 233 cases where legal 
acts or their provisions were found unconstitutional. Laws were frequently amended, 
sometimes immediately following their adoption, which further diminished the stability of 
the legal framework.356 When paired with a still volatile political system, this contributed to 
Lithuania’s failure to decrease energy dependency, even after it had formally joined the 
European Union and NATO. 
 
Energy Policy As an EU Member State 
 
The Paksas Scandal 																																																								
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 Only a few months after assuming office in February 2003, President Paksas was 
embroiled in a scandal that could have been lifted out of the pages of a Cold War spy novel, 
and which ignited fears amongst the Lithuanian and European public of nefarious Russian 
interference. Although he was later accused of a number of corruption charges, the most 
significant involved his relationship with Yuri Borisov, a Russian arms dealer with 
commercial interests in both Russia and Lithuania. Borisov was alleged to have contributed 
over $400,000 to Paksas’ presidential campaign in exchange for preferential access to the 
president’s office.357 Later, observers would note that this figure was likely much higher, up 
to an estimated $6 million, and that Borisov’s support may have been a cover for money 
passed directly from Russian energy companies including LUKoil and RAO EES.358 Officials 
investigating the affair claimed that Borisov “nurtured close relations with Mr. Paksas’s 
national security advisor Remigijus Acus, and with a Russian political consulting firm, 
Almax, a company suspected of having connections with Russia’s foreign intelligence 
service.”359 
 After the election, Paksas subverted a routine background check and expedited Mr. 
Borisov’s application for Lithuanian (and therefore European) citizenship after he had 
previously been stripped of it. The citizenship issue was ultimately what brought the scandal 
to light after the director of the State Security Department reported that Mr. Borisov and 
Mr. Acus had become entangled in a separate criminal investigation that involved over 2,000 
wiretapped conversations. Making matters worse, reports surfaced that Borisov had close 
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ties to the KGB and the GRU, and that Paksas had leaked classified information to Mr. 
Borisov about investigations into his commercial interests. Finally, Paksas was charged with 
interfering into the privatizations of Mazeikiai and Lietuvos Dujos on behalf of the Russian 
state. Although Paksas initially denied the allegations, arguing “There’s only one thing that 
can be said; all of the people who are involved in the process of impeachment opposed me 
in the election,”360 he was impeached in April 2004. 
 
The Uspaskich Scandal 
 Unfortunately, the Paksas scandal was not the only scandal involving the energy 
industry that erupted during the first years after Lithuania’s accession to the European 
Union. The scandal of Economics Minister Viktor Uspaskich brought to light the extent to 
which corruption and ties between Lithuanian businessmen and Russia had taken over 
Lithuania’s energy sector. In the early 1990s, Uspaskich, a former welder for Gazprom, had 
risen to become one of Lithuania’s top ten richest people. Uspakich retained close ties to 
Gazprom throughout this career, with observers noting that at one point he was “the only 
person in Lithuania with constant direct access” to the company.361 Uspaskich used this 
connection to Gazprom to launch a series of successful gas intermediary companies 
including Stella Vitae, but following an internal reorganization with Gazprom in which they 
replaced these intermediaries with a new set of smaller, consolidated companies, Uspaskich 
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was cut out of the lucrative business. 362 In Lithuania, Gazprom’s new management363 
transferred all of its contracts to Dujotekana prompting Uspaskich to begin a crusade against 
Dujotekana and Gazprom.  
 Coincidentally, when Uspaskich began publically denouncing Dujotekana, allegations 
of corruption around his Russian related construction business were made public. The media 
seized hold of this story and Uspaskich was asked to resign in May 2005.364 He then fled to 
Moscow.365 But while the outcry over Uspaskich’s personal corruption allowed the corrupt 
practices he was bringing to light about Dujotekana to go unnoticed, a separate and 
seemingly random incident brought to light an even larger scandal surrounding the gas 
industry. 
In August 2006, Vyatautas Pociunas, an officer for Lithuania’s State Security 
Department (VSD) died after falling out of a window in Brest, Belarus. The incident raised 
eyebrows because less than a year earlier, Pociunas had been in charge of the VSD’s 
economic security department and had suddenly been transferred to the provincial 
Lithuanian consulate in Belarus at the precise moment of the scandal over the sale of 
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Mazeikiai to Yukos.366 Eventually, investigations into his death would reveal that corruption 
in the energy industry did not just involve high level politicians, but had expanded to include 
vast numbers of regular officials. Dujotekana, “using profits generated by its import 
operations—as it was able to charge a significant markup on gas—was able to distribute 
broadly and generously among a large number of politicians, public opinion makers, and 
educational institutions.”367 Some members of the VSB itself were also involved in the 
corruption, and contact between Dujotekana’s chairman Rimantas Stonys (an alleged 
personal friend of Vladimir Putin) and the VSB were exposed. 
 The scandal revealed that during this period, Lithuania had lost a degree of control 
over its own security forces, many of who had contacts with Dujotekana, and indirectly, 
members of the Russian security services. The investigation also revealed that the VSD had 
launched unauthorized investigations including the collection of compromising materials on 
opposition politicians and on those who made it difficult for Gazprom to pursue its 
commercial interests in Lithuania.368 
 During the period of 2004-2006, there was little improvement to Lithuania’s energy 
security, and in fact the extent of the dependency was made even more apparent by 
Dujotekana’s growing role in Lithuanian politics and economics. Officials continually 
delayed reform, including a new gas framework law that was needed in order to implement 
the EU’s 2003 gas directive dictating an open market with price liberalization. Pursuing this 
policy was difficult because Lithuania was completely dependent on Gazprom, and de-
regulation with a monopoly would only strengthen its position in the Lithuanian market. But 																																																								
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rather than face the problem head on, Lithuanian policy makers postponed the matter until 
2007.  
 At this point in the case, Lithuania diverges dramatically from Ukraine. Absent a 
number of factors and fortuitous timing, it is highly likely that Lithuania would have 
continued on the path of active dependence as did its neighbor, Latvia. A brief comparative 
case study of Latvia is presented in the conclusion of this chapter. However, as discussed in 
detail in the next section, Lithuania managed to break the path dependency of corruption 
and distorted markets in the energy sector through the addition of a third player: the West.   
 
2006-Present: Lithuania Diversifies 
 
 Although energy diversification had been Lithuania’s stated policy since 
independence, the numerous scandals revealed that extensive corruption at the highest levels 
had significantly increased Lithuania’s dependence on Russian energy, particularly through 
the privatizations of Mazeikiai Nafta, Lietuvos Dujos and the gas intermediary business. But 
these scandals, particularly the enormous uproar over the links to Russian security services 
and the Putin regime brought to light in the Uspaskich scandal, helped spark a renewed 
energy amongst Lithuanian policy makers for energy independence. The public also became 
more concerned about energy security following the Ukrainian crises of 2006 and 2009, 
which showed that even comparatively more secure states like Ukraine369 could be extremely 
vulnerable to supply threats from Russia. Finally, during this period, Lithuania experienced a 																																																								
369 Despite Ukraine’s intense dependence on Russian supplies, Ukraine had the advantage 
over Lithuania in that it held the transit pipelines to Gazprom’s important European market. 
Following the inauguration of the Nord Stream pipeline that connected Russia directly to the 
German market, Lithuania was cut out of the, admittedly small, transit regime to 
Kaliningrad.  
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price shock, with gas prices rising from $85/mcm in 2005 to $345 in 2009 when the Nord 
Stream Pipeline came online rendering Lithuania’s gas transit to the Kaliningrad region 
obsolete.  
 All of these events contributed to Lithuanian energy security becoming a first 
priority for both policy makers and the public. But the crucial break to the pattern of active 
dependence came via a series of fortuitous events that aligned the interests of the new 
Lithuanian government and the European Union at precisely the right moment. While the 
Ukraine crises gave rise to a new sense of the necessity of Lithuanian energy security for 
Lithuanians, the Ukraine crises and the subsequent lack of supplies in other EU member 
states also brought European Continental energy security to the forefront of the EU agenda. 
As will be discussed further below, the planned closure of the Ignalina NPP in 2009 allowed 
Lithuanian policy makers to lobby the European Union for strategic investment in its energy 
sector, which allowed the new government to break the grip of its energy veto players by 
replacing their revenue stream with European Union funds. 
 
Energy Policy Reform: A Third Player Tips the Balance 
 
 In 2007 the Lithuanian government launched a new National Energy Strategy, which 
for the first time ever, highlighted Lithuania’s energy insecurity vis-à-vis Russia. The Strategy 
clearly presented Lithuania’s dependence on a single supplier as a security issue and set out 
plans to reduce dependency by building a new nuclear power plant by 2015, increasing 
energy efficiency, investing in renewables and developing a new gas storage facility.370 But 
Lithuania had implemented new energy strategies before without follow through. In fact, 
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plans for a new NPP were stymied almost immediately by a concern over a lack of 
transparency and by the fact that Poland, Estonia, Belarus and Kaliningrad were all planning 
to build their own NPPs in the coming years.  Similarly, although after the Dujotekana 
scandal public opinion had shifted in favor of increased price regulation and against gas 
intermediaries, the Ministry of the Economy opposed regulations even as the President 
argued for EU compliant regulation. In March 2007, under increasing pressure from the 
European Union, the Seimas passed a law regulating gas prices that was immediately blocked 
by the Ministry of the Economy.  
 But in the October 2008 elections a new center right government led by PM Andrius 
Kubilius and new president Dalia Grybauskaite came to power. Grybauskaite, nicknamed 
“Steel Magnolia”, had been educated at Georgetown University, and prior to the election 
had served for five years as the European Commissioner for Financial Programming and 
Budget in Brussels. In Brussels she was known for her commitment to the European project 
and for her stark opinions on the role of Russia as an adversary of the European Union.371 
Unsurprisingly given her previous experience, both Kubilius and Grybauskaite were 
committed to Lithuania’s energy security and pursued it as a first priority. One of their first 
priorities following the elections in January of 2009 was the re-establishment a Ministry of 
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Energy that was separate from the Ministry of the Economy that had become mired in 
corruption.  
 
The Closure of Ignalina: “There is enough concrete for both thieves and Ignalina” 
Part of the reason for the new government’s commitment to energy security was the 
planned closure of the Ignalina NPP in late 2009. After losing control of Mazeikiai and 
Lietuvos Dujos, Ignalina had become an even more crucial energy resource, responsible for 
over 70% of Lithuania’s power generation. But for years Ignalina had been a major concern 
for the EU and neighboring states that had learned more about the plant’s shoddy 
construction following mandatory safety inspections. One story emerged that during 
construction in the 1980s, so much concrete and other building materials were stolen that 
barriers between storage pools and the ground beneath them leaked. One Russian expert 
who asked not to be identified, laughed and said: “Under the Soviet system, 30 percent theft 
of building materials was assumed and taken into account before construction began. So 
there was enough concrete for both the thieves and Ignalina.”372 By 1995, Ignalina was listed 
amongst the most dangerous nuclear reactors in the world, posing “significant safety risks” 
and “remaining unstable and difficult to control” relying “heavily on operator intervention to 
keeps things from going out of kilter,” according to a report prepared by the U.S. 
Department of Energy.373 
 Sweden, Poland, and Brussels were not the only parties concerned about the safety 
of Ignalina. In the mid-1990s the US Energy Department of Nuclear Science ran a $121 																																																								
372 Browne, Malcolm. “Lithuania’s Dangerous Orphans: 2 Huge Reactors,” The New York 
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million program of technical assistance dedicated entirely to nuclear plants in the former 
Soviet bloc and called for the creation of a $10b fund that would allow the 10 most 
problematic reactors (including Ignalina) to be shut down and replaced. Because Ignalina 
was the same model as Chernobyl and had had several safety crises, it became a specific 
target of both the European Union and the United States. During Lithuania’s negotiations 
with the European Union over accession, the previous government had negotiated a deal 
whereby the European Union would grant at least $207 million Euros to help fund the cost 
of closing Ignalina. But following the loss of Mazeikiai and Lietuvos Dujos, not to mention 
the supply security guaranteed by Lithuania’s gas transit link to Kaliningrad after the 
construction of Nord Stream, political will in Lithuania had shifted against closing the plant. 
 Although Lithuania had agreed to shut the plant by December 31, 2009, by 2007 
former PM Aleksandras Abisala had been appointed Lithuania’s special envoy in Brussels to 
make a case for keeping the plant open. When he accepted the role, Abisalsa stated, 
“extension of the nuclear power plant’s operations for several years could be one of the 
possibilities to neutralize energy threats.”374 But while Abisala was ultimately unsuccessful, 
the new government under Kubilius and Grybauskaite saw the impending closure as an 
opportunity to shift Lithuania’s energy policy westward. Following intense negotiations with 
the European Commission and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
together with fourteen European governments, Lithuania secured more than €800 million to 
finance the decommissioning NPP, to be managed by the Ingalina International 
Decomissioning Support Fund.375 Further, the administration managed to persuade the EC 
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that funds designated for Ignalina would not fall under the category of “state aid”, which 
would subject the money to stricter terms and oversight.376 Ignalina was shut in December 





Figure 6-2: Closure of the First Reactor, Iganlina Nuclear Power Plant 
Photo credit: Getty Images377 
 
 This major coup and windfall allowed the new government to embark on a number 
of EU led energy security initiatives that had been delayed by previous administrations. In 																																																								
376 European Commission, “State Aid: Commission Concludes that €170 million support for 
Lithuanian gas-fired power plant does not constitute state aid,” February 14, 2008. 
 





mid-2009 Lithuania started “unbundling” its gas sector to comply with the European 
Union’s Third Energy Package requiring a separation of energy supply and generation from 
the operation of transmission networks.378 Lithuania was in violation of this requirement 
since the sale of Lietuvos Dujos to Gazprom and EON Ruhrgas, but the decision to finally 
unbundle was surprising to many analysts considering Lithuania was eligible for a derogation 
of these requirements due to its position as an isolated gas market without any infrastructure 
connections to other member states. Because unbundling would require Gazprom to give up 
control of Lithuania’s pipeline system and thus sell its share of Lietuvos Dujos, many of 
Lithuania’s energy veto players were vehemently opposed to the policy.  
 But successive scandals and links between the gas industry and Russia had weakened 
the position of many of Lithuania’s most powerful actors, and resulted in the election of new 
reformers with firm ties to the west. During this time, a group in the Seimas suggested 
building an LNG terminal at Klaipeda that might help ease Lithuania’s precarious situation 
after the closure of Ignalina. But during the discussions over the terminal, intense 
disagreements between the government and Lietuvos Dujos arose over connecting the 
transmission grid to the port. When it became clear that Lietuvos Dujos would actively resist 
the project and render any LNG terminal useless, Kubilius decided the only way to break 
their grip would be to avoid derogation and implement the Third Energy Package, thereby 
destroying Gazprom’s monopoly over Lithuania’s energy grid.379 
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 Fortuitously, the timing of this decision aligned perfectly with the European Union’s 
final adoption of the Third Energy Package in 2009. This laid down a convenient path for 
Lithuania to follow, as well as an opportunity for the state to take advantage of European 
funds for implementation. Kublilius admitted, “our membership in the EU since May 2004 
was very beneficial to us, because we had a chance to participate in the creation of the 
European instruments which we later could use individually against Gazprom, but this time 
a European instrument.”380 But to get all of the funds offered by the EU, Lithuania was 
required to fulfill the “N-1” requirement, which involved finding an alternative gas supplier 
before December 2014. As Gazprom was not only the sole supplier but also the owner of 
the transmission system, this would require Lithuania to fully unbundle by 2014 and to 
secure an additional gas supplier. Given the geographic and infrastructure constraints, 
Lithuania’s only option was to construct an LNG terminal. 
 Of course, the decision to move away from Gazprom, which had provided generous 
rents for a large group of Lithuanian actors including Lubys, was unpopular with certain 
segments of Lithuanian society (and Moscow). But unlike Ukraine, Lithuania’s energy veto 
players were aging, and had not been replaced by a class of younger and more ambitious 
oligarchs. Part of the reason for this of course, was that the Lithuanian market, and therefore 
available rents, was much smaller than in Ukraine, and thus new generations without 
consolidated links to Moscow found it both less enticing and more difficult to enter this elite 
group. Around this time in 2011, Lubys, who had acted as a powerful lobbyist for 
Gazprom’s (and his own commercial) interests for twenty years, passed away while riding his 
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bicycle.381 To help further break the grip of the old guard, the new government actively 
encouraged young Lithuanians to join government and key industries: including the gas 
sector. Younger generations were both more likely to have an affinity for the West, and had 
likely grown up with the prospects and benefits of EU membership. One example of this 
strategy was the appointment of Dominykas Tuckus in 2013 as CEO of Litgas, one of the 
largest successor companies to Lietuvos Dujos. Although born in Lithuania, Tuckus had 
attended university in Milan (graduating in 2005) and later worked in Stockholm, Vienna and 
Dubai. He took over operations of the company while under the age of 35. 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Vilnius Headquarters of Litgas, with gas pipeline 
Photo Credit: Emily Holland, July 27, 2015 
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 But despite the fact that a new generation and the new government were anxious to 
take advantage of the benefits of EU membership and its new commitment to energy 
security at the periphery of the continent, Lithuania faced significant pushback from 
Moscow. Following the unbundling announcement, Putin publically called the 
implementation of the Third Energy Package “uncivilized robbery.” He further claimed, 
“Our companies, together with our German partners, legally acquired distribution assets in 
Lithuania. Now they are being thrown out of there with reference to the Third Energy 
Package.” 382  Russia announced its intention to fight the implementation, so Lithuania 
“invited” the European Commission (EC) to participate in the negotiations. A Lithuanian 
lawyer working on the case stated that “the Commission was very active in the process 
because “‘the Commission saw that Lithuania's case was the litmus test. If Lithuania did not 
succeed to implement the ownership unbundling, it would have been a very strong hit to the 
whole Third Energy Package and would hinder its viability.”383 
 Despite protests from both Gazprom and EON, on February 27, 2012 members of 
the EC, Gazprom and the Lithuanian government agreed on the terms of the unbundling. 
It was agreed today between representatives of the Lithuanian government, 
Gazprom and the European Commission that in the light of the objective of 
implementing the government's decision for ownership unbundling of the 
Lithuanian gas transmission and distribution network by end 2014, it is necessary to 
enter immediately into negotiation to resolve outstanding issues relating to the 
unbundling process, to the transit of gas to Kaliningrad, to the future term and off 																																																								
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take volumes and to the valuation of the unbundled company with a view to 
adopting by 31th May 2012 an agreed roadmap for final implementation of 
unbundling. The intermediate target dates in the Action Plan adopted in the 
government's resolution of 28th October 2011 will be amended accordingly.384 
 
But Gazprom was never a company to be trifled with, especially in the wake of the 2009 
financial crisis and the subsequent loss of significant market share in Europe. After 
announcing that it would comply with the unbundling, Gazprom refused to grant Lithuania 
the same market discounts (15%) it gave to Latvia and Estonia. Latvia conveniently decided 
to forgo unbundling until at least 2017 and subsequently signed another long-term contract 
with Gazprom securing minimum volumes to 2030.385 By 2013 Lithuania was paying the 
highest prices for gas in the entire EU, and in 2011 Lithuania filed a complaint against 
Gazprom at the EC accusing the company of abusing its dominant position in the market. 
In 2012, Lithuania took Gazprom to the Stockholm Arbitration Court, claiming that 
Gazprom had overcharged $1.6 billion for gas between 2004 and 2012. Unfortunately for 
Lithuania, the court ruled against their claims and Moscow retaliated by bringing the 
Lithuanian case and the Third Energy Package as a whole to the WTO, arguing that its 
policies were discriminatory.386 As of April 2017, the case is still pending. 
 But despite the roadblocks put up by Gazprom, Lithuania still needed to implement 
the TEP and find an alternative supplier quickly in order to secure the generous EU funds. 
To accomplish this the government made the commission of an LNG terminal a capstone 
project. Gazprom resisted the terminal through Achema, which lodged a complaint in the 
EC over the “25% rule,” which required all importers of gas to import at least 25% of gas 																																																								
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through the new LNG terminal. Achema, which was still the largest consumer of natural gas 
in Lithuania and had close contractual ties with Gazprom, argued that the 25% rule violated 
their commercial rights. Achema lobbied hard against the terminal via two of their media 
holdings, the BTV television station and the Radiocentral and Lietuvos Radijas radio 
stations.387 Eventually the parliament was forced to cancel the 25% rule in order to facilitate 
the terminal.  
 The project was also met by significant resistance by the Lithuanian Gas Association 
(LGA), which represented companies that imported and supplied gas for re-sale. The LGA, 
whose main members were all tied to Gazprom and whose address was registered to the 
same address as Lietuvos Dujos, filed a complaint with the EC arguing that the LNG 
terminal would be receiving illegal state aid from Europe.388 Gazprom even exerted pressure 
against the terminal via Latvia, who had resisted Lithuania’s attempts to involve it in a Baltic 
gas ring. In early 2013 Latvia attempted to block an €87 million loan by the European 
Investment Bank arguing that the funds would be better spend on a regional Baltic LNG 
terminal located in Latvia or Estonia. 
 But Lithuania’s efforts were firmly supported by the European Union, which by that 
point had invested significant resources into Lithuania’s energy security as an example for 
other energy dependent new members. Further, after the Ukrainian gas crisis of 2009 and 
subsequent failure to make substantial improvements to its dependency, Lithuania’s 
successful diversification was more important than ever to support its Third Energy 
Package. Finally in March 2012 Lithuanian company Klaipedos Nafta signed a 10-year lease 
agreement with Norwegian Hoegh LNG to build a floating storage and regasification unit 																																																								
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with a capacity of 4bcm/year, almost double Lithuania’s annual gas consumption. 389 
Immediately following Gazprom’s forced sale of Lietuvos Dujos for €121 million, Lithuania 
created a new state-owned gas company, Litgas, which signed a contract with Norway’s 
Statoil for .5 bcm/year. The “Independence” arrived in Klaipeda in October 2014 and came 
online in 2015. 
 
 
Figure 6-4: The Inauguration of the FRSU Independence, October 28, 2014. 
Photo Credit: Hoëgh LNG 
 
 But while the arrival of Klaipeda was heralded as throwing off the yokes of Russian 
domination, the terminal has subsequently faced criticism. First, Lithuania was forced to pay 
Norway market prices for LNG, almost three times the price of Gazprom’s pipeline gas. 
Given that Lithuania’s annual budget is $10.1 billion, the Independence’s daily operating 																																																								
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costs of $189,000 caused many Lithuanian’s to oppose the project. In order to salvage the 
project, Lithuania has tried to cancel the lease and purchase the terminal outright, but 
Norway has so far refused this offer. Nevertheless, the Grybauskaite government and the 
EU have continued to herald the Independence as a major policy success. Despite the 
obvious problems, Lithuania managed to break the pattern of active dependence and pursue 
a costly policy of diversification. 
 
 




 Of all the post-Soviet cases, Lithuania stands out for its pursuit and moderately 
successful quest for energy independence. Despite having been left with problematic energy 
infrastructure and factor endowments, Lithuania managed to make the painful transition 
towards decreasing dependence on Russian energy supplies. To do this, Lithuanian 
policymakers capitalized on EU level reforms and marketed themselves as the capstone case 
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shows that despite democratic reforms and the lure of the West, breaking active dependence 
and Soviet institutional legacies is exceptionally difficult. Part of the reason for Lithuania’s 
success was indeed luck: the goals of a new coalition of reformers and EU policy makers 
fortuitously aligned at exactly the same moment. Further, the fact that Lithuania was left 
with the “two dangerous orphans” at Ignalina was a further impetus for the European Union 
to devote time and material resources towards ensuring Lithuania’s energy security. 
Additionally, Lithuania’s relatively small market and lack of rent-seeking opportunities did 
not incentivize new energy veto players to enter the market and replace the former 
communist elite as they aged. 
 Despite the fact that Lithuania is a democracy whereas Ukraine is decidedly not, 
Lithuania’s successful pursuit of energy security is not due solely to its more robust 
democratic institutions. As evidenced by the case above, even after Lithuania had joined the 
European Union, informal Soviet institutions surrounding property rights and the energy 
sector continued to prevent any substantive increase in energy independence. Further 
evidence of the uniqueness of the Lithuanian case is a comparison to its Baltic neighbor 
Latvia, which had both similar Soviet legacies and a post-independence path to democracy. 
Like Lithuania and other post-Soviet states, Latvia was left with a legacy of energy intensive 
development with no domestic resources to power its economy. Perhaps even more than 
Lithuania, Latvia’s economy was highly dependent on Russian oil trans-shipment, and thus 
the Russian oil lobby has maintained a powerful presence in Latvian politics. Despite a 
number of attempts by Lithuania to persuade it join in regional Baltic energy projects 
including the Baltic gas ring, Latvia has repeatedly declined to move away from Russian 
supplies. In fact, despite Lithuania’s offer to decrease Latvia’s 100% dependence on Russian 
gas with LNG gas from the Independence, in 2015 Latvia signed a long-term contract with 
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Gazprom ensuring Russian supplies until 2030.  
 Why has Latvia been unable to pursue energy security like its southern neighbor 
Lithuania? First, after independence Latvia’s property rights regime was not substantially 
restructured around the energy sector. Latvia’s energy oligarchs (all of whom are former 
Soviet leaders or managers) controlled politics and oversaw a flawed privatization process 
that allowed Gazprom to take majority control over its natural gas company Latvijas Gaze, 
which holds a monopoly over import, transmission, storage and sale. After seeking a 
derogation of the unbundling requirements, Latvia was the last of the three Baltic states to 
implement “unbundling” and has neglected to pursue alternate suppliers or break from 
Gazprom. Second, Latvia faced an even more intense problem with corruption in its energy 
sector than did Lithuania. In 1997 a number of cabinet ministers faced accusations of 
corruption and ultimately lost their jobs because of undisclosed business interests.390 Latvia 
consistently rates lower on international indexes of transparency and good governance than 
does Lithuania.391 Finally, Latvia did not have a ruling coalition that was inclined to pursue 
greater ties with the EU over energy issues when it became Brussels’ first priority. This 
meant that it did not have leadership lobbying the EU for material incentives to diversify 
away from Gazprom, nor did it have the opportunity for increased funds to shut down 
Soviet plants. Ironically, the fact that Lithuania pursued this option so fully (taking the 
majority of the funds earmarked for EU energy security) meant that there was no 
opportunity for Latvia to position itself as a potential energy reformer. This reduced Latvia’s 																																																								
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choices and made it impossible for the government to break the grip of active dependence. 
In fact, Lithuania’s antagonistic policy towards Moscow incentivized Russia to give greater 
discounts to its Latvian partners, which further entrenched Russia’s position in the Latvian 
market. 
 There are several implications from the Lithuanian and Latvian experiences. First, 
even in the most aggressive post-Soviet reformers, an unofficial nomenklatura property rights 
regime remains a huge impediment towards pursuing the most basic state security policies. 
Second, even after successfully reforming the political system and the economy, the energy 
sector remains the most resistant to change. Because the energy sector was the most heavily 
entangled with Moscow to begin with, exerting control over this industry requires immense 
resources that most of these countries do not possess. Even after nearly a billion Euros of 
investment, Lithuania’s energy sector is still unwieldy and difficult to control. Although the 
country has made enormous progress in supply diversification and in re-gaining control over 
its own energy infrastructure, Lithuania sill remains dependent on Russian resources, and 
where there is energy from Russia, rent-seeking opportunities follow. Where large resources 
earmarked specifically for diversification are unavailable, a radical transformation of these 
sectors is unlikely in the coming years.  
Nevertheless, an important policy note is that the successful employment of the 
European Union aid regime in Lithuania demonstrates the possibility of undermining the 
Russian cross-national investment networks that support Russian foreign policy aims in 
Europe. In particular, the suggestion that Putin himself was likely involved in the signing of 
the 1993 Barter agreement that facilitated corruption in the Lithuanian energy sector adds 
significance to this assertion. Putin’s work on the barter contracts is an early example of the 
type of crony capitalism that facilitates Russian foreign policy aims to this day, and may 
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indicate that even before Putin rose to power this was his preferred method of governance. 
It may also indicate a reason why nurturing and supporting favorable relationships with 























Chapter 7 - FROM RUSSIA WITH LOVE: THE CASE OF HUNGARY 
 
 
 “I should tell you that Hungary is not in a very friendly environment…we have neighbors in 
the European Union!” 
-Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orbán392 
Introduction 	
 Following the 2014 crisis that led to a temporary suspension of Russian gas supplies, 
Ukraine was relying solely on “reverse flow” volumes from Western European states to meet 
its energy needs. But in September of 2014 Budapest suddenly stopped sending reverse flow 
gas to the desperate Ukrainians citing “technical reasons”. Although subsequent 
investigations showed that plenty of free capacity remained in the pipeline linking Hungary 
and Ukraine, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán told Hungarian radio that Budapest 
would need to import increased volumes of Russian gas into Hungary to boost levels in 
Hungary’s storage reserves, necessitating an interruption of supplies to Ukraine.393  
 Coincidentally, Hungary’s decision to cut-off Ukraine from much needed supplies 
came just three days after a visit to Budapest by head of Gazprom Alexey Miller. The timing 
of this decision had major consequences: later that week the European Union, Ukraine and 
Russia were meeting in Berlin for emergency tri-partite talks on signing a new gas contract 
between Russia and Ukraine ahead of the winter season. Budapest was also gearing up for its 
own talks with Gazprom over renewing its 1996 gas contract, expiring in early 2015. 
Unsurprisingly, the result of the gas cut off was to weaken Ukraine’s position at the 
bargaining table with Russia while simultaneously increasing concessions in the new 
Hungarian gas contract. Speaking at a joint press conference on February 17, 2015, Orbán 																																																								
392 Official Transcript of Joint News Conference between Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin, 
February 7, 2017. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53806> 
 
393 Buckley, Neil. “Hungary Halts Flow of Gas to Ukraine,” The Financial Times, September 
26, 2014.  
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declared, "I thank President Putin for making it possible for the people and industry of 
Hungary to be supplied with cheaper Russian gas. Without reliable supplies of Russian gas 
we would not be able to continue the work we are planning to carry out."394 
 Hungary’s new gas contract was just the latest and most stark evidence of a major 
shift in Hungarian energy policy: after years of relatively successful diversification and 
significant restructuring of its energy sector, Budapest had made a sharp turn eastwards and 
back into Moscow’s energy embrace. Why did Hungary abandon its pursuit of energy 
security in favor of increasing dependence on its dominant supplier? In this chapter, I 
examine Hungary as a disconfirming case because it has the anticipated outcome of 
dependence but did have a substantive transformation of its property rights regime. Despite 
Hungary’s strong post-independence legacy of anti-imperialism and rule of law reform, the 
Hungarian case demonstrates how contemporary economic and political policies can affect 
energy security even in the absence of a strong Soviet institutional legacy. 
In this chapter, I argue that Hungary’s severe economic crisis in 2009 and the 
subsequent success of a populist regime led to a situation in which it was politically 
expedient to characterize the EU as a cosmopolitan enemy, thus making an enemy of the 
EU policy of energy diversification. As part of this populist shift, Hungarian leaders 
increasingly relied on clientelism and plebiscitarian linkages to maintain power.395 Many of 
these clientelist relationships were in the profitable sectors of energy and banking. As 
scholars of populism have noted, successful populism can destabilize democratic 
																																																								
394 Oil and Gas Eurasia, “Russia and Hungary Agree on New Gas Contract,” February 18, 
2015. 
 
395 See Barr, Robert R. “Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics,” Party Politics l 
15, no. 1 (2009): 42. 
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institutions396 and in this case, acted as a force against the rule of law process that drove 
Hungarian transition. I will demonstrate below that Hungary’s populist turn eroded the rule 
of law in the energy sector, leading to increased corruption and shift from diversification to a 
clear case of active dependence energy policy. Although Hungary has experienced the 
erosion of democratic indicators writ large, energy was particularly vulnerable to these forces 
because energy policy was both a crucial component of Orbán’s nationalist economic plan 
and is generally prone to corrupt practices.  
 As I will discuss shortly, the Hungarian case is a good example of how larger 
geopolitical trends can have an impact on domestic level energy policy. Because providing 
energy has implications for security, social welfare and electoral politics, it is often one of the 
first and most prominent sectors to be affected by a major shift in geopolitical alignments. In 
the Hungarian case, the election of a populist leader and the rise of global populism 
necessitated a rhetorical and subsequent policy shift away from the European Union, which 
was painted by Orbán as a corrupt and cosmopolitan entity seeking to undermine Hungarian 
national sovereignty. Because the European Union was advocating for an all EU energy 
union that would indeed have limited Hungarian sovereignty over its own energy affairs, EU 
energy policy became an expedient political enemy. Russia offered an alternative: an illiberal 
regime on which to model a new Hungary, as well as the option of cheap energy that would 
subsidize Orbán’s populist program of social affordability.  
This chapter investigates the relationship between global political trends and energy 
policy, and aims to explain why a state would move from a security maximizing 																																																								
396 See Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira. “The Ambivalence of Populism: Threat and Corrective 
to Democracy,” Democratization 9, No. 2, (2011): 184-208. Mudde, Cas & Cristobal Rovira 




diversification policy to one of consciously increasing dependence on an already dominant 
supplier. I begin this chapter with a brief discussion of Hungary’s post-independence reform 
process, highlighting how of all three cases discussed in this project, Hungary was the most 
substantially reformed politically, economically and in the energy sector. I then demonstrate 
a major substantive shift in Hungary’s energy policy after the election of Victor Orbán’s 
Fidesz party in 2010. I trace the process of how populism and a general decline in Hungary’s 
democratic indicators led to increased corruption around the energy sector, the 
empowerment of actors close to Moscow and dramatically increased dependence on Russian 
commodities. More specifically, I discuss the role of different types of corruption in the 
success of the Orbán campaign and regime. I also discuss the interaction between domestic 
transnational actors and the new tools of financial globalization that support transnational 
corruption. Using primary source research, news reports and interviews and field 
observations from two trips to Hungary in August 2013 and 2015, I analyze evidence from 
the case and conclude. 
 
Independent Hungary 1990-2000 
 
 In 1989 Prime Minister Joszef Antall replaced General Secretary of the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party Janos Kadar, and the Hungarian parliament adopted a “democratic 
package” including trade union pluralism, freedom of association, assembly and press and 
instituting a multi-party system with direct representative elections. Hungary, already one of 
the leaders in the reform process by the late 1980s, held its first free parliamentary elections 
in May of 1990, which effectively dismissed the communists, despite the fact that they held 
even more than the usual advantages of an incumbent party. Hungary was unique from the 
outset: not only was its transition peaceful, but unlike other post-Communist states, the 
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Communists did not continue as an important political and economic force. Even before the 
1990 elections the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the leading party in the governing 
coalition, campaigned on an anti-communist and pro-reform platform. Emphasizing reform 
of the bureaucracy through Western principles and purging the bureaucracy of the 
nomenklatura, the swift and decisive nature of Hungarian political transition was in stark 




 While a detailed account of Hungary’s dual transition is beyond the scope of this 
project, already by the early 1990s Hungary had made great strides towards implementing a 
rule of law property rights regime that was entirely distinct from the communist 
nomenklatura system. Even before the prospect of EU membership imposed a whole new 
set of rules, Hungary had already built several formal state institutions that constrained the 
discretion with which elites could extract state assets. Not only were these institutions 
adopted formally, they were also enforced. Hungary was one of the first former socialist 
states to implement a civil service law, which took administrative decisions out of the hands 
of elites, and also set up a strong constitutional court that reviewed party decisions, acting as 
a powerful check on institutions from the period of 1990-1998. The Court was highly 
activist, and acted numerous times as a check against potential abuse of power.397 In 




397 Gryzmala Busse, Anna. “Post-Communist Competition and State Development,” Center 
for Eastern European Studies Working paper 59, Harvard University, (December 2004.)  
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Figure 7-1: Hungary POLITY Score 
Source: Center for Systemic Peace, POLITY IV Project398 
 
In addition to its political reform, Hungary was already viewed as one of the best 
candidates for rapid economic transition due to the fact that a number of reform initiatives 
had already began in the late 1980s. To avoid near financial and economic collapse in the 
mid 1980s, the socialist government had issued a number of liberal initiatives including a law 
on joint ventures, an income tax, a two-tiered banking system and even joined the IMF and 
the World Bank. Thus unlike most of its neighbors, even before independence Hungary had 
a fledgling experience with some elements of a market economy.  
Of course, the Hungarian transition was not all rosy. Despite the fact that rapid 
economic transition was seen as the only course of action, the public nonetheless held 																																																								
398  Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV Country Regime Trends, Hungary, 2013. < 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/hun2.htm> 
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extremely hostile views of the government and put considerable pressures on politicians to 
avoid making painful economic decisions.399 One of the most prominent displays of public 
dissatisfaction with swift reforms revolved around an attempt by the government to raise 
gasoline prices by 65% to bring them to market levels. In response, on October 27, 1990 
angry taxi and truck drivers blockaded Budapest’s streets and bridges in protest. During the 
so-called “Taxi Strike”, protestors blocked traffic in other cities around Hungary and 
brought the nation’s economy to a standstill for several days.400 Despite the government’s 
initial refusal to back down, emergency negotiations resulted in the government agreeing to 
scale back the price increase. This however, was unsustainable because unlike other Eastern 
European states that raised prices gradually over a several month period, the Hungarian 
government had taken no steps to reduce consumption and instead used almost all of its fuel 
reserves to continue supplying gas at subsidized prices. 
 
Rapid Privatization of the Energy Sector 
 
 Along with the complete restructuring of the Hungarian economy, the privatization 
process started early on in the 1990s due in part to a “head start” on some energy issues. 
Similar to other areas of the economy, Hungary was at an advantage to other post-
communist countries and a much greater advantage than the post-Soviet states because the 
inefficiencies of the centrally planned economy on energy issues had already become 
apparent by the 1980s and a number of reform initiatives had already been started by the 
socialist Hungarian government. Faced with finding a solution to a crippling foreign debt 																																																								
399 Bunce, Valerie and Maria Csanadi. “Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in 
Hungary,” East European Politics and Societies7, no. 2, (Spring 1993). 
 
400 Greenhouse, Steve. “Evolution in Europe: Gas price Protest Cripples Hungary,” The New 
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 268 	
problem, on January 31, 1989 the Minister of Industry put forth a list of fifty-one Hungarian 
state enterprises that would be put for sale to foreign buyers.  By the end of 1989 direct 
foreign investment in Hungary totaled approximately $300 million, compared to a 
cumulative total of $200 for the entire previous decade.401 
 But as was the case with most privatizations, by late 1989 there had already been 
several well-publicized cases of plundering of state assets with some courts refusing to 
register shady deals. To stem this problem, in January 1990 the parliament produced the Law 
for Defense of State Property and then established a State Property Agency to oversee the 
privatization process. The new Hungarian government, which came to power in May 1990, 
placed a special emphasis on economic efficiency rather than political goals as well as 
transparency and accountability in a decentralized privatization framework.  
 Unlike many other post-socialist states, Hungary decided to give priority to the 
privatization of its energy sector, introducing the appropriate conditions for competition in 
various market segments at a later stage. The decision to place a priority on the privatization 
of the energy sector was not completely altruistic: already by 1992 and despite substantial 
reorganization and cost-cutting measures, modernization of the energy sector stagnated 
resulting in a serious debt problem. Facing devaluation and the prospect of rival 
privatizations across Eastern Europe, Hungary was forced to swiftly prepare for 
privatization of its industries. 
 In 1992 the Hungarian government developed an energy policy that set out the 
process for privatization: first corporatizing state owned enterprises, developing a legal 
framework and finally establishing a regulatory regime in conjunction with legislated pricing 
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policy and mechanism. The government then gradually relinquished management and 
ownership roles and by 1998 had divested majority ownership in all power and gas 
distribution companies and most power generation plants.402 Although the government 
generally prioritized strategic foreign investors, financial portfolio investors were preferred in 
the case of the Hungarian oil and gas conglomerate MOL. Originally established as the 
National Oil and Gas Trust (OKGT) in 1960, OKGT gradually assumed all responsibilities 
for managing and developing gas and oil production and distribution in Hungary. It also had 
a monopoly for exploration until 1991, when the government restructured the company 
separating distribution companies into independent joint stock companies (owned by the 
Hungarian government) and MOL (the successor joint stock company to OKGT). 
The shift away from strategic investors occurred after prolonged negotiations where 
potential investors were interested in only some of MOL’s sectors, and the industry itself 
protested against being subsumed completely by a large multi-national oil or gas company (in 
this case either an American or Russian multinational). To allay these concerns, particularly 
of the prospect of MOL being purchased in Gazprom, the government settled on a three-
phase privatization of both domestic public and international private placements, with the 
government retaining only 25% plus the “golden share”. During phase one in 1995, 18.5 
million shares with a nominal value of 1,000 HUF were sold via private placement on the 
US, Luxembourg, and London stock exchanges to foreign institutional investors while 5.4 
million shares were sold to MOL employees and 492,000 to management. Later that year a 
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further 3.5 million were sold on the Hungarian stock market.403 In the later phases in 1997 
and 1998 a further 30% shares were sold, with the main stockholders an array of foreign 
investors including Germany’s Ruhrgas, EWN and Italgasz.404 
 By 1998, Hungary had gone the farthest of any ex-socialist country in reforming its 
energy sector and successfully privatizing its energy companies. While privatization of 
strategic sectors did not begin in Ukraine until 1996 and Lithuania in 1999, by this time 
much of Hungary’s energy sector was already privatized into a diverse array of ownership 
structures. Of course, Hungary’s success in this endeavor was partially driven by the 
presence of the IMF and other Western organizations that imposed financial constraints 
forced the government to focus on the process under the watchful eye of oversight 
institutions. Nevertheless, the privatization of Hungary’s energy sector, though not 
completely clean, was the least marred by corruption and was unique in the region in the 
extent to which privatization of energy was based on actual sales rather than free distribution 
of state owned assets to red directors and other former communist elites. 
 
Energy Policy With an Eye towards the West 
 
Hungary’s initial mismanagement of its energy sector as displayed by the Taxi Strike 
was perhaps not surprising considering the unfavorable energy conditions with which it was 
saddled at independence. Like the majority of former communist states, Hungary had an 
overly developed heavy industry sector and an underdeveloped service economy. The natural 
gas situation was especially dire: historically Hungary had significant gas reserves of its own, 
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but a massive gasification of the residential sector during the 1980s had turned the country 
into a net importer as its own domestic production entered a steep decline. By independence 
natural gas constituted 35% of its total primary energy share and nearly all of it was supplied 
by Russia via Ukraine. Adding to its insecurity was the fact that Hungary was a “dead end” 
for suppliers, as no major transit quantities passed through its territory.  
Hungary was also heavily dependent on coal, which eventually became a highly 
politicized issue. By the late 1980s coal mining had become inefficient and the industry was 
indebted. By 1990 Hungarian coal was not competitive with imported coal even on the 
domestic market and most mines were not operational without massive state subsidies. To 
the consternation of the coal lobby, in 1992 the government announced that it would close 
all but eight state run mines by the year 2000.405 The consequence of this decision was 
further increased reliance on natural gas. Faced with a situation of rapidly increasing natural 
gas dependency and almost no domestic reserves with which to meet it, the government was 
forced to deal with energy policy almost immediately upon independence. This was a major 
difference from both Ukraine and Lithuania, who despite facing an arguably worse situation 
of dependency, did not manage to craft a coherent national energy strategy until years later.  
In the 1992 Energy Policy, Hungary placed special attention on increasing energy 
security by aiming to lower unilateral import dependency on Russia and by increasing storage 
capacity.406 Unlike Ukraine and Lithuania, these stated goals were followed up with action: in 
line with these targets oil reserves were increased from 20 to 90 days of average domestic 
consumption and electricity power generators that ran on fossil fuels were required to secure 
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their own stockpile for sixteen days of usage. To tackle the issue of natural gas dependency 
the Hungarian government installed a new gas interconnector to Austria (HAG), which had 
a capacity of 12 million cubic meters per day and could replace one third of the Ukrainian 
connector’s 30 mcm per day capacity. Constructed in 1995 and already operational by 1996, 
the HAG was a great step forward in reducing dependence on a singe pipeline, if not actual 
supply diversification. Although the gas imported via HAG was the same Russian gas 
available via Ukraine, it could safely provide backup supplies in case of any interruption 
from Ukraine and could also provide further supplies to Western Hungary in case of low- 
pressure problems or unexpected surge in demand.  
Most important, the HAG fulfilled the EU’s “N-1” criteria, which required potential 
member states to diversify security of supply beyond one supplier. Paired with Hungary’s 
decision to increase available gas storage supply as per EU regulation, the swift moves to 
diversify showed that Hungary was already making serious overtures towards EU accession 
requirements, even before it was required to do so. Like other new potential members, 
Hungary could have applied for a derogation of these requirements based on the extent of 
its unfavorable infrastructure, but unlike Lithuania and others, it did not choose to do so. 
Making expensive and difficult reforms to its energy sector early on was instrumental in 
preventing actors with incentives to profit off of inefficiencies from gaining veto power.  
Like other post-communist countries, Hungary experienced a decline in energy 
intensive industries due to economic restructuring, but despite this Hungarian energy 
intensity remained relatively high due a lack of initial investment in energy efficiency 
measures. Nevertheless, despite a failure to adjust consumer prices for energy, the Hungarian 
government was proactive in removing price controls for industrial consumers even before 
they had to pay market prices for imported energy. Already by 1989 most energy prices 
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covered economic costs (besides household prices) and between 1990-1994 price controls 
were gradually removed completely (resulting in the Taxi Strike). Unlike Ukraine, which to 
this day continues to subsidize household energy prices, in Hungary tariff policies and 
regulation further addressed price distortions to support the privatization process. 
The result of tackling its energy policy early in the 1990s meant that Hungary already 
had a substantially more well developed energy security policy before many other post-
Socialist states had even begun the process of privatization. As I will discuss in the next 
section, the prospect of EU accession and the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 would push 
Hungary towards even more serious steps to diversification, which makes the stark reversal 
of Hungary’s entire post-Soviet energy policy under Orbán even more puzzling. 
 
 Hungarian Energy Policy as EU Energy Policy 
 
 Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004 obliged the country to comply with EU 
legislation and regulations across a host of issues including energy. Not only did Hungary’s 
performance on political and economic indicators rise rapidly to meet European standards, 
but by the early 2000s Hungary had made significant progress towards exceeding European 
energy requirements. Part of this decision was no doubt based on the prospect of EU 
accession, but also due to the deteriorating domestic supply situation. In the 2000s gas 
consumption in Hungary fell from its peak of over 14bcm in 2006 to below 8bcm in 2014. 
But because of the concurrent rise in oil prices, to which gas prices are indexed, Hungary 
paid roughly the same amount for its reduced supplies as it had during peak consumption. 
In response, Hungary embraced all available EU opportunities that were emerging as 
a result of a Union-wide energy security policy aimed at reducing dependence on Russian 
supplies. Soon after its accession Hungary took advantage of EU subsidies for green energy 
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and instituted the most advanced green energy regulations in Eastern Europe, including the 
region’s first feed-in tariff system. The Hungarians also took advantage of a European 
Commission directive that named several cross-border gas interconnectors between Hungary 
and Romania, Croatia and Slovakia that would be eligible for community financial 
assistance.407 Even before the 2006 crisis, Hungary was using the EU aid regime to its full 
advantage, receiving the highest proportion of EU aid as a proportion of its GDP (5.64%).408 
 
The Ukraine Crises Leave Hungary out in the Cold 
 
 Despite Hungarian efforts to decrease supply dependence on Russia, Hungary 
experienced severe gas shortages as a result of the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 
2006. This emergency highlighted the still precarious nature of its energy situation, and so 
the government took serious measures to prevent a similar calamity. First, MOL offered one 
of its production sites to the government for conversion into a national strategic gas storage 
facility. Although construction costs were estimated at over $750 million, some of the cost 
was covered by a €200 million loan by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development to MOL, as well as tranche of further investment by Western banks.409 
 Although the Nabucco Project, aimed at providing alternative natural gas supplies 
from the Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia to Central and Southern Europe, was 
announced in 2002, it was not until after the scare of the 2006 crisis that the incumbent 
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Hungarian socialist-liberal government expressed its support for the Western backed project. 
Floated as a competitor to Gazprom’s South Stream project, Nabucco was aimed at limiting 
Gazprom’s control over the Southern European market. Although some Hungarians 
expressed concern over the financial practicality of the project, after the 2009 Ukrainian gas 
crises things Hungarian support for the project increased considerably. 
 In January of 2009 when supplies to Ukraine were cut for fourteen days, Hungary 
experienced a severe energy shortage that left tens of thousands of people without heating in 
the dead of winter. By the end of the dispute, officials stated that some 40 Hungarians had 
died due to frigid temperatures.410 Despite the diversification measures begun in the 1990s, 
the 2009 dispute demonstrated to the Hungarian people that it was still especially vulnerable 
to gas supply issues. As many of the new infrastructure developments were not yet ready 
(the strategic storage facility and new interconnectors), the system was unable to cope with a 
40% loss in main supply, and over 22 large industrial consumers were completely shut off 
from supply and forced to close. The closure of the factories as well as the lack of heating 
caused outrage amongst Hungarian citizens who blamed the European Union and 
incumbent Hungarian government from failing to protect them. Although the government 
responded by improving pipeline connections to Baumgarten and Slovakia, the Ukraine 
crisis disaster and severe economic crisis precipitated by the global financial crisis left the 
Hungarian population in deep discontent. 
 This malaise contributed to the election of Viktor Orbán and his right-wing Fidesz 
party, who came to power on an anti-EU nationalist populist platform.411 Although the full 
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condition under which Orbán’s election took place are beyond the scope of this chapter, the 
nascent anti-European sentiment amongst certain segments of the population and the 
populist nature of his party platform would have dire consequences for both Hungarian 
democracy and Hungarian energy security. 
Orbán’s New Vision for Hungarian Energy Policy 
 




In the wake of the global financial crisis, Viktor Orbán, a former Soviet dissident, 
returned to power in 2010, inheriting a spiraling deficit and a €20 billion IMF bailout 
program. With the backdrop of a growing sense of public discontent, Orbán’s campaign was 
classically populist: framing his Fidesz party as anti-establishment, nativist and emphasizing 
the faith and wisdom of ordinary people against a “corrupt” establishment:413 in this case the 
European Union. Similar to the way in which Silvio Berlusconi used populism to destroy 
traditional political alliances in Italy, Orbán overcame the traditional left-right cleavage of 
Hungarian politics with a vertical cleavage that placed cosmopolitan elites against the 
Hungarian “people” and promised to return them to sovereign power.414 Despite the success 
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of Hungary’s early liberal reforms, populism spread in Hungary with surprisingly little 
resistance. Fidesz based their entire party on political polarization, and as early as 2006 
centered a popular campaign on arguments that one side was nationalist (Fidesz) while the 
ruling liberal coalition was fundamentally opposed to the nation.415 
In the 2010 elections, Fidesz commanded an absolute majority in parliament and 
under Orban’s leadership began a systematic attack on liberal institutions, which they painted 
as undermining the Hungarian nation.416 Because of its overwhelming electoral success, 
Fidesz took as a mandate undermining the rule of law processes that drove transition. 
Although Hungary experienced a democratic backslide across the political spectrum, two 
economic sectors were particularly affected by Orban’s nationalist plan to transform the 
Hungarian economy: banking and energy.  
 
Institutional Backslide & Corruption 
 
With a 2/3 super majority in parliament, Fidesz was able to carry out a complete 
reconstruction of the state, which included the creation of a new constitution, a change in 
electoral law and major institutional reorganization. From the beginning of its term in May 
2010 until December 2013, parliament adopted a total of 840 acts that had the overall effect 
of centralizing authority within the office of the PM. One example was the amendment of 
the local government act on January 1, 2012, which reversed the de-centralization processes 
that had been enacted in 1990 to promote democratic governance.  																																																																																																																																																																					
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By reorganizing the state and with its absolute majority in parliament, Fidesz began a 
systematic attack on institutions that had the power to check legislative and executive power. 
The new constitution greatly reduced the power of the Constitutional Court, which had 
previously played an active role in the Hungarian political system, by limiting the court’s 
ability to pass verdicts on a variety of issues and by vesting parliament with the right to 
appoint the Court’s president. Since 2011, the government has frequently eroded the court’s 
power by amending the constitution to remove court oversight on important issues.417 The 
attack on the court, which previously had the right to oversee issues of public interest 
including energy deals, greatly reduced public oversight of the energy sector just as the 
government began to implement its new agenda. 
A main element of the Fidesz program was focused on Orbán’s ten-point nationalist 
plan to revitalize the Hungarian economy, which included a number of proposals to reduce 
costs for consumers, nationalizing the banking sector, reducing taxes and creating full 
employment. Additionally, the plan called for creating a new energy system that would make 
energy as cheap as possible while opening the economy “to the east.” Naturally, the 
economic viability of instituting all of these points at once was near impossible, as it required 
cutting state revenues dramatically while providing more services to the public. But to 
support its populist rhetoric, which requires continued mobilization against enemies once in 
power, Orbán continued to attack the European Union and embrace the East.  
Fidesz began an immediate program of centralizing the bureaucracy and weakening 
the civil service through frequent and arbitrary replacement of officials. Almost immediately, 
policy-making initiative and agendas were removed from the ministries themselves placing all 
decision-making capabilities in the office of the prime minister. The reshuffle included the 																																																								
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creation of a new body within the Ministry of the Economy devoted entirely to pursuing 
stronger economic ties with Russia. While the mandate of this department was clear, the 
goals and means through which to achieve them were not specified. A former official in this 
department admitted that the entire office was at the whim of the prime minister, and that 
there were no stated goals or objectives other than increasing economic ties with Russia.418  
Ironically, Fidesz had run on a platform of ridding the Hungarian state of the 
endemic post-communist bureaucratic corruption that was a legacy of state ownership. Of all 
the post-communist reformers, Hungary had the least amount of bureaucratic purges and 
thus still faced significant low-level petty official corruption.419  One main platform of 
Orbán’s populist campaign was full-scale elite replacement of the bureaucracy in order to rid 
the country of “liberal corruption”.420 Of course, Fidesz’s plan was not to replace the 
bureaucracy to rid the state of corruption, but rather to replace the old form of 
institutionalized corruption with a new elite crony capitalist form of corruption.421 This type 
of corruption was crucial to Fidesz’s success because it provided patronage for supporters to 
help fund their campaigns and ensured the regime access to favored industries. One 
particularly noteworthy example of the regime’s new corruption was the scandal around 
Ildiko Vida, the head of Hungary’s National Tax and Customs Administration (NTCA), who 
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facilitated VAT fraud by government cronies and bribed American companies with tax 
breaks in return for funding policy papers favoring Orbán’s regime.422  
As a result, a new brand of crony capitalism corruption proliferated in the strategic 
sectors of energy, banking, construction and the automotive industry, as Fidesz continued to 
reduce avenues for public oversight on its new economic agenda. Civil society and oversight 
organizations were regularly shuttered when they came into conflict with the government. 
One example of this was the former Energy Efficiency Association that lobbied for higher 
efficiency standards in public buildings. Although Hungary has some of the least efficient 
construction standards in Europe, the government closed the organization in 2016 when it 
began publicizing accusations of corruption in the construction of the Budapest’s new Metro 
line.423 Investigations have subsequently revealed the Metro scandal as Europe’s largest case 
of corruption, with European anti-fraud authorities recommending that Hungary refund the 
EU more than €300 million of misappropriated financing.424  
In 2017, Hungary dropped seven places in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index, continuously deteriorating since 2011. Corruption has increased so 
markedly since the 2010 elections that for the first time this year Hungary is more corrupt 
than even Romania, which means that corruption in Hungary is the worst of any new 
member state in the EU aside from Bulgaria.425 This dramatic increase in corruption can 
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often be tied directly tied to the regime, which is said to have misappropriated over 300 
billion HUF in public funds in 2016 alone.426 
The backslide of rule of law governance and public oversight into the distribution of 
state assets accompanied a policy of increased state control over the energy sector. Despite 
its dire economic situation, Hungary began re-nationalizing large chunks of its formerly 
privatized energy sector, including a 21% stake in MOL from a Russian company. While the 
details of this deal will be elaborated below, part of Hungary’s ability to take back control of 
these sectors came from the fact that despite Orbán’s rhetoric, Hungary continues to receive 
significant EU funds for its energy and other programs. Under Orbán, corruption around 
the misuse of these funds proliferated rapidly. For its “Environmental and Energy Efficiency 
Program,” Hungary has a total budget of €3.7 billion, of which €3.2 billion is provided by 
the EU (through the Cohesion Fund and European regional Development Fund). Before the 
purchase of MOL, the funds were dispersed to the government, but the outcome of the 
program was negligible.427 In 2014, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) carried out 13 
investigations of suspected fraud of EU funds in Hungary, making it OLAF’s second most 
common target after Romania.428 During this time the Orbán government reallocated large 
amounts of EU funds from projects including energy efficiency investments in residential 
buildings to projects including “refurbishment of public buildings.” Although the European 
Commission objected to this plan, it is difficult to assess if they are being allocated correctly 
because most EU funds are not monitored appropriately. An official in the Ministry of 																																																								
426  Transparency International. “Hungary Still in Decline,” January 25, 2017. < 
https://transparency.hu/en/news/cpi-2016-magyarorszag-tovabbra-is-lejtmenetben/> 
 
427 European Commission. “Environmental and Energy Efficiency OP Hungary,” 2017.  
 
428 Transparency International Hungary. “The Corruption Risks of EU Funds in Hungary,” 
2015.  
 282 	
Natural Development told me in an off the record conversation that it was impossible to 
keep track of all of EU funds and where they might end up.429 
After the 2010 elections, Hungary experienced a major decline in democratic 
indicators and a huge proliferation in corruption. As the government attacked oversight 
institutions and eliminated channels of communication between the government and civil 
society including the media, public oversight on issues of energy became extremely limited. 
Because a major part of Fidesz’s political platform involved a continued attack against 
liberalism and the West, in particular Brussels, which was advocating for union-level energy 
policy and decreased dependence on Russian commodities across Europe, they began a 
complete realignment of energy policy and increased state control over energy assets. As 
discussed earlier, because energy is such a profitable and opaque industry, it is vulnerable to 
corruption even in the best institutional environments. The transformation from 
bureaucratic corruption to a new form of crony capitalism is part of a liberal backlash that 
can take hold in other similarly well-institutionalized states including Hong Kong and to 
some extent, Russia. As Hungary’s institutions were systematically dismantled, the 
corruption and abuse of power in the energy sector led to a major shift in energy policy 
outcome: from one of diversification to active dependence. 
 
Energy Policy under Orbán: Hungary Turns its Back on Diversification 
 
“It is not the role of the EU to enter into gas negotiations! Open your markets, make liquid 
hubs, but please don’t propose things that remind me of the COMICON system!” 
-Peter Hohaus, E.ON Head of Legal Affairs430 																																																								
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 Although Hungary had devoted significant resources towards diversification efforts, 
the Ukrainian gas crises highlighted the state’s remaining vulnerabilities, especially in the gas 
sector. Ironically, while the Ukraine crises brought European energy security to the forefront 
of the European agenda, the fact that it was now a European Union led initiative made it 
vulnerable to attack by Fidesz. The EU’s proposal for an Energy Union and the Third 
Energy Package included increasing Brussels’ control over the domestic energy affairs of EU 
member states, which played into Orbán’s hands and allowed him to frame EU proposals as 
a violation of Hungarian sovereignty and an attack on Hungarian nationhood. Moreover, 
refuting EU policy on diversification issues also helped support his domestic initiative of 
social affordability by justifying the purchase of cheaper Russian gas over more expensive 
Western reverse flow volumes. 
To facilitate a dramatic change in the previous twenty years of Hungarian energy 
policy, Fidesz immediately embarked on a complete bureaucratic reorganization that 
weakened the civil service and concentrated power in the office of the Prime Minister. 
Parliament first abolished the Ministry for Environment and Water and placed it under the 
Ministry of Rural Development. Eventually, the bureaucracy was shuffled again, placing 
abolishing the Ministry of Rural Development into the Ministry of Agriculture, which now 
has control over the energy sector and environmental issues, but only as related to the 
commercial interests of Hungarian agriculture.431 Energy Policy was moved to the Ministry 
of National Development, which also housed the Ministry of State Property and 
Infrastructure, the sectors of the Hungarian economy that would become highly entangled 																																																								
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with energy and marred by corruption. Finally, although energy policy was officially under 
the purview of the Ministry of National Development, most decision-making on issues of 
national level policy came directly from Orbán himself, with the Ministry often left out of 
discussions entirely.432  
Along with modifying the bureaucracy, ruling Fidesz, which opposes climate change 
initiatives and energy saving policies, had almost complete control over energy issues due to 
its 2/3 supermajority in parliament. Because the largest opposition during this period was 
the far-right Jobbik party and Hungary’s Socialist Party (MSZP), neither of which had a 
strong position on energy, Fidesz was able to make dramatic changes almost immediately. By 
2011 the Orban government had modified 21 laws on energy, including passing nine 
different energy acts and legislation packages. Out of these nine, four acts were proposed 
individually by MPs, and three were related to the announcement of international legislation, 
leaving only two acts put forth directly by the government. By introducing legislation in this 
fashion, the government was able to bypass its obligation for administrative and professional 
discussion over the contents of the laws. This is further evidence that the government 
regarded energy policy as a state monopoly, over which political discussion was not 
warranted.  
Fidesz’s main legislation included the New Szechenyi Plan, the National Renewable 
Energy Action Plan of Hungary and the National Energy Strategy for 2030. Despite the lofty 
sounding titles, much of the content of the National Energy Strategy directly contradicted 
the National Climate Change Strategy, and shaped long-term energy strategies along current 
energy industry interests including granting key market roles to state-owned energy interests 
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against foreign owned companies.433 The most significant shift in policy was the emphasis on 
seeking a special relationship with Russia over the European Union. The Strategy states that, 
“Russia is Hungary’s most important energy partner,” and that Hungary should seek closer 
relations with Central European states that act as a “buffer” towards EU policy formulated in 
Brussels.434 This alignment with the Visegrad countries on issues of energy security reveals 
Orbán’s discomfort with EU proposals to increase control over the energy affairs of 
member states. Summarizing the perspective of the Poles and the Hungarians, Peter Hohaus 
of E.ON remarked, “It is not he role of the EU to enter into gas negotiations. […] open 
your markets, make liquid hubs, but please don’t propose things that remind me of the 
COMICON system.”435 
One of the cornerstones of Fidesz’s campaign was a plan to slash consumer utility 
prices, which had risen sharply over the years despite economic crisis. Much to the chagrin 
of the mostly foreign owned utility providers, upon election Fidesz introduced a moratorium 
on rising gas and electricity prices, eventually cutting consumer utility rates by more than 
25%. This became Fidesz’s silver bullet in the 2014 electoral campaign. Not only were 
companies required to comply with the directive, but they were also forced to promote cuts 
by telling consumers how much they had saved on their monthly utility bills. In 2013, a 
consortium of Hungarian gas companies won a lawsuit that would have obstructed the price 
reductions and Fidesz responded by launching a petition drive to prove that Hungarians 
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wanted to pay less. Orbán announced that these signature sheets would have the power of a 
referendum and announced on an interview with state-owned radio, “the international 
service providers have strong friends…it is necessary to unite for the sake of the national 
will, and protect the utility price reductions…This is a difficult battle, and my back is scarred 
by whips and cudgels…”436 The utility companies were forced to drop their protest. 
In 2011, Fidesz introduced a flat rate personal income tax rate of 16% and later 
introduced the EU’s lowest corporate tax rate of 9%.437 The corporate tax rate meant that 
Hungarian corporate taxes are lower than almost all other states except notorious island tax 
havens including the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. Orbán’s nationalist 
economic plan also included controversially nationalizing the pension fund, pledging full 
employment and increasing minimum wage. Naturally, these policies caused concern about 
where Hungary would secure the funds necessary for all of these dramatic changes. One way 
included making dramatic changes to the gas sector, including re-nationalizing parts of the 
national champion MOL. 
 
From Russia with Love: How Russia Helped Line Hungary’s Pockets with Gas Money 
 
 Between the summers of 2011 and 2015 Fidesz amended several acts on regulation 
in the gas trade, helping E.ON Trade Limited and a company known as MVM Partner 
Limited (MVMP) to take a privileged position on the Hungarian market. After abolishing 
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Hungary’s groundbreaking green energy feed in tariffs for electricity generation, Fidesz 
issued a government decree providing cheap gas to rural settlements and institutions that 
were now facing electricity shortages. To facilitate this, they released 585 million cubic 
meters of gas from Hungary’s strategic gas reserve. Then under the guise of maintaining 
Hungarian energy security by replenishing the strategic reserve, Fidesz issued regulation 
13/2011 (IV.7) and yearly updates (2012, 2013, 2014), decreeing that the HAG pipeline 
between Hungary and Austria could be used free of charge and without going before public 
auction (as mandated by the TEP). The government then authorized two companies: MET 
International AG and MOL Energy Trading Limited to purchase and redistribute the 
missing volumes of gas to Hungarian consumers and the strategic reserve. The companies 
did replace the 585 million cubic meters of gas and more: over the course of four years the 
companies imported over 19.6 billion cubic meters of gas from the Austrian border 
completely free of charge.  
 Why did the government allow these companies to bypass paying tariffs for 
imported gas beyond the replenishing of the strategic gas reserve? While the ultimate 
beneficiaries of this Byzantine scheme cannot be verified outright, Fidesz and its corporate 
supporters including a company called MET Ltd. benefited tremendously, and ultimately the 
government was able to buy back a 21% share in MOL through enormous tax profits and 
shady contracts. MET Ltd. was founded by MOL in late 2007, and in 2009 was transformed 
into a public limited company registered in Belize by a company called Normeston Trading 
Limited which is associated with Russian oil company Bashneft, a subsidiary of Rosneft and 
the Russian government.438 MET profited from the pipeline scheme by buying Russian gas 
																																																								
438 Interview with Benjamin Lakatos, MET Group CEO in Figyelo Business Weekly, January 
29, 2015. Bloomberg, “Company Overview of Normeston Trading Limited,” March 13, 2017.  
 288 	
from the Austrian hub and then selling the gas at the Austro-Hungarian border to MVMP, 
which would then import the gas through its free access to the pipeline, and altruistically sell 
the gas back to MET with no profit. MET then sold the gas for profit to the Hungarian 
state. This means that a Russian owned holding company with ties to the Kremlin was 
purchasing its own gas for a discount on the Austrian hub, shipping it for free, then selling 
to the Hungarians for another profit. This scheme was so profitable for the Hungarian 
government that in 2012 alone the tax profits were $225 million,439 which raised the alarm of 
all three main opposition parties (MSVP, Jobbik and LMP) who responded by filing 
complaints of misappropriation of state funds, fraud and money laundering. The National 
Office for Investigations found no evidence of a crime and ultimately refused to open an 
investigation. MSZP then requested to see the MET gas contracts and are still awaiting a 
court decision on the matter. 
 Beyond evidence of industry corruption, the MET saga became even more 
convoluted because it facilitated the eventual sale of stakes in MOL, as well as MET itself, to 
close associates of the Orbán regime. In 2011, the Hungarian government was able to 
purchase a 21.4% interest in MOL from Russia’s Surgutnyetyegaz.440 While Hungary painted 
this as a victory for Hungarian energy security and reasserting control over the national 
economy, the fortuitous timing of the sale indicate that it may have been part of the MET 
deal, and leverage for the upcoming contract negotiations between Hungary and Gazprom in 
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2014.441 In 2013, MET Holdings took over ownership of MET Hungary. To facilitate this 
deal, Normeston sold 2/3 of its shares in the company to holding companies registered to 
Istvan Garancsi and Gyorgy Nagy. Garancsi, head of the Videoton Football team, is known 
to be a close friend of Viktor Orbán and has been quoted saying that he is “tied” to Orbán 
with a “rope of friendship.” According to Forbes, since 2011 Garancsi has been his personal 
wealth grow by 24 billion HUF ($82m).442 The connections between the Orbán regime and 
Russia took an even more bizarre turn in fall of 2015 when two small Swiss and Roman 
newspapers published articles claiming that Orbán was travelling to Switzerland to conduct 
MET business with the Russians. A Hungarian energy expert told me that they interpreted 
the articles as a warning by foreign security services that they were watching the opaque 
deals between Hungary and Russia because the two articles appeared simultaneously in small 
newspapers that are not in the habit of breaking news of international economic importance. 
 
Hungary and Russia Reach a New Deal 
 All of these Byzantine arrangements took place in the context of the upcoming 
negotiations for the Russo-Hungarian gas contract. If the increasing web of ties between the 
regime and the Russians was not a clear enough signal of Hungary’s intentions, Orbán 
continued his program of framing his nationalist economic plan as reasserting Hungarian 
sovereignty from the Europeans, and in particular the Germans. In a speech in March of 
2014 announcing the completion of gas interconnectors between Hungary and Slovakia, 
Orbán stated:  
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This is the first time in the history of Hungary that we can very safely say that 
whatever happens to the east of us, and let us put that issue in brackets now, but 
only for today, gas will arrive in Hungary under all circumstances. If I add to this the 
fact, Ladies and Gentlemen, that in recent years, and I am sure you remember that 
there was a great deal of debate on the issue, Hungary eventually repurchased from 
the Germans the rights to contracts signed with the Russians and we previously 
repurchased our, in my view irresponsibly sold, natural gas reservoirs, and if we add 
to this the fact that the Hungarian State has acquired a 25 percent stake in one of 
Central Europe's largest companies, Mol, then taking all of these factors into account 
what I can tell you is that the Hungarian State has today in its possession everything 
required to ensure that, whatever may happen in the world, we will be able to 
predictably and securely supply the Hungarian economy and Hungary's households 
with natural gas.443 
 
To the consternation of the European Commission, following visits to Budapest by Vladimir 
Putin and Alexey Miller, Hungary halted reverse flow supplies to Ukraine. Helene Banner, 
European Commission spokeswoman, announced, “The message from the commission is 
very clear. We expect all member states to facilitate reverse flows as agreed by the European 
council in the interest of a shared energy security.”444 Orbán replied, “In the next period we 
will need large quantities of gas…we will receive this, I agreed this with Alexey Miller.” 
Although Hungary did eventually agree to re-start reverse flow, Orbán publically repeated 
Russian claims that reverse flow was an illegal violation of the “destination clauses” found in 
bi-lateral gas contracts.  
 During the run-up to the 2015 renegotiation with Gazprom, Hungary also 
abandoned its once vocal support for the Western-backed Nabucco pipeline project, instead 
joining Gazprom’s South Stream project in 2012. While the EU argued that Gazprom’s 
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South Stream pipeline would run afoul of European anti-trust laws, Orbán became more 
defiant, pushing legislators to approve an amendment allowing a company to construct a gas 
pipeline on Hungarian territory even if it did not have the licenses necessary to operate it.445 
Uproar in Brussels and Washington only underscored Orbán’s claim that the West was 
seeking to undermine Hungarian sovereignty over its own domestic affairs. In a speech in 
Munich, Orbán railed against the United States for pressuring Hungary to abandon South 
Stream, stating that Hungary’s support for the project had been caught up in “geopolitics, 
military policies and security policies,” and that it did not indicate increased support for 
Russia. “We don’t want to move closer to anyone, nor do we want to distance ourselves 
from anybody,” he claimed, stating instead that his policies were not “pro-Russian” but 
rather “pro-Hungary.”446 
 But on February 17, 2015 Orbán and Putin held a joint press conference in Budapest 
to announce the outcome of negotiations on replacing the 1996 gas contract. "Today we 
have agreed, taking into account our good relations and on the basis of mutual agreement of 
both sides, that gas which goes unused by Hungary can be used in the following years, and 
that we will pay for that gas when we get it. For us it's a great relief," said Orbán. "I thank 
President Putin for making it possible for the people and industry of Hungary to be supplied 
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with cheaper Russian gas. Without reliable supplies of Russian gas we would not be able to 
continue the work we are planning to carry out."447 
 Putin then took the stage and announced that Russia had agreed to cancel Hungary’s 
“take-or-pay” obligation in the new contract as a gesture of goodwill towards Russia’s 
“Hungarian friends”. As part of the deal Gazprom also allowed additional volumes of 
underground storage in its Hungarian gas storage facilities. In return, Hungary signed a long-
term contract locking the Hungarian market into buying gas exclusively from Russia for the 
following six years. At this same meeting, Putin also announced that due to the close 
friendship between the two states, Russia had agreed to extend a €10 billion loan to Hungary 
to finance an expansion of its Paks nuclear plant, which generates over 60% of Hungarian 
electricity.  
 Accepting a deal which guaranteed Hungarian access to cheap energy supplies does 
not necessarily indicate a major realignment of its energy relations, but after announcing the 
deal the Hungarian government made a number of policy decisions that demonstrate that 
Hungary was not only looking for a cheap deal, but also making conscious choices to 
increase its dependence on Russian commodities. Current Hungarian energy security centers 
on a large increase in nuclear power generation, which will be provided by Russia’s money 
and the nuclear fuel on which Paks is entirely reliant. The expansion of Paks, built by 
Russia’s Rosatam, includes two new nuclear power generators, with a capacity of 2,400MW. 
Financed entirely through the Russian loan, the Paks facility completely undermines the 
stated government goal of increasing energy independence.  
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“The Sun Never Shines at Night!”448 
 After the announcement of the Paks deal, the government placed serious restrictions 
on renewable energy projects that might have decreased the need for increased nuclear 
capacity and therefore increased dependence on Russia. Recent legislation by Fidesz 
prohibits the installation of wind turbines within a 12 km radius around any settlement, 
which de facto prohibits new projects in the entire country, and also introduced a huge levy 
on solar panels.449 In March of 2017 a new electricity grid usage fee for household renewable 
energy plants over 4kw will further decrease investment in renewables. This is part of 
Orbán’s tactic of keeping energy prices artificially low through state control, which 
discourages investment in energy efficiency or on demand-side management measures to 
decrease energy consumption.450 Although Hungary has committed to EU renewable targets, 
it consistently develops programs in accordance with EU frameworks, takes EU funds and 
then fails to implement the goals. This is not surprising considering that over 80% of 
Hungarian public investment between 2011-2013 originated from the European Union. For 
a European state, Hungary has a very small share of renewables in its energy mix, only 10% 
of final consumption. Although it has signed onto EU initiatives, Hungary is unlikely to 
meet its 2020 renewables target of 14.65% with current regulations in place. This shortfall is 
not due to lack of opportunity: Hungary has significant potential for renewables and 
increased energy efficiency. According to a recent study, 2,800 MW of wind and 1400MW of 																																																								
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solar capacity could be installed by 2030, which along with much needed energy efficiency 
improvements would render the Paks nuclear facility obsolete. 
 Despite the ease with which Fidesz has been able to make major energy security 
decisions, the Paks deal did garner significant criticism from domestic political opposition 
and the European Union. One major issue of concern was that at a time when the European 
Commission has made transparency in energy markets a top priority, the Paks deal is 
extremely opaque, with even the annual cost to Hungary’s national budget classified as a 
state secret. Recently, Hungarian parliament passed legislation stripping the country’s nuclear 
regulatory oversight over Paks and giving that responsibility directly to Orbán’s government. 
While the European Commission can launch investigations into potential misappropriation 
of EU funds, the EC released a statement explaining,  
It remains a fact that member states are free to choose between different energy 
sources and on the general structure of their energy supply. This can be seen as an 
imperfection of an inefficiency of the EU treaties, as it limits the options to design a 
truly common energy policy and ensure member states’ technological and political 




 Despite a promising start to diversification in the 1990s and 2000s, Hungary has 
become increasingly reliant on Russian commodities since the election of Orbán in 2010. 
Overall, net imports account for 62% of energy consumption.452 Energy dependence for oil 
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is 82%, natural gas 78% and 100% for nuclear fuel.453 When including nuclear fuel in import 
calculations, Hungary’s total import dependence on Russian commodities for 2015 rises to 
80%.454 Oddly, the Orbán government uses increasing “energy security” as an argument to 
justify its plans to expand the Paks facility and to increase reliance on Russian gas. Although 
Hungarian policy makers have shunned EU led efforts at diversification, “energy 
independence” remains a crucial component of Orbán’s nationalist rhetoric. Hungary’s 
refusal to participate in renewable energy and energy efficiency schemes illustrates the 
government’s unrealistic assumptions and retrograde reflexes from Soviet times. To provide 
cheap energy to its people at all costs it must build the nuclear facility and take over the 
energy industry in order to control prices. According to a Hungarian energy expert, “Russian 
state and state owned companies are good at serving this type of energy policy, this is the 
policy they understand and can work with.”455 
 Orbán’s successful takeover of Hungarian institutions required several political and 
rhetorical scapegoats. First, his program of re-asserting Hungarian sovereignty and anti-
establishment populism necessitated an attack on the European institutions that were 
promoting an agenda of centralized control over European energy policy. This was 
facilitated by the fact that around the time of his election Germany was taking a leading role 
in pushing for increased control over the European agenda and many Hungarians felt that 
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Germany was not a good advocate for Hungarian interests.456 Second, much of Orbán’s 
electoral success rested on his promises to reduce utility costs, which required a takeover of 
the largely foreign-owned energy sector. The simultaneous renationalization of the energy 
sector paired with an attack on institutional oversight and democratic backslide led to a 
proliferation of corruption. As the institutions that once protected the state against venal 
interests were destroyed and civil society marginalized, new opportunities for profit for 
actors close to the regime emerged. Faced with major challenges in its traditional market, 
Russia was eager to expand its reach into the Hungarian market, especially with Orbán 
welcoming with open arms. The abandonment of diversification in favor of active 
dependence served Orbán’s domestic political goal of consolidating the power of his illiberal 
regime. The Western liberal crisis precipitated by a sweeping sense of malaise over the 
uneven distribution of benefits of globalization was particularly hard felt in Hungary, which 
experienced a devastating economic crisis in 2009. This made populist attacks on elite 
institutions like the European Union particularly attractive in Hungary, and no doubt 
contributed to Orbán’s ability to swiftly dismantle years of progress based on liberal rule of 
law traditions.  
 On February 3, 2017, Putin once again travelled to Budapest to meet with Orbán 
and reaffirm their close energy partnership. During the press conference Orbán revealed that 
“Hungary’s gas needs are ensured until 2021,” and that Hungary had also decided to embark 
on a program to renovate Russian Orthodox Churches in Hungary. He further announced 
that the renovation of all of Budapest’s metro cars would take place in Russia, and that 
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Russia was ready to extend a further loan of €12 billion for the Paks nuclear project.457 
Notably, Orbán announced that while all matters between Russia and Hungary had been 
resolved in a satisfactory manner, the only threat to Hungarian energy security was the 
European Union.  
 
We agreed that we have already eliminated the majority of obstacles. One issue 
remains open and we are waiting for an EU decision on it. We are convinced that 
our agreements are fully in compliance with EU requirements and we very much 
hope that this year we will be able to begin preparations and go ahead with 
construction in 2018. The European Union has blocked something that would have 
served the interests of Hungary. I should tell you that Hungary is not in a very 
friendly environment. We have neighbours in the European Union. We are members 
of the European Union. Hungary has built its capacities in the direction of both 
Croatia and Romania, from where we could receive alternative supplies, but neither 
Croatia nor Romania – nor the European Union, if you will – has for its part built 
these capacities so that we could provide reverse flow supplies and also receive 
supplies from there. In other words, Hungary is blocked from the south.458 
 
For his part, Putin announced, “Hungary is, without a doubt, one of Russia’s most 
important and reliable partners in Europe. Our countries conduct a regular political dialogue, 
our foreign ministries have close contacts, and our Intergovernmental Commission 
on Economic Issues is working effectively.”459 
 While the Lithuanian example show how it is possible but difficult it is to break the 
cycle of energy dependence, the Hungarian example demonstrates how easy it is to turn 
away from independence. Hungary emerged at the end of the Cold War as a shining example 
of reform, becoming one of the first former communist states to embrace rule of law 
democracy and the West. But the election of Orbán amidst a global political atmosphere of 																																																								
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unrest undid years of institutional reform in just a short period of time. Fidesz’s nationalist 
economic policy encouraged a culture of corruption around favored sectors, particularly 
energy, and shifted its energy alignments against the European Union and back towards 
Russia. Today, Hungary is one of Russia’s staunchest supporters on the international stage, 
with Oráan praising Putin’s regime in his notorious “illiberal democracy” speech.460  
Nowhere has the renewed relationship manifested itself more than in the energy 
sector. Hungary is more reliant on Russian commodities than it was any other period since 
independence. Hungary’s abandonment of diversification and embrace of active dependence 
illustrate the dangers of institutional backslide for the security of the state. Although 
Hungary remains a member of the EU and NATO, it is more vulnerable than ever to a 
change in Russia’s incentives. While it is unlikely that Russia would turn off Hungary’s taps, 
the entire point of energy security policy is to be prepared for the unexpected, a lesson the 
United States learned the hard way during the 1973 oil crisis. Abandoning diversification in 
favor of increased dependence on a dominant supplier may have domestic political benefits 
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Chapter 8 - CONCLUSION 
 
“Sometimes I think that maybe it would be best if our bear just sat still. Maybe he should 
stop chasing pigs and boars around the taiga but start picking berries and eating honey. 
Maybe then he will be left alone. But no, he won’t be! Because someone will always try 
to chain him up. As soon as he’s chained they will tear out his teeth and claws.” 





Russian president Vladimir Putin once described the fall of the Soviet Union as “the 
greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”462 But more than 25 years later, the legacies 
of the Soviet Union continue to have profound effects on the economic and political 
trajectories of former satellite states. The system of centrally managed dependence left 
Russia with vast resources, but many states struggling to meet their most basic energy needs. 
Surprisingly, many of these states did not seek long-term solutions to their dependence, but 
instead maintained a system of inefficiency and insecurity vis-à-vis their main supplier, 
Russia. Others invested significant economic and political resources to moving away from 
Russian commodities and its geopolitical influence. The popular media often accuses the 
Kremlin of wielding energy as a weapon, but more puzzling is why states leave themselves 
vulnerable to energy coercion.  Why and under what conditions do states pursue energy security? 
Conversely, why do some highly dependent states fail to maximize their security vis-à-vis a dominant supplier?  
I have argued that to understand the complex nature of energy dependence and 
security it is necessary to look beyond energy markets to domestic political capture and 
institutional design. Throughout this dissertation I have argued that initial reform choices 																																																								
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guiding transition had long-lasting affects on the ability to make coherent policy choices. 
States that did not move away from Soviet era property rights empowered actors with an 
interest in maintaining the status quo of dependence. Others that instituted de facto 
democratic property rights to guide their energy transitions were able to block energy veto 
players and move towards a security maximizing diversification policy. Although the 
institutional legacies of the Soviet Union had long-lasting effects on all states in the region, I 
argued that all states were not doomed to path dependency. Change is possible in both 
directions: towards and away from the institutional reform that facilitates energy security. 
One interesting finding of this dissertation was that new financial tools of globalization 
facilitate the type of grand transnational corruption that plagues the energy sector. Thus 
while I argue that energy security in Eurasia is largely a story of the long shadow of Soviet 
institutions, globalization has provided new avenues for corruption and reinforced Soviet 
patterns of elite resource distribution. 
To evaluate the conditions under which states pursued diversification or active 
dependence policies, in Chapter Three I presented an original dataset and index of energy 
dependence on Russia using new measures including contract favorability and ownership of 
infrastructure and other downstream energy assets. This index demonstrates that some states 
are even more dependent on Russian commodities than standard indexes would estimate, 
and also demonstrates more nuanced changes in dependency over time according to changes 
the gas contracts that oversee trade. Chapter Four was an initial step towards quantitative 
generalizability. I have amassed a large dataset and will embark on full-scale quantitative 
analysis as the next step of the project. However, empirical testing of institutional 
development is accompanied by methodological difficulties. The next stage of this project 
will encompass research design strategies to best make use of this new large body of data. 
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The cross-national quantitative data suggests that weak property rights lead to 
increased energy dependence. However, measuring Soviet institutional legacies and elite 
networks is a complex endeavor and existing measures of these sorts of institutions are 
highly imperfect. In order to elucidate the mechanisms of my causal process, I supplemented 
the cross-national statistical data with three case studies based on eighteen months of field 
work in the region: Ukraine, Lithuania and Hungary.   
First, I evaluated the mechanisms of the Strong Players, Weak Rules theory through 
the case of energy security in post-Soviet Ukraine and found support for the mechanism 
through which failed institutional reforms facilitated corruption and led to increased levels of 
energy dependence on Russia. At transition, Ukraine was left with an energy intensive heavy 
industry centered developed strategy with few resources to power it. During the Soviet 
period Moscow drained Ukraine’s substantial natural gas reserves for export to Western 
Europe, leaving Kiev heavily dependent on Russian gas to meet its domestic energy needs. 
Further, because during the Soviet period energy policy was managed centrally in Moscow 
rather than at the Republic level, Ukraine was left with poor infrastructure that had been 
designed to transit gas across its territory rather than to connect grids within the country. 
Throughout the post-Soviet period Ukraine faced a serious problem of energy insecurity, 
and yet policymakers were unable successfully confront the issue. In fact, even after the 2006 
and 2009 crisis, Ukraine increased its dependence on Moscow rather than seeking to 
decrease it. I argued that a failure to restructure the property rights regime to guide transition 
empowered energy veto players with an interest in maintaining ties to Moscow. Because 
policy makers did not construct a property rights regime to guide the privatization process, 
oligarchs were able to capture valuable state resources: Soviet era distribution of assets not 
only continued after independence, but proliferated under new market conditions. I 
 302 	
demonstrate that energy veto players blocked reforms in favor of upholding status quo in 
which they were making enormous profits off of the state. Further, the complete 
institutionalization of corruption around the energy sector through constitutional, judicial 
and legislative reform upheld a system that sacrificed Ukrainian energy security for the venal 
interests of policymakers and private actors.  
As of April 2017, Ukraine is currently importing no volumes of gas from Russia, and 
is instead receiving reverse flow volumes from EU member states. But despite a pledge from 
the new government in Kiev to increase energy security, significant obstacles remain. First, 
part of the reason for Ukraine’s dramatic decrease in reliance on Russian imports stems from 
the fact that industrial production in the war-torn eastern regions has collapsed. In the first 
quarter of 2015 alone, Ukraine experienced a 17.6% decline in economic output while 
industrial production declined more than 20%. European reverse flow imports are not only 
more expensive than Russian pipeline gas, but will not be enough to meet the needs of a 
rebuilt industrial sector. Second, although Ukraine has adopted a number of legislative 
measures including the 2015 Law on the Gas Sector, compliance will be near impossible 
given the nature of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Adding to the gloomy outlook is the fact 
that since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, Russia has committed to a policy 
of diversifying gas transit away from Ukraine as early as 2019. While completely 
circumventing Ukraine is unlikely, Kiev must skillfully negotiate its future as a gas transit 
state either with Gazprom or with European consumers. Although Kiev has made inroads 
into battling endemic corruption, Ukraine is still run by many of the same oligarchs who 
stymied energy sector reform for years. Re-aligning Ukraine’s energy interests towards 
diversification remains an immense challenge that will require massive amounts of economic 
and political capital. 
 303 	
Next, I examined the case of post-Soviet Lithuania as an outlying case that broke 
from path dependent active dependence to embrace a diversification policy. Like Ukraine, 
upon independence Lithuania was left in the unfortunate position of possessing an energy 
intensive economy and few domestic resources. Even worse, Lithuania was an energy island, 
in that it had no infrastructure connections to its neighbors and was not a significant transit 
state. After a difficult path paved with corruption and scandal, ultimately Lithuania invested 
significant resources towards diversifying its energy supply away from Russian commodities. 
Today Lithuania is a leader in Baltic energy security and acts as a model for other states 
seeking to break the yoke of energy dependence. I argued that Lithuania was able to break 
from path dependence due to a volatile political system and a fortuitous alignment between 
the European Union and Lithuanian political actors energy aims. Following the Ukraine 
crises, the pursuit of a cohesive EU level energy security policy was at the forefront of both 
European and Lithuanian agendas, which facilitated the transfer of huge amounts of EU aid 
to help restructure the Lithuanian energy sector. The Lithuanian case has the interesting 
implication that despite democratic reforms, breaking active dependence and Soviet 
institutional legacies is exceptionally difficult. Even after Lithuania had joined the European 
Union, informal Soviet institutions in property rights and the energy sector was a major 
obstacle towards reform. But the case of Lithuania shows that where significant resources 
can be specifically earmarked towards energy reform, change is possible. Lithuania’s 
rejection of Russian commodities and subsequent foreign policy alignment away from 
Moscow demonstrate that the employment of EU aid can undermine the cross-national 
investment networks that support Russian foreign policy aims in the region.  
Finally I examine post-Soviet Hungary’s energy policy as a crucial case that lacks the 
primary independent variable of nomenklatura property rights and long-term initial 
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conditions of my theory, but has the anticipated outcome of active dependence energy 
policy. One of the most aggressive post-Soviet reformers, Hungary began the 1990s with a 
clear diversification policy, taking active measures to increase energy efficiency, storage and 
even supply diversification. But following the election of right-wing populist leader Viktor 
Orbán in 2010, Budapest has not only dramatically increased its reliance on Russian 
commodities, but has taken active measures to stymie energy efficiency and green energy 
initiatives. The Hungarian example provides a good illustration on the dangers of overall 
institutional backslide, where attacks on democratic oversight, the court system and rule of 
law led to a proliferation of corruption in strategic sectors of the economy, including energy. 
Further, Orbán’s brand of populism is centered on an attack on the European institutions 
that promote an agenda of centralized control of the European energy policy of 
diversification. Interestingly, the Hungarian case provides evidence for the destabilizing 
interactive effects of old institutional arrangements and new global financial tools. Part of 
the reason the new regime was able to gain control over the previously commercialized 
energy sector was through the availability of mechanisms that walk the line between legal 
and illegal activities such as multinational companies, offshore financial vehicles, and 
complex layers of acquisitions. Thus while corruption is often based on local and regional 
ties between elites, the mechanism through which they achieve their goals are embedded in 
globalization itself.463  
Despite strong support for the Strong Players, Weak Rules theory, not all cases are 
fully consistent with energy security’s alignment with institutional reform. Despite strong 
institutional development and high transparency, Germany has increased its reliance on 																																																								
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Russian commodities over time. Business ties between Russian and German firms are a 
strong lobby in German politics and has wielded significant influence over German foreign 
policy. Recent attempts by Brussels to make bilateral gas contracts transparent were shut 
down by fierce opposition by two strange political bedfellows: Germany and Hungary. 
Further, despite the protestations of Eastern European countries including Poland claiming 
Gazprom is using its energy as a foreign policy tool against energy dependent countries, 
Germany has been a strong supporter of Gazprom’s attempt to construct a second Nord 
Stream pipeline. In this case, the even in the absence of the corruption that so often plagues 
the energy sector, the effect of strong commercial interests might be a predominant factor in 




 Although this project was focused on the particular legacies of the post-Communist 
world, the theories and implications generated here can also apply to natural gas dependent 
states in other regions, as well as to other industries with similar quasi-regional structures 
including water, telecoms, internet and even high-speed rails. In the following section I 
briefly outline the applicability of this project to the cases of energy dependence in Israel, 
and water dependence in Central Asia. 
 
Contemporary Israeli Energy Security 
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“Let me tell you something that we Israelis have against Moses. He took us 40 years through 
the desert in order to bring us to the one spot in the Middle East that has no oil.”464 
-Golda Meir 
 
 Israel’s lack of energy security has long troubled policymakers as it was highly 
dependent on energy imports and had no diplomatic relations with its neighbors until 1979. 
In 2012, only 13.4%465 of Israel’s energy was domestically produced, and like Lithuania, 
Israel was an energy island with no infrastructure links to its neighboring states and thus no 
transit regime. In many ways, Israel’s energy dependence was even more extreme than states 
in Eastern Europe: although Israel could import oil, the percentage of natural gas in its fuel 
mix has risen steadily over the past several decades and its import options are extremely 
limited. Israel’s immediate neighbor Egypt has faced acute natural gas shortages: currently 
many of Egypt’s LNG plants are idle due to lack of supply. Jordan is likewise dependent on 
the same sources. Deteriorating relations with Turkey and Palestine greatly limited Israel’s 
options, and of course, the Arab world remains fundamentally opposed to trade and 
relations. Throughout the past several decades Israel began exploring other options of 
supply diversification, considering Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and even Kurdistan, but were 
ultimately unable to make a deal. Instead, Israel cobbled together a policy based on 
expensive LNG limited imports from Egypt. 
 But in 2012 two developments occurred that forced Israel to re-evaluate its tenuous 
energy security policy. First, repeated terrorist attacks on a gas pipeline linking Israel and 
Egypt in the Sinai desert completely halted the supply of gas to both Israel and Jordan. 
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Resumption of supplies was unlikely because after the collapse of the Mubarak regime Egypt 
was facing domestic gas shortages, and providing gas to Israel was politically controversial. 
Critics of the former regime claimed that providing gas to Israel was part of a corrupt pact to 
sell off Egypt’s strategic reserves while funneling cash to the Mubaraks.466 Immediately, 
Israel faced a critical energy shortage, resulting in blackouts. Second, in 2010 a partnership 
between Noble Energy and the Israeli Delek group discovered significant offshore natural 
gas deposits in Israeli waters with enormous potential for both increasing Israeli energy 
security and state revenues. Stanley Fisher, the outgoing governor of the bank of Israel 
estimated that domestic gas sale revenue from one field alone would be $24 billion by 
2027.467  
 But surprisingly the discovery of gas reserves did not translate into greater energy 
security. At the time of writing, over seven years since the discovery of the reserves, Israeli 
gas has not yet made it to the domestic market. Part of the reason for this was a major 
disagreement between the government, citizens and the Noble-Delek consortium over 
taxation, regulatory issues, export licenses and anti-trust action. In 2011 there were massive 
protests against the extent to which “tycoons” controlled the Israeli economy and political 
system. One such tycoon, Yitzhak Tshuva, was the owner of Delek Energy. Citizens were 
concerned that the tax regime, based on laws from 1952, would give away huge amounts of 
wealth to Delek and other powerful corporations. Under the law, royalties would be capped 
at 12.5% and allowed for huge tax write offs that seemed the exclude the public from the 
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benefits of the gas discoveries.468 In response to the public concern a commission was 
formed to investigate potential new regulation and legislation, but the commission was 
immediately the victim of sustained media attacks by groups associated with the oligarchs. 
 The shareholders of Delek argued that “communist” approaches to the development 
of the reserves allowed for the stealing of private property and insisted on both a 
monopolistic position in the market and the right to sell as much Israeli gas as possible to 
foreign buyers. Although the government attempted several times to come to resolve these 
issues in order to get the gas to market as quickly as possible, Noble and Delek held out for 
better terms. Finally, the government relented and decided to allocated 60% for domestic 
usage and 40% for export. Critics of the government claim that the 60-40 decision was 
pushed through the cabinet without necessary parliamentary approval.469 Finally in late 2016 
and against fierce political opposition, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
authorized the gas project, although the terms of the much debated taxation regime remain 
unclear. To proceed with the project Netanyahu signed Section 52, overriding anti-trust rules 
and preserving a cartel in the gas industry.  In response, on February 23, 2017 Noble Energy 
approved $3.75b for the first phase of extraction from the Leviathan field. Netanyahu 
announced, “The move would give Israel gas supply, and promote cooperation with the 
countries of the region.”470 
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 But rather than invest in ensuring Israeli energy security, Noble and Delek first 
signed an LTC with Jordan for $500 million worth of Israeli gas. On March 3, 2017 the first 
volumes reached Jordan. The Israeli story is full of domestic political complexities, but the 
essential facts are that despite severe energy insecurity, Israel was unable to make use of its 
own domestic resources for the better part of a decade. This is largely due to corruption and 
the immense power of energy veto players who the government could or would not force to 
work for Israel’s security interests rather than their own commercial interests. Moreover, 
despite the wishes of Israeli citizens, who felt that the resource was commonly owned, the 
Noble-Delek consortium refused to proceed with the project until their own demands for 
export potential were met. Netanyahu’s willingness to skirt institutional processes in favor of 
the tycoons raises questions of collusion and cronyism. Indeed, Netanyahu’s government has 
been accused of facilitating a backroom deal that favored the interests of the tycoons over 
those of the Israeli state—Yaron Zelicha, an economist and former finance ministry official 
called the gas deal “organized robbery” at the highest levels of government.471 
 Israel, like the states of the former Soviet Union, has undergone a significant 
economic and political transformation from socialism to a free-market. Within the political 
context of single party rule for nearly thirty years, Israel’s market reforms allowed large 
business interests to gain enormous political influence. Although a transition to a free market 
had begun in earnest by the 1980s, organizational changes in the 1990s increased the pace of 
privatization and streamlined the oversight process. First, the government formed a small 
ministerial committee for privatization and then passed legislation that gave the Government 
Companies Authority (which supervised state-owned enterprises) more power over the 
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privatization process.472 The effect of empowering a small number of actors with vested 
interests in state-controlled enterprises was problematic and led to a flawed privatization. 
Although cronyism was not as severe as places like Ukraine, privatization created significant 
inequality and a class of powerful tycoons with complete control over sectors of the 
economy including telecoms, media, banking shipping, chemicals and of course, energy. The 
recent inability of the government to extract natural gas from the new fields is an excellent 
example of the danger of empowering a class of actors with veto power over strategic energy 
reserves. 
 
Central Asian “Water Wars” 
 
“Water resources could become a problem in the future that could escalate tensions not only 
in our region, but on every continent!”473 
-Former President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov  
 
 As energy resources become increasingly scarce, energy dependency has become a 
major policy and theoretical point of discussion. But other quasi-regionally traded 
commodities can have also have a significant effect on both state security and relations with 
neighboring states. Commodities that require extensive cross-border infrastructure systems 
to transport or manage require investments on the part of both the upstream and 
downstream state. Like natural gas, the nature of such commodities including water, 
telecoms, and internet can be halted by one party due to the infrastructure on sovereign 
territory. For years, concerns over a potential “water war” in Central Asia has loomed large. 																																																								
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Although this has not yet come to pass, disruptions in supply have already led to skirmishes 
and unrest. Over twenty-five years after independence, Central Asian states have been 
unable to come to a long-term agreement over the distribution of water resources, leaving 
the downstream countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan dangerously 
dependent on the whims of the upstream states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with whom there 
are contentious diplomatic relations. 
 During the Soviet period development strategies were encouraged based on shared 
resources. Although Uzbekistan lacks access to water, its economy was reliant on water-
intensive cotton production. To manage the flow of water, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which 
both have abundant water resources, would release water from their reservoirs in spring and 
summer to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In return the downstream states 
would ship and coal supplies upstream each winter. This barter system worked well under 
the Soviet system when resources were centrally managed by Moscow rather than via bi-
lateral negotiations. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union a rapidly rising population, 
limited arable land and inefficient farming methods exacerbated tensions over water 
distribution. Similar to many of the energy dependent states in Eastern Europe, water 
dependency in the downstream republics is worsened by a continued failure to modernize 
the water dependent sectors of energy and agriculture. 
 Despite the lack of water security, states of Central Asia were unable to agree on a 
regional framework for water. Both the Nukus Agreement of 1995 and the Syr Dara 
agreement broke down soon after signing. Uzbekistan, which requires Tajik water to irrigate 
its cotton fields, was particularly threatened because of a long-standing political dispute 
between former Uzbek president Islam Karimov and Tajik president Emomali Rahmon. The 
animosity between the two leaders was so severe that according to an incredible U.S 
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diplomatic cable, Rahmon bragged that he got into a brawl with Karimov at a CIS Summit in 
Sochi in 2004. “As both men grabbed each other by the collars, former Ukrainian President 
Leonid Kuchma pulled the dueling president’s apart. Rahmon claimed to have had the last 
word: ‘Anyway Samarkand and Bukhara will be ours again one day!’”474 
 Although the downstream republics have suffered from a lack of secure water 
supplies, upstream states are also threatened. In January 2009 (coincidentally during the same 
period as the second Ukrainian gas crisis) a major power cut left the Tajik capital of 
Dushanbe in complete darkness. The crisis had severe human costs: one of the back up 
generators at a major hospital failed during the blackout leading to the deaths of several 
babies in the neo-natal unit. Ultimately it was determined that the power cut was caused by 
corrupt mismanagement of the water system. Due to political capture by actors close to the 
regime, both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan started using more water to generate electricity in the 
winter, thus leaving less available to reach the downstream states that then held up promised 
shipments of fuels.  
Endemic corruption undermined several regional projects aimed at managing the 
transnational water relationships in Central Asia. Funded by the Asian Development Bank, 
World Bank and the UK’s Department for International Development, the Taza Suu Project 
in Kyrgyzstan was aimed at improving water supply corridors to over 730 villages. After 
more than $66m had been allocated but little progress had been made, the Asian 
Development Bank opened an investigation into corruption, discovered that $52m had been 
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stolen, and cancelled the project.475 More puzzling however, was Tajikistan’s failure to begin 
construction of the long-heralded Rogun Dam project. In theory, the dam would allow 
Tajikistan to sell electricity to Afghanistan and South Asia, commercializing its long 
underutilized commodity and giving the country more control over its resource. Despite the 
potential transformative nature of this project, it has been delayed for years due to 
incompetence and corruption. Tajikistan spent much of 2016 seeking a bailout from the 
IMF of $500 million, but now Dushanbe bailed out the country’s major banks with the 
issuance of debt securities with money that seemingly appeared out of nowhere.476  Finally, in 
late 2016, two months after the death of Karimov who had openly threatened war if the 
project was completed, Tajikistan began construction on the project. 
Now, over twenty-five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its resource 
distribution system, the states of Central Asia are no closer to securing their water and 
electricity needs. Ironically, the five states rank among the top 11 most wasteful water 
consumers in the world. Turkmenistan, which has scarce access to domestic water resources, 
has the world’s highest per capita water consumption rates, four times that of the United 
States and 13 times greater than China.477 In both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan water and 
electricity industries prop up the regime with hard currency, and so there is little incentive 
for reform or to make desperately needed efficiency adjustments.478 Although the Rogun 
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Dam project has been resumed, underlying corruption has not been addressed and it is 
unlikely that the project will be completed in the coming years. Arguably the most crucial 
human resource, a lack of secure access to water leaves the states of Central Asia 
dangerously dependent on one another. The inability to successfully manage water relations 
is puzzling from an international relations perspective, which assumes that states want to 
maximize security by diversifying supply, or at the very least not endangering their access to 
a crucial commodity. 
Central Asia’s lack of political transformation after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
left it one of the most corrupt regions in the world. Although there was almost no real 
political or institutional transition—the leaders of Central Asia are largely Soviet era elites 
who never left the political sphere—elites have taken advantage of globalization to increase 
their control over strategic industries and assets including water and energy. Heathershaw 
and Cooley (2015) argue that elites in Central Asia have used global financial institutions and 
offshore vehicles to control nominally state-owned assets, launder money through shell 
companies and structure side payments via the same post-Soviet business networks and 
global financial institutions that have facilitated energy corruption in East and Central 
Europe.479 The nomenklatura property rights regime that favored insiders with privileged 
access to the regime was exacerbated by a post-Soviet convergence with modern capitalism, 
leading to endemic and spectacular corruption across strategic sectors including water and 
energy. The case of water mismanagement in Central Asia is in many ways a more extreme 
example of the dangers of the persistence of Soviet era informal institutions and their 
interactions with modern globalized capitalism. That these institutional legacies can have 
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such a profound effect not only on the security of a states but on the everyday lives of 
citizens demonstrates the need for further research into the specific mechanisms by which 
globalization facilitates Soviet era networks. 
Theoretical Implications 
 
The end of the Cold War brought with it a hope for liberalism and the triumph of 
Western norms of rule of law, transparency and democratic property rights. But energy, one 
area in which Moscow maintained significant influence over its former satellite states, 
revealed the extent to which de facto institutional arrangements remain resistant to change 
and are even perpetuated by global financial instruments. Recent events, including the 
spectacular collapse of Ukraine and the Hungarian return to Moscow’s embrace demonstrate 
the fragile intersection of security and energy dependence. This study generates insights on 
the future of energy dependence in theory as well as in practice. 
The findings of this study have a number of implications for future academic 
research. First, although international relations literature has long moved beyond the 
conception of states as unitary actors, there is still a need to examine new and relevant 
categories for analysis. One such actor is business elites, whose international and domestic 
connections have important implications not only for trade, but also for state security. The 
example of sub-national actors such as gas middlemen that can have profound and 
deleterious effects on the energy security of states like Ukraine demonstrates the need to 
more fully understand this category of actor and their effects on state security. Rawi 
Abdelal’s work emphasizing the multi-national firm and even personal connections as 
distinct and important actors of international relations is an important step in the right 
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direction,480 but as I have demonstrated in this project, understanding the role of individual 
business elites and their effects on geopolitics is similarly crucial.  
One key implication from the Lithuanian case study is that despite major democratic 
and institutional reforms, EU membership, and an overall pro-Western attitude, elite 
business ties in strategic sectors can significantly influence policy and hamper reform. 
Academics have tended to categorize regimes in terms of democracy and non-democracy, 
but these categories mask important factors like business environments, the decision-making 
environment and the ties between them. The endurance of Soviet era institutions in certain 
economic sectors continues to have an affect on foreign policy decision-making and security. 
Although the Baltic States have been staunch NATO supporters against a potential Russian 
challenge in the region, interviews conducted in Lithuania during the summer of 2015 
indicate that powerful business lobbies remain wary of endangering profitable relationships 
with Russia. In the European context, understanding the economic interests of business 
actors is essential for determining geopolitical alignments. In many instances, the interests of 
business actors in small states may be more aligned with Russia than previously thought, and 
understanding how these interests inform politics is crucial.  
More generally, the relationship between Russia and the West is multi-faceted due to 
economic concerns on one hand and security concerns on the other. This study 
demonstrates that the two interact in ways we have not yet systematically explored before. 
While academic literature has tended to disaggregate economic and security concerns into 
disparate fields, the study of energy security demonstrates that this should not always be the 
case. The study of globalization, capitalism, trade and new financial tools should not be 
relegated to the field of international political economy, because as the Ukraine and Central 																																																								
480 Abdelal, “The Multinational Firm,” 2015. 
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Asian water cases demonstrate, trade and corruption can have profound effects on the 
physical security of a state. Currently Ukraine is facing a major energy crisis and risks falling 
into anarchy because rebels in the Eastern provinces have grabbed control over the 
country’s important coal and coke supplies. Without access to Russian gas supplies or its 
own domestic coal, the country’s armed forces will not be able to operate and the economy 
may collapse.  
In this study, I have argued that the interaction between domestic institutional 
reform and contemporary capitalism can have profound effects not only on a state’s 
economic future, but also on its security. Although there is a large literature on the 
pernicious effect of corruption on good governance, understanding the extent to which 
failed reforms can harm security outcomes beyond energy is critical. Moreover, new global 
financial tools offer new avenues for corruption and may shift the loci of power away from 
G8 states towards developing economies. Recent scholarship by Sharman, Cooley and others 
has demonstrated the need for a more profound understanding of financial globalization, 
transnational corruption and their effects on international relations. 481  This project 
demonstrates that the effect of these new tools can amplify the threat to national and 
economic security posed by stagnant institutional reform. Further research would do well to 
explore how the model of crony capitalism exported by Russia to other illiberal regimes is 
supported by globalization and exacerbates security concerns. 
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 Energy issues have enormous consequences for overall diplomatic relations. 
Although energy is only a facet in the relationship between Russia and the West, the findings 
of this dissertation reveal a potential reason for why Russia is so steadfastly set against the 
expansion of European Union association agreements.  
The case of Lithuania demonstrates that significant amounts of EU aid can in fact 
succeed in disrupting the cross-national investment networks that support Russian foreign 
policy in the region. Although Lithuania’s ability to make use of the funds was due to a 
fortuitous alignment between the political actors at the time and the availability of funds 
earmarked specifically for energy security, the fact remains that these funds did change the 
incentives of actors away from Russian interests and towards European ones. Lithuania may 
be viewed as the canary in the coalmine for Russian energy interests in the Baltics and 
beyond. Although Latvia has so far rebuffed Lithuania’s attempts to join in a cooperative 
Baltic gas project, forthcoming EU regulations will undermine the ability of Latvian energy 
veto players to maintain a monopoly on the market. Lithuania’s energy about face may be 
one reason for Russia’s strong reaction against EU association agreements in Ukraine and 
Moldova: the Lithuanian experience demonstrates that EU aid regimes can significantly 
disrupt Russian investment networks. Although Lithuania itself is a small market, Russia’s 
investments in Ukraine are significant and as demonstrated by the continued separatist war, 
yield considerable foreign policy benefits to the Russian regime. 
 Beyond Europe, the ways in which business actors intersect with policy agendas can 
also generate insights into a greater understanding of Chinese foreign policy. Many of the 
business practices discussed in this project are also used in the Chinese context. China, 
which has no official Ministry of Energy, instead relies on a National Energy Commission as 
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a consultative body with little de facto control over an unwieldy energy sector. As evidenced 
the recent Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) scandals, opaque business 
practices with unnamed intermediaries can result in incoherent state energy policies that 
benefit elites at the expense of the state.482 Understanding how lack of institutional oversight 
and property rights regimes can affect the formation of coherent security policy is crucial in 
the Chinese context. Although there is wide variation in the types of institutions governing 
property rights between Europe and China, the interactive effects between corruption and 
new financial tools may yield similar effects in both regions, ceteris paribus.  
 Evidence from the Hungarian case suggests a new linkage between populism and 
crony capitalism that can have major consequences on both domestic and foreign policy. As 
populist parties rise to prominence in important states like Turkey, India and other states in 
Europe policymakers should be aware of the dangers of rhetorical attacks on “liberal” 
corruption that can facilitate arbitrary replacement of officials with regime insiders. As the 
Hungarian case demonstrates, illiberal populism can swiftly reverse years of institutional 
reform that both expand opportunities for and promote new opportunities for profit for the 
regime. As the effects of a Western liberal crisis over uneven distribution of the benefits of 
globalization continues to spread, attacks on institutions and liberal rule of law traditions 
may become more widespread. Ironically, these new actors often promote an agenda of 
ridding the state of bureaucratic corruption, only to make institutional changes that replace it 
with crony capitalism and kleptocracy. The Hungarian case demonstrates that this can have 
effects far beyond the energy sector. 
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 For years observers have argued that Russia uses its energy as a weapon to punish 
and reward its enemies and allies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Russia was 
weak and seeking to reclaim its identity as a major power, energy was one area where it 
remained an undisputed world leader. But as the Ukraine and Lithuanian examples indicate, 
domestic actors in the downstream state limit Russia’s power by taking advantage of 
competing revenue streams. Public opinion during the Ukraine crises was always anti-
Russian, despite the fact that Putin himself issued statements emphasizing Russia’s 
commitment to remaining a reliable supplier. But subsequent EU legislation seeking to 
weaken Russia’s dominant position in the market only added to the narrative of Russia as a 
victim of Western aggression and sabotage. In response to sanctions targeting Russia’s 
energy industry, Putin exclaimed at a press conference that he had heard from high level US 
officials that it was unfair that Siberia’s immense resources belonged to Russia in its entirety. 
Referring to the colorful image of the Russian bear protecting his taiga, Putin exclaimed, 
“And then, when all the teeth and claws are torn out, the bear will be of no use at all. 
Perhaps they’ll stuff it and that’s all.” 483  As populations grow and resources become 
increasingly scarce, energy security is likely to become more crucial than ever. Given the 
immense untapped resources that lie beneath the Russian bear’s taiga, policymakers and 
academics should seek to understand more fully the ways in which resources inform 
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 The methods used to develop this index are in part based upon the methodology of 
the Energy Institute’s Index of U.S. Energy Security Risk, which was tasked with formulating 
an index of a single number based on a number of metrics. The U.S. Index uses both 
historical and forecast data from the IEA, but does not include many of the measures 
included in our study. While the Energy Institute’s Index focuses on global energy security 
risk in large economies (top 25 economies only), it does not focus on risk based upon a 
single supplier or commodity. However, the Index is useful in that it provides justification 




Normalizing the Metrics into Indexes 
 
 The goal of this index is to provide insights into the levels of energy security in 
consumer states of Russia’s natural gas relative to other countries and over time. Because the 
various metrics are measured in a wide variety of units, it is necessary to transform the data 
into like units that we can then assemble into an index. Each measure presented in Chapter 3 
is given an assigned value on a scale of 1-10 and assigned a weight. Each of the 10 metrics 
produced for each country is then combined to produce an overall energy security risk score 
(on a scale of 0-100) that represents their weighted average. For weighing the metrics, I 
assign relative importance to each category based on Bayesian inference and the methods 
used by the Energy Institute, IEA and the European Commission. 
 
Table B1 below Summarizes the Metrics used in the Index  
 
Metric By Classification Definition Importance 
Weight 
(percent) 
Energy Expenditure Metrics 
Total Share of Natural 
Gas (TPES) 
Sum of production and 
imports subtracting exports 
and storage changes. 
Indicates the degree to 
which an economy is reliant 
on a particular fuel source. 10 
Energy Intensity 
Millions Btu of primary 
energy used in domestic 
economy per $1000 USD of 
real GDP 
Indicates the importance of 
energy as a component of 
economic growth 10 
Energy Dependence Metrics 
Dependence on Russian 
Gas Supplies 
Percentage of dependence 
on Russian gas supplies, 
calculated by share of 
imports from Russia in total 
supply 
Indicates level of supply 





Percentage of Gazprom 
ownership of natural gas 
transmission, distribution 
and storage infrastructure in 
downstream state 
Additional measure of level 
of supply dependence on 
Russian gas 15 
Diversification Metrics  
Reverse Flow 
Presence of reverse flow 
capacity linking state to 
other market (East and 
Central European states 
only) 
Indicates the possibility of 
reverse flow volumes into 
the market 5 
Natural Gas Storage 
Capacity 
Natural gas storage capacity 
as a percentage of annual 
natural gas consumption 
Indicates the level of 
storage capacity of natural 
gas that can be accessed in 
potential supply disruptions  5 
LNG Capacity 
LNG capacity as a 
percentage of annual natural 
gas consumption 
Indicates the capacity of 
LNG facilities that provide 
access to alternate suppliers 5 
Nuclear Power 
Percentage of power 
generation provided by 
nuclear power 
Indicates the percentage of 
power generation provided 
by domestic nuclear power 5 
Renewables 
Percentage of power 
generation provided by 
renewable energy sources 
Indicates the percentage of 
power generation provided 
by domestic renewable 
sources of energy 5 
Contract Data   
Contracts Scale of contract favorability 
Indicates if the natural gas 
contract was favorable to 
consumer or producer state 
based on dollar value and 





Natural Gas in TPES: Percentage total converted to 1-10 
Energy Intensity: Converted to 1-10 scale 
Dependence on Russian Gas Supplies: Percentage Total converted to 1-10 
Ownership of Downstream Infrastructure: Estimation of total percentage Gazprom 
ownership in downstream assets converted to 1-10 
Reverse Flow: Dichotomous Variable 10=No reverse flow 1=Reverse flow; Western 
European Countries Excluded  
Natural Gas Storage Capacity: Percentage of non-storage capacity converted to 1-10 scale 
LNG Capacity: Percentage non-LNG capacity converted to 1-10 scale 
Nuclear Power: Percentage non -Nuclear power converted 1-10 scale 
Renewables: Percentage non-Renewable converted 1-10 scale 
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Contracts: Favorability as a dichotomous variable (0= favorable to consumer, 1=producer) 
multiplied by $value of contract per capita. Contract Value/Cap value calculated by units of 
$736 (to convert to 1-10 scale).  
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Armenia 1996 673 
	
Estonia 1991 528 
Armenia 1997 704.35 
	
Estonia 1993 564.3 
Armenia 2006 694.4 
	
Estonia 2005 587.5 
Armenia 2009 712.7 
	
Estonia 2013 591.25 
Armenia 2014 656.6 
	
Estonia 2016 578 
Armenia 2015 654.8 
	
Finland 1991 500.5 
Austria 1991 345.45 
	
Finland 1994 654.35 
Austria 2004 376 
	
Finland 2012 638.75 
Austria 2012 419.2 
	
Finland 2013 569.45 
Austria 2015 318 
	
Finland 2015 493 
Belarus 1991 591.5 
	
France 1991 390.8 
Belarus 1993 709.75 
	
France 2006 405.95 
Belarus 2001 673.5 
	
France 2008 385.5 
Belarus 2002 669.1 
	
France 2015 384.3 
Belarus 2004 669.55 
	
Georgia 1992 560 
Belarus 2005 674.45 
	
Georgia 2003 524 
Belarus 2006 673.45 
	
Georgia 2004 521 
Belarus 2007 698.3 
	
Georgia 2016 294.65 
Belarus 2010 669.5 
	
Germany 1991 275.5 
Belarus 2011 731.5 
	
Germany 2007 324.9 
Belarus 2015 747.1 
	
Germany 2008 369.7 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 2015 377.85 
	
Germany 2011 354 
Bulgaria 1991 509.5 
	
Germany 2012 359 
Bulgaria 1998 516.4 
	
Germany 2014 365 
Bulgaria 2006 498.85 
	
Germany 2015 342.2 
Bulgaria 2011 525.85 
	
United Kingdom 1999 253.4 
Bulgaria 2012 494.65 
	
United Kingdom 2012 256.8 
Bulgaria 2013 486.5 
	
United Kingdom 2015 236.35 
Bulgaria 2014 488.3 
	
Greece 1998 452.8 
Czech Republic 1991 518 
	
Greece 2014 346.9 
Czech Republic 1998 636.35 
	
Hungary 1991 492 
Czech Republic 2006 506 
	
Hungary 1996 563.95 
Czech Republic 2007 502.5 
	
Hungary 2014 443.25 
Czech Republic 2011 456.45 
	
Hungary 2015 432.65 
Czech Republic 2012 473.5 











Italy 1991 326.1 
	
Serbia 1996 596.6 
Italy 1993 331.85 
	
Serbia 2008 594 
Italy 1996 327.6 
	
Serbia 2013 607.15 
Italy 2000 316.8 
	
Slovakia 1991 520.75 
Italy 2003 323.5 
	
Slovakia 2008 654.5 
Italy 2007 334.95 
	
Slovakia 2013 500 
Italy 2011 320.7 
	
Slovakia 2014 500 
Italy 2013 292.7 
	
Slovenia 1992 531.75 
Italy 2014 288.75 
	
Slovenia 2010 382.65 
Italy 2016 287.7 
	
Slovenia 2013 356.2 
Latvia 1991 499 
	
Turkey 1987 454.45 
Latvia 1996 638.5 
	
Turkey 1996 416.15 
Latvia 2015 590.6 
	
Turkey 1997 391.3 
Lithuania 1991 540.5 
	
Turkey 1998 400.9 
Lithuania 2004 595.1 
	
Turkey 2012 384.35 
Lithuania 2012 597.2 
	
Turkey 2015 355.5 
Lithuania 2013 592.1 
	
Ukraine 1991 570.25 
Lithuania 2014 528.6 
	
Ukraine 1994 593.15 
Lithuania 2015 453.6 
	
Ukraine 1997 602.05 
Macedonia 1991 274.8 
	
Ukraine 1998 598.6 
Macedonia 1997 368.73 
	
Ukraine 2000 600.1 
Macedonia 2012 364.9 
	
Ukraine 2001 588.45 
Moldova 1991 669.2 
	
Ukraine 2002 585.05 
Moldova 2007 703.6 
	
Ukraine 2006 571.45 
Moldova 2012 666 
	
Ukraine 2009 632.35 
Moldova 2015 635.8 
	
Ukraine 2010 562.65 
Netherlands 2000 284.25 
	
Ukraine 2012 546.75 
Netherlands 2003 270 
	
Ukraine 2013 528.45 
Netherlands 2010 272.2 
	
Ukraine 2014 431 
Netherlands 2015 263.8 
	
Ukraine 2015 337 
Poland 1991 529.5 
	 	 	Poland 1993 596.7 
	 	 	Poland 2010 496.3 
	 	 	Poland 2012 464.5 
	 	 	Poland 2014 406 
	 	 	Romania 1991 386.45 
	 	 	Romania 2010 360.2 
	 	 	Romania 2012 334.05 
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